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Abstract
This dissertation studies the impact of behavioral interventions on waste
sorting and energy conservation, two domains where sustained environmen-
tal conservation has the potential to substantially reduce social costs. The
interventions are evaluated by means of field experiments. The first essay in-
vestigates the relative impact of behavioral interventions versus neoclassical
interventions. It finds that interventions that draw on extrinsic motivations
have an immediate and sizable effect on waste sorting behavior, but also that
the average treatment effects attenuate steeply over time. In contrast, the
essay finds equally sizeable yet long-lasting effects of a treatment designed
to increase households’ intrinsic motivation to sort waste. The second essay
analyzes the effect of social learning interventions. It considers two interven-
tions, one aimed at leveraging social learning via role models and a second
one via feedback on the prevalence of organic waste sorting in the house-
hold’s direct vicinity. The essay finds that both interventions increase waste
sorting in the short run, but only the social feedback’s impact is long-lasting.
The third essay analyzes residential energy consumption, and how real-time
disaggregated consumption feedback corrects consumer mistakes in this do-
main. The essay finds this feedback, provided by way of in-home displays,
to reduce household energy consumption. The savings are largest on gas
consumption, and the evidence suggests the effect to reflect reductions in
space heating. The three essays are preceded by an introductory chapter
that introduces the topic of study and the field experimental methodology.
The dissertation closes with a concluding chapter that reviews its contri-




It is strange to reflect on a PhD written for a large part during a worldwide
pandemic. The days on campus with familiar faces seem a long time ago,
with most interactions currently taking place by means of Zoom or simply
by phone. Yet thinking back to the over 6 years I spent at Tilburg Univer-
sity, working towards this PhD, I cannot feel differently than tremendously
grateful for the people that I have met, and the amount I was able to learn.
Before I move forward, I would like to direct some words of gratitude to
those that supported me during this journey.
To start off my words of thanks, I would like to thank PBL (the Nether-
lands Environment Assessment Agency) for the fruitful collaboration and
the generous funding that made my PhD research in Tilburg possible.
Then, of course, a word of thanks to my first supervisor. Daan, you
enabled me to work independently, but always made time for me when I
needed direction. Thank you for the insightful discussions regarding field
experimental design and analysis, and all the comments and feedback you
have provided me with over the years. I am very grateful for the opportunity
to step into the field, and to learn as much as I did.
There are more researchers I would like to thank. I am greatly indebted
to Ben, Jetske, and Kees. Ben, thank you for your insightful comments, and
helping me become a better writer and empirical researcher. Jetske, your
kind words of advice have been extremely valuable to me during this tra-
jectory. Thank you. And Kees, thank you for your perseverance and your
support. You were key in making sure that our display research-project sur-
vived until the very end, and our talks enriched my understanding of energy
research. I also thank all committee members, for their valuable comments
that improved this doctoral thesis and increased its societal relevance.
This thesis bundles three field experiments, and therefore many people
‘from the field’ fulfilled important roles in ensuring that these projects came
to a successful outcome. Regarding the waste management experiments,
I direct a great amount of thanks to everyone involved in the Afval in de
iv
hoogbouw project. Especially, Gijs and Addie for project management, and
Marn, for sharing his insights and his patience handling my email requests.
In addition, special thanks to Cees, for our conversations about psychology.
Regarding the display project, I am grateful to the whole EDA consortium,
and to Ernestine and Erik of Quintens for managing the project. Also the
University of Groningen and Energysense were important partners, that
helped us with the project website and the energy data infrastructure.
During my PhD, I got the opportunity to go on a research visit at the
University of Chicago. I would like to express my gratitude for receiving the
Aart de Zeeuw scholarship, for John allowing me to visit his group, and the
fantastic learning experience that was my research visit. I am also grateful
to Winnie, who provided me with a great place to stay during my time there.
I also thank my cohort of the Research Master for their companionship
over the years. Especially, thank you Dorothee, Laura, Santiago, Oliver,
Thijs, and Sophie – our little group, shirking in practice – for the coffees,
lunches, Columbian food, econometrics consulting and so much more. You
made Tilburg the home it was. Sophie, you were the best office mate one
could have during the PhD. But Albert, my pandemic office mate, you are
a close second. Thank you for helping me out with practical matters at the
office, that greatly reduced stress on my part during busy times.
Thank you to other friends, and family. Thanks to the girls of Novem
Invictae, especially Caroline, Lisanne and Hanna. Your (video) phone calls,
texts, talks over dinners and even flowers have provided me with great sup-
port. But also thanks to Harold and Nicoline. Our diners together reminded
me to not take myself so seriously, and provided a much welcomed distrac-
tion during stressful times. A warm thank you to my family, who have
always provided me with their unconditional support. I feel lucky having
been brought up by parents who always believe in chances and opportunities.
I would not have made it this far without you.
Finally, I would like to thank Marcel. Your idea to invest in a good coffee
machine has been one of the best decisions made during my PhD – especially
since working at home became the norm. On more serious terms, thank you,
so much, for your love and support. You have been by my side from the end
of the Research Master until the very end of the PhD. Surrounded by your
love, this whole trajectory has been a lot easier than it would have been
without. Being with you truly is a grand adventure, and an adventure that
continues, now that this PhD adventure ends.
Mirthe Boomsma
Eindhoven, June 13, 2021
v
Contents
List of Tables x
List of Figures xii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Topic of study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Thesis outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Preview of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 On the relative effectiveness of neoclassical and behavioral
interventions 15
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.1 Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.2 The interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2.3 Timeline of the RCT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.4 Randomization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.5 Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3 Analysis of the decision to sort organic waste . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.1 The persistence in organic waste sorting behavior . . . 36
2.3.2 Identifying the types of households that are likely to
engage in organic waste sorting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4 Estimating the impact of the three interventions on the fre-
quency of waste sorting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4.1 Graphical evidence on the impact of the three inter-
ventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4.2 Parametric analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
vi
CONTENTS
2.4.3 Weight versus frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.5 Treatment effects on households’ perceived desirability and
feasibility of waste sorting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5.1 Testing for treatment-induced survey selection bias . . 56
2.5.2 Treatment effects on the factors affecting waste sorting 59
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3 What do my neighbors do? Leveraging social learning 71
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.2 Design and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.2.1 Background and experimental setting . . . . . . . . . 76
3.2.2 Treatment description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.2.3 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2.4 Data, randomization procedure and treatment balance 91
3.3 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.4.1 Main treatment estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.4.2 Treatment spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.4.3 Treatment heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.4.4 Treatment dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3.4.5 The relationship between usage frequency and weight 122
3.5 Identification of the underlying mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.5.1 Mechanism identification strategy . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.5.2 Selection into the survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.5.3 Identification of the treatment mechanisms . . . . . . 132
3.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.A Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
3.A.1 Supplementary materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
3.A.2 Robustness checks main analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4 The impact of real-time consumption feedback on gas and
electricity use 153
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
4.2 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
4.2.1 Background and Experimental setting . . . . . . . . . 157
4.2.2 Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.2.3 Treatment assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
vii
4.2.5 Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
4.2.6 Treatment Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
4.3 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.3.1 Intention to Treat Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.3.2 Treatment Effect on the Compliers . . . . . . . . . . . 177
4.4 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
4.4.1 Treatment effects on Energy Consumption: ITT esti-
mates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
4.4.2 Treatment effects on Energy Consumption: IV estimates184
4.5 How households interact with the in-home display . . . . . . 187
4.5.1 Selection into the survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
4.5.2 Survey evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
4.7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
4.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
4.A.1 Electricity Consumption Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
4.A.2 Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
5 Concluding remarks and policy implications 209
5.1 Contribution to literature on behavioral interventions . . . . 210
5.2 Implications for Dutch environmental policy . . . . . . . . . . 211
5.2.1 Key factors influencing representativeness of the pop-
ulation and situation for the residential organic waste
sorting interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
5.2.2 Key factors influencing representativeness of the pop-
ulation and situation for the intervention targeting
residential energy conservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
5.2.3 Properly acknowledging and resolving uncertainty in
evidence-based policy making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
5.2.4 Concluding remarks regarding policy lessons . . . . . 227






2.1 Descriptive statistics of the household sample, and treatment
balance tests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2 Factors correlated with households’ usage of the outdoor or-
ganic waste collection facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3 The average impact of the three treatments on the number of
distinct organic waste container usage days per week. . . . . . 48
2.4 The dynamics of the treatment effects, for each month in the
post-intervention period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.5 Impact estimates for households used the organic waste con-
tainers at least once in the month before the start of the
relevant treatment, and those that did not. . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.6 Factors explaining households’ propensity to participate in
either the second of the third survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.7 Treatment effects of the persuasive appeal treatment on the
second and third survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Chapter 3
3.1 Threshold weights of the weekly amount of organic waste de-
posited as used to compute the number of stars in the social
feedback treatment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.2 Summary statistics of the sample characteristics and balance
tests for the treatment groups to be used to estimate the
treatment effects (Tests I – III). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3 Treatment impact estimates for the three main interventions
(Tests I-III). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
x
LIST OF TABLES
3.4 Estimates of the presence of spillovers effects between treated
and non-treated households for the social modelling treatment
(Test IV) and the combined treatment (Test V), respectively. 107
3.5 Results of the spillover test between combined treatment and
social feedback households (Test V) using ANCOVA. . . . . . 112
3.6 Testing for treatment heterogeneity between sorter and non-
sorter households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.7 The impact of the receipt of an extra star on household or-
ganic waste sorting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.8 Analysis of the weekly amount of weight collected in a container.125
3.9 Household characteristics correlated with the propensity to
participate in the survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.10 Treatment effects on indices for five potential treatment me-
diator categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.A1 Balance tests for the household-container clusters to be used
for spillover tests IV and V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
3.A2 Estimates of the main treatment effects (Tests I-III) using
non-linear estimation models (the negative binomial model
and the probit model for the odd- and even-numbered columns,
respectively), aimed at probing the robustness of the treat-
ment estimates obtained using OLS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.A3 The outcomes of testing for multiple hypothesis biases. . . . . 151
Chapter 4
4.1 Balance test on the two meter types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
4.2 The number of households randomised by randomisation date
and location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
4.3 Balance test on the two treatment arms . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
4.4 Correlates of receiving a display. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
4.5 Intention-To-Treat Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
4.6 IV Estimates of Treatment Effect on Compliers . . . . . . . . 185
4.7 Analysis of the decision to respond to the survey invite. . . . 190
4.8 Treatment estimates on reported energy saving behavior . . . 192
4.9 Treatment estimates on household estimated energy charges. 194
4.10 Treatment estimates on Use by Category Score. . . . . . . . . 195
4.11 Treatment estimates on rank of items of the Use by Category
Score. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196




2.1 Timeline of the Randomized Controlled Trial. . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Number of households making their first organic waste dis-
posal by calendar week in the baseline period. . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3 Markov diagram of the shares of households sorting or not-
sorting in each of the months. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 Average frequency of organic waste facilities usage in each of
the three intervention groups, compared to the control group. 43
Chapter 3
3.1 Timeline of the Randomized Controlled Trial. . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2 Visual representation of our two-stage randomization strategy. 88
3.3 Temporal pattern of the average organic waste sorting per-
formance, measured by the number of unique usage days per
week (panel (a)) or by the share of unique user households
per week (panel (b)), in each of the four treatment groups. . 100
3.4 The average number of unique organic waste disposal days per
week of each of the two types of social feedback households
(in the Pure Feedback and in the Mixed Feedback/ Combined
household-container clusters) and of the combined households
(in the Mixed Feedback/ Combined household-container clus-
ters). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.5 The distribution of the amount of organic waste collected in
the containers of the 42 associated household-container clus-
ters in the last month before the start of the social feedback
intervention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
xii
LIST OF FIGURES
3.6 Treatment estimates per month, for the social feedback and
the social modelling interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.A1 Photograph of one of the collective organic waste containers
that were introduced in the research area. . . . . . . . . . . . 143
3.A2 Example of one of the four social modelling flyers. . . . . . . 144
3.A3 Social feedback letter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Chapter 4
4.1 Distribution of Experimental population by postal code 2-
region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
4.2 The Energy In-Home Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.3 Key functions of the energy in-home display . . . . . . . . . . 161
4.4 Number of observations per calendar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.5 Treatment and Control Energy Consumption by Calendar day 180
4.6 The Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the Number
of days after randomisation until display installation. . . . . . 181
4.7 Number of installations by calendar date . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
4.8 Intention-To-Treat Estimates by Heating Quartile . . . . . . . 183
4.10 Treatment effect On Complier (ToC) Estimates by Heating





Behavioral economics has broadened the economist’s view of human deci-
sion making. Actual behavior may deviate from that of ‘homo economi-
cus’ because of bounded self-interest, bounded rationality and bounded self-
control (Mullainathan & Thaler, 2001). This broader perspective provides
economists with new instruments to alter behavior, with better insight into
how traditional policy instruments (such as taxes) would function in actual
markets, and allows for better analysis of the welfare implications of policy
changes (Chetty, 2015). Behavioral economics also offers another rationale
for policy intervention, next to traditional market failures such as external-
ities: the existence of behavioral biases which prevent the efficient outcome
to materialize (Shogren & Taylor, 2008). People may know what is in their
best interest, but they may not be able to commit to their preferred course
of action, resulting in a welfare loss.
The insights of behavioral economics are of great relevance to the field
of environmental economics, where inefficient outcomes are often associated
with substantial environmental and thus social costs. For instance, the be-
havioral economics insight that households are not always selfish is fruitful
ground for policies that appeal to social preferences, which can be harnessed
to induce households to incorporate the environmental costs of their deci-
sions. In addition, the insight that households may not always make ratio-
nal use of all available information highlights the potential of interventions
that help households make decisions that are in line with their preferences.
When behavioral biases induce households to over-consume environmental




In this thesis, I analyze the effects of behavioral interventions on environ-
mental conservation behaviors relevant for policy. Can these interventions
influence household behavior? And if so, is the behavioral change persistent
over time?
1.1 Topic of study
I examine the effectiveness of behavioral interventions in two domains in
which sustained environmental conservation has the potential to substan-
tially reduce social cost: residential waste sorting and residential energy
conservation. If households fail to sort their waste into the reusable and
non-reusable (residual) waste flows, valuable scarce resources are squan-
dered. Non-sorted or contaminated waste flows also increase environmental
pollution. Polluted waste flows may leak into the ground (or into ground
water) when land-filled or processed to compost, but pollutants can also
be emitted to the air in the form of methane and carbon-dioxide in case of
waste incineration (Bijleveld et al., 2021). Residential energy consumption
is associated especially with greenhouse gas emissions, with the amount of
emissions depending on the energy mix employed (Andor et al., 2020).1
The behavioral interventions studied in this thesis capitalize on the
bounded self-interest and bounded rationality of households to induce bet-
ter environmental outcomes. Specifically, in the domain of residential waste
sorting I study the effects of (i) appeals to extrinsic and intrinsic motives,
and (ii) social learning. In the domain of energy conservation, I analyze the
impact of an information treatment in the form of feedback on a household’s
energy consumption.
1.2 Methodology
I provide evidence for the effectiveness of these behavioral interventions by
means of field experiments. Field experiments use random treatment assign-
ment in a setting that captures important characteristics of the real world
(List & Reiley, 2008). Collecting data in the field as opposed to the labora-
tory is expected to make the results similar to those in the policy context and
1In addition to the environmental externality, electricity consumption also yields a
congestion externality. Supply always needs to meet demand, and hence the volatility of
demand makes electricity consumption quite expensive – and especially so during peak
hours. In addition, the sustainability of the energy grid is an important policy matter
due to the shift to wind and sun energy carriers combined with a growing energy demand
(Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands, 2016).
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thus to score high on ecological validity (Roe & Just, 2009). For instance,
both the energy conservation and waste sorting experiments discussed in
this thesis, take place within the household home. The context may be es-
pecially relevant as habits may play an important role in the environmental
behaviors that I analyze. Habits are ingrained behaviors that take place in
a stable context (Verplanken & Aarts, 1999), and field experiments allow
me to research such behaviors in their natural environment. Field experi-
ments have the real-world characteristic in common with observational data.
The advantage of using the experimental approach is the control over the
way households are (randomly) assigned to treatment. This randomization
feature of field experiments enables me to provide credible estimates of the
causal effects of the researched interventions. These causal effects explain
what would happen when these interventions are implemented, compared
to the alternative situation (also referred to as the counterfactual) in which
the policy would not have been implemented.
To examine how experiments can help with the identification of causal
estimates, it is useful to analyze the the fundamental identification problem
in causal inference (Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986).23 The treatment effect (τ)
on individual i can be defined as the change in outcome when she would
receive treatment, compared to the situation where she would not have re-
ceived treatment. Let us use T ∈ {0, 1} to denote an individual’s treatment
status, with T = 1 if the individual is assigned to treatment, and with T = 0
if the individual is assigned to control. Using yij to denote the potential out-
come of individual i if her treatment status would be T = j, j ∈ {0, 1}, the
treatment effect for individual i is τ = yi1 − yi0. Here, the term potential
outcome refers to an outcome that may or may not be observed, as observ-
ing a certain outcome depends on the state of the world— in our case, the
treatment individual i is assigned to. Unfortunately, researchers cannot es-
timate τ directly, as they do not observe how treated individuals’ outcomes
would have been had they not received treatment, nor how control group
individuals’ would have fared had they received the treatment. Researchers
therefore typically estimate β instead (Angrist & Pischke, 2009);
β = E[yi1|T = 1]− E[yi0|T = 0]








2This discussion builds on Duflo et al. (2007); Czibor et al. (2019) that analyze the
causal identification strategy used in field experiments.
3For simplicity, we assume in this example that treatment compliance is perfect.
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The researchers typically estimate (some variant of) the first line, and
thus estimate β as the difference in mean behavior among treatment house-
holds (those i for who T = 1) and control group households (those i for
who T = 0). We can rewrite this equation. By subtracting and also adding
E[yi0|T = 1], we obtain the two new terms shown in the second line. This
rewriting allows us to analyze under what circumstances β = E[τ ], the aver-
age treatment effect (ATE), and when the parameter denotes another causal
parameter of interest, such as the treatment effect on the treated. The first
term, E[yi1 − yi0|T = 1] equals the average treatment effect on the treated
(TOT), while the second term, E[yi0|T = 1]−E[yi0|T = 0] denotes the dif-
ferences in outcomes due to selection bias. This bias arises when households
that ended up in the control group are not identical to those who ended
up in the treatment group. To convince readers that β equals the causal
treatment effect on the treated, the researcher should thus provide a com-
pelling argument of why selection bias is of minor importance, or absent. In
other words, why the potential control outcome is the same for the treated
as for the non-treated households. Yet, as the potential outcome for treat-
ment households in the control state of the world (E[yi0|T = 1]) cannot be
observed, the reader is unable to empirically verify the plausibility of this
assumption.
Random treatment assignment, with sufficiently large sample sizes, solves
the selection problem. In this case, “flipping a coin” to decide who ends up
receiving the treatment results in the treatment and control group being
very similar (if not identical) in terms of the (distribution of) all possible
characteristics – observed, and also unobserved. When successful, random-
ization ensures that the average outcome observed in the control group is
in expectation equal to the average outcome of the treatment group house-
holds, in case they would have not been assigned to treatment (E[yi0|T = 1]
= E[yi0|T = 0]). That means that the selection bias term is zero and the
treatment control difference can directly be interpreted as the causal treat-
ment effect on the treated. When the researcher additionally assumes that
the potential outcomes of an individual is independent of the treatment
status of other individuals, the so-called SUTVA assumption (“Stable Unit
Treatment Value Assumption”; (Angrist et al., 1996)) and that no individual
can select themselves into or out of the treatment during data collection, β
can more generally be interpreted as the average treatment effect (ATE). In
this case, E[yi1|T = 1] − E[yi0|T = 0] = E[yi1 − yi0] and thus the estimate
equals the expected difference in potential outcomes for the experimental
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population (Duflo et al., 2007; Czibor et al., 2019).4
1.3 Thesis outline
The remainder of this thesis is as follows. The second chapter analyzes
the effects of interventions aimed at either providing extrinsic incentives
or at strengthening intrinsic motives. Especially extrinsic incentives, such
as convenience and price incentives, have spurred a vast literature in the
domain of residential waste sorting. Convenience is generally found to be
conducive to higher rates of waste sorting (Hornik et al., 1995; Ferrara &
Missios, 2012; Bucciol et al., 2015), but it is not always easy to facilitate.
This is especially true in urban settings where curbside collection may not be
feasible due to space constraints. Price incentives generally have been found
to be effective (e.g. Fullerton & Kinnaman, 1996; Usui, 2008; Dijkgraaf
& Gradus, 2004; Bel & Gradus, 2016; Bucciol et al., 2015), but the results
vary substantially across studies and with recycling program characteristics.
For instance, Bucciol et al. (2015) argue that curbside collection increases
waste sorting by 15%, an effect that doubles when accompanied with a waste
pricing scheme, while Bel and Gradus (2016) do not find that the existence of
a curbside collection scheme influences waste price elasticity. Consequently,
the role of price incentives and convenience within this context is still a
matter of debate.
Moreover, as price incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation to sort
waste (Frey & Jegen, 2001), residual waste taxation raises concerns about
possible contamination of the recyclable waste flows, and increased dumping
and waste burning practices to evade the pricing scheme (Fullerton & Kin-
naman, 1995). This fear, but also the limited political feasibility of imposing
taxes, has led to persistent barriers in the uptake of direct price incentives.5
Behavioral interventions, especially those that appeal to non-selfish motives,
may not suffer from these limitations, and may be a fruitful alternative, or
complement. The empirical literature on behavioral interventions within
4There are other reasons to favor experiments. For instance, as treatment assignment
does not depend on (a complex function of) covariates, the results might be easier to
replicate. Another reason could be that the more simple analysis methods of experiments
might be more credible, compared to more complex observational methods in which re-
searchers have more degrees of freedom in their choice of analysis. See for a discussion of
these and more arguments, Czibor et al. (2019).
5Note that another difficulty in the implementation of waste taxes could be the costs




the domain of waste sorting is relatively undeveloped, however (Briguglio,
2016). There is thus little evidence of their effect relative to traditional
policy instruments, which will be the topic of investigation of this chapter.
The third chapter examines the potential of social learning to improve
waste sorting. Social learning refers to the process by which new behaviors
can be acquired by observing and imitating others (Bandura & Walters,
1963; Bandura, 1977). This may help households deduce valuable informa-
tion about the act and the (public) benefits of sorting which can elevate
some of the informational constraints found in the literature (Hornik et
al., 1995; Gamba & Oskamp, 1994; Vollaard & van Soest, 2020)6. How-
ever, the peer information might also appeal to reciprocal or conformity
preferences (Goldstein et al., 2008; Schultz et al., 2007), or induce ‘condi-
tional cooperation’ when households respond to the contributions of others
by also choosing to contribute Fischbacher et al. (2001); see also Ostrom
(2009). Applications of social learning, especially social comparisons (see
for example Allcott, 2011b; Allcott & Rogers, 2014), have been shown to
be promising tools to foster behavioral change. However, there are only few
applications in the domain of waste sorting (e.g. Linder et al., 2018; Milford
et al., 2015; Nomura et al., 2011). Chapter three analyzes two applications
of social learning, social feedback and social modeling, using straightforward
paper-based interventions in the waste sorting domain.
The fourth chapter discusses the effect of an intervention aimed at stim-
ulating energy conservation. Within this context, households face a private
monetary incentive to engage in resource conservation, in contrast to the two
earlier chapters addressing sorting of household waste. A large literature has
focused on the energy price incentive, examining effective energy pricing such
as dynamic pricing to smooth energy consumption in and outside of peak
hours and so ease the load for energy production (for an overview, see Price,
2014). Yet, pricing does not seem to be the sole solution to lower private en-
ergy costs and lower environmental costs. Demand is relatively price inelas-
tic without consumption feedback (Jessoe & Rapson, 2014), and households
face several barriers that limit their uptake of energy-saving investments,
even when these are attractively priced (e.g. Allcott & Greenstone, 2012;
Gillingham & Palmer, 2014). An important reason seems to be bounded
rationality. In particular, households apply heuristics when they respond to
energy prices (Ito, 2014), pay less attention to energy costs when these are
6Agents may attribute more weight to imperfect signals provided by their peers com-
pared to their own private information Banerjee (1992); Bikhchandani et al. (1992); see
also Asch (1956).
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not salient (Allcott, 2011a; Sexton, 2015), and have trouble identifying the
large contributors to their energy bill (Attari et al., 2010). Chapter four con-
tributes to the existing work of consumption feedback interventions in the
energy domain designed to limit behavioral barriers (Allcott & Rogers, 2014;
Jessoe & Rapson, 2014; Ito et al., 2018).7 The chapter analyzes the effect of
real-time electricity and gas consumption feedback on energy conservation.
The fifth and final chapter provides some concluding remarks. The first
section discusses how this thesis contributes to the literature on the impact
of behavioral interventions on household habits. The second section analyzes
the relevance of the interventions studied to Dutch environmental policy. It
applies insights of the recent literature on scaling (Al-Ubaydli et al., 2021)
and discusses the generalizability and scalability of the interventions studied
to the Dutch policy context. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion
of the role field experiments may play in evidence-based policy making.
1.4 Preview of results
The findings of the three field experiments discussed in this thesis can be
summarized as follows. I resort to the plural ‘we’ when discussing them
rather than the singular ‘I’, as these three chapters are the result of collab-
orative research efforts. In the second chapter, we find that an appeal to a
household’s intrinsic motives to sort waste induces persistently higher levels
of organic waste sorting. In contrast, we fail to find persistent results for
a treatment offering extrinsic incentives (a reward) or for a treatment that
harnesses reciprocity. An accompanying survey reveals that this treatment
has been effective in stimulating positive attitudes of households towards
at-home organic waste sorting.
In the third chapter, we find that providing neighborhood-level feedback
on the amount of organic waste collected induced households to increase
their waste sorting in both the short as well as in the longer run. Dis-
tributing flyers that depicted the behavior of a ‘social model’ only had a
short-term impact, and we do not find any evidence of adding this leaflet
to the neighborhood-level feedback letter increases the latter’s effectiveness.
An analysis of underlying behavioral determinants reveals a change in house-
hold attitudes in response to the treatments, but we also find evidence for
households to perceive both higher benefits to sorting, and a higher-self
efficacy to sort their organic waste.
7See the meta-reviews by Abrahamse et al. (2005); Darby (2006); Fischer (2008);
Ehrhardt-martinez et al. (2010); Delmas et al. (2013); Karlin et al. (2015).
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In the fourth chapter, we find feedback by way of an in-home display
to reduce household gas consumption by almost 7 percent, and electricity
consumption by about 2 percent. The relatively high gas savings on cold
days suggest that reductions in space heating explain most of the gas savings.
We find evidence that these changes are due to households becoming better
informed of the size of their gas bill. As a result, our findings suggest that
real-time disaggregated consumption feedback may be an effective tool to
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A sizeable share of the pollution generated by consumers and households
is caused by everyday activities that are better described as habits than as
the outcome of continuous utility (re-)optimization (Carrus et al., 2008).
Commuters’ transportation choice, residential energy and water usage, and
household waste recycling are examples of recurring behaviors of which the
desirability, or optimality, is only infrequently (re-)evaluated by the individ-
uals undertaking these activities. From an environmental policy perspective,
the notion that polluting and resource-intensive activities might be habit-
driven implies that even temporary policies can have long-lasting effects –
if they can break old polluting habits and introduce greener ones (Becker &
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CHAPTER 2. ON THE RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF
NEOCLASSICAL AND BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS
Murphy, 1988).
In this paper we experimentally test how to improve improve a specific
type of environmental behavior – increasing households’ propensity to sort
waste, and then especially organic waste sorting. Studying waste sorting is
important from an environmental policy perspective, because recycling helps
reduce resource depletion, as well as the emission of greenhouse gases.1 More
importantly, however, residential waste sorting is very interesting from an
academic perspective because in-house (organic) waste sorting, unlike resi-
dential water or energy conservation, is an activity that is driven by espe-
cially behavior (as opposed to technology) that are largely habit-driven, and
with little (if not zero) private returns. “Technologies” like recycling bins
and kitchen top receptacles can facilitate waste sorting, but by themselves
they can not recycle resources.2 Because behavioral change is indispensable
for improved waste sorting, improving waste sorting provides a strong chal-
lenge for any intervention – as behavior is notoriously difficult to change
(Brandon et al., 2017). But it also holds the promise that if behavior
is changed, it may have changed (semi-)permanently, as waste sorting is
strongly habit-driven.
We test the relative effectiveness of three different interventions by im-
plementing a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) among 1090 households
(or 2254 individuals) living in apartment buildings in downtown Amster-
dam, the Netherlands. The first intervention was targeted at strengthening
people’s attitudes towards waste sorting by providing them with detailed
information on why organic waste sorting is important, together with an
explicit appeal for the recipient household to engage in organic waste sort-
ing. The second intervention consisted of promising households a reward
for proper waste sorting over a three-month period. The third intervention
aimed at improving waste sorting by harnessing reciprocity. Independent
of their past recycling behavior, households in this treatment arm received
a gift, which was accompanied by a (written) appeal to either start or in-
tensify in-house waste sorting. The three treatments differ in the extent to
which they target the recipient household’s intrinsic or extrinsic motivation
1For instance, organic waste sorting helps reduce the emission of greenhouse gases be-
cause the separate treatment of organic waste improves the technical efficiency of residual
waste incineration and because organic waste is an energy source of and by itself (Bijleveld
et al., 2021). It helps reduce resource scarcity because organic waste can be reused to pro-
duce new products such as organic fertilizer (van Dijk & Hultermans, 2020).
2This is in stark contrast to domains of energy and water conservation, where energy-
efficient refrigerators or low-flow shower heads can provide savings without a necessitating
a change in day-to-day usage.
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to sort waste. The first intervention, which we will refer to as the persuasive
appeal treatment, focuses on improving the recipient’s intrinsic motivation
to recycle. As such, it can be classified as a behavioral intervention (or
“nudge”), as it aims to alter people’s behavior without forbidding any op-
tions or significantly changing their economic incentives (Thaler & Sunstein,
2008). The second intervention, which we will refer to as the reward treat-
ment, aims to induce increased waste sorting by improving the activity’s
private cost-benefit ratio. As such it can be viewed as (a specific form of)
a neoclassical policy intervention aimed at providing extrinsic incentives to
sort waste (Lazear, 2000). The third intervention, which we will refer to
as the reciprocity treatment, combines elements of both extrinsic and in-
trinsic incentives as it aims to harness reciprocity to improve waste sorting
outcomes by giving an unconditional gift (Fehr et al., 1993; Rabin, 1993).
As the three interventions’ budgets were roughly the same, this paper can
be viewed as a test regarding the relative cost-effectiveness of neoclassical
versus more behavioral interventions in changing behavior.
We monitor the frequency with which individual households dispose of
their organic waste over a period of 14 months; from at least nine months
before the start of the interventions until three of five months after their
start. We find that all three interventions positively affect waste sorting
behavior in the short run. On average, all three interventions increase the
frequency with which households make use of the collective organic waste
collection facilities by about 20% in the first month after the treatment
has been implemented. This increase is due to a combination of previously
non-sorting households starting to use the waste sorting facilities, and of
already sorting households intensifying their waste sorting activity. We find
that the persuasive appeal treatment is especially effective in inducing non-
sorter households to start sorting, while the gift and reward treatments’
impact is predominantly via intensifying the activity of sorter households.
We also find, however, that the effect is short-lived for both the reward and
the reciprocity treatment. In these two treatments, the frequency of organic
waste disposals falls back to the level as observed in the control group within
8 weeks after the start of the intervention. This is in stark contrast to
the long-lasting impact of the persuasive appeal treatment, as we observe
that the initial improvement in waste sorting activity does not appreciably
depreciate over the five-month post-intervention period for which we have
data.
We also conducted a number of surveys to explore the underlying mecha-
nisms of these differential impacts. Consistent with the observed long-lasting
impact of the persuasive appeal treatment on waste sorting, we find that this
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treatment significantly improved our respondents’ attitude towards the de-
sirability of in-home waste sorting up to six months after the intervention.
We document that the persuasive appeal treatment increased households’
sense of personal responsibility to sort waste, consistent with a model of
morally-motivated behavior (Brekke et al., 2003). We fail to detect any
changes in the perceived personal responsibility to sort waste in response to
either the reciprocity or the reward treatment.
Our study contributes to two strands in the literature. First and fore-
most, we contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of behavioral inter-
ventions, typically referred to as ‘nudges’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), within
the context of environmental behavior. Conveying the message that a change
in behavior can help protect the environment, whether done so in the form
of a moral appeal or by communicating a social norm, has been found to be
effective in reducing households’ consumption of both water and electricity
(see for example Allcott, 2011; Allcott & Rogers, 2014; Ayres et al., 2012;
Ferraro et al., 2011; Ferraro & Price, 2013; Brent et al., 2020), and also
in encouraging households to sort waste (Linder et al., 2018; Abrahamse &
Steg, 2013; Osbaldiston & Schott, 2012; Czajkowski et al., 2017; Nomura et
al., 2011; Alacevich et al., 2020).
Our study is among the few studies that document a behavioral inter-
vention not just having an immediate but also a longer-lasting (or maybe
even permanent) impact on behavior– see Brandon et al. (2017), but also
see Bernedo et al. (2014) and Kesternich et al. (2019) for notable exceptions.
The fact that we observe this longer-run effect in the context of waste sort-
ing is especially interesting because any change in environmental outcomes
is caused predominantly by a change in behavior. This is in stark contrast
to, for example, water and electricity usage, where the adoption of techni-
cally more efficient appliances can result in savings without requiring any
concomitant change in behavior (see for example Stern, 2000; Karlin et al.,
2015; Brandon et al., 2017).
The second strand of literature our paper contributes to is the one on
intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation, and then especially on the relative im-
portance of these factors as drivers of environmental behavior. Both in-
trinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives matter for performance outcomes
in many domains in life – from school achievements to job performance
(Cerasoli et al., 2014).
While the literature on the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation (especially the issue of ‘crowding out’) is quite substantial (for
overviews, see Frey, 1997; Frey & Jegen, 2001; Deci et al., 1999, 2017;
Gneezy et al., 2011; Meier, 2007), little is known about these motivations’
18
2.1. INTRODUCTION
relative effectiveness in steering behavior. Kuvaas et al. (2016) correlate
measures of intrinsic motivation and external incentives on a series of job
performance indicators, and find that the correlation between intrinsic mo-
tivation and work performance was three times stronger than for extrinsic
motivation (see also Kuvaas et al., 2017). And Wrzesniewski et al. (2014)
find that the stronger a recruit’s intrinsic motivation to attend West Point,
the higher the probability of receiving early promotion during the five years
of mandatory service, and the higher the probability of remaining in the
military beyond the mandatory five year period. The opposite was found
for recruits with stronger extrinsic motives to attend West Point. These
insights seem to apply to residential waste management too. Cecere et al.
(2014) analyze the outcomes of a large European-wide survey on waste pre-
vention, and find that households that attach more weight to cost-benefit
considerations and reputational concerns are less likely to care about food
waste prevention.
These correlational studies suggest (but do not prove) that, all else equal,
strengthening people’s intrinsic motivation would be more effective than of-
fering extrinsic incentives. Causal evidence for this conjecture is, however,
scant, especially in the realm of public good provision in which private mon-
etary benefits to conserve are absent. A notable exception is Vollaard and
van Soest (2020), who implemented an RCT to test the impact of three
interventions aimed at improving residential waste sorting. Two of these in-
terventions were aimed at increasing households’ intrinsic motivation. They
consisted of sending out a moral appeal letter about the societal impor-
tance of recycling (i.e., an injunctive social norm intervention; see Ferraro
& Price, 2013), and of a campaign to communicate the local prevalence of
proper waste sorting (i.e., a descriptive social norm intervention; see Gold-
stein et al., 2008). The impacts of these two interventions on residential
recycling rates were then compared to that of a third one: a short but in-
tensive campaign to monitor and enforce proper waste sorting. Vollaard and
van Soest (2020) find that the regulatory crackdown resulted in significant
and substantial increase in the various recyclable waste flows (paper, plas-
tics and organic waste) and a concomitant decrease in the total amount of
residual waste collected. The instantaneous and long-lasting effect of the
enforcement activity is in sharp contrast to the lack of impact, in both the
short and the longer run, of the injunctive and descriptive social norm in-
terventions. Extrinsic incentives thus outperformed the intrinsic motivation
interventions, but the amount of money spent on the enforcement activity
was an order of magnitude larger than the budget for the other two in-
terventions. Our paper complements the work by Vollaard and van Soest
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(2020) in that we test the effectiveness of intrinsic and extrinsic motiva-
tion interventions using equal budgets, providing better insight into not just
interventions’ absolute but also their relative effectiveness.
We are not the first to study waste sorting. There is a series of papers
developing theories on the drivers of recycling behavior, from neoclassical de-
terminants (Fullerton & Kinnaman, 1996) to behavioral determinants such
as as social norms, environmental attitudes and self-image concerns (Viscusi
et al., 2011; Abbott et al., 2013; Brekke et al., 2003; Nyborg et al., 2006;
Brekke et al., 2010). We use the insights provided by these studies to design
our three treatments that differ in the manner they appeal to these two
categories of motives. There is also a fairly large empirical literature ana-
lyzing the importance of neoclassical attributes such as benefits and costs
of sorting (e.g., the presence of waste pricing schemes, and the convenience
of sorting). While convenience is identified as an important factor (Hornik
et al., 1995; Ferrara & Missios, 2012; Bucciol et al., 2015), the role of prices
seems more complex, with results depending on the structural characteris-
tics of the recycling program studied (Bel & Gradus, 2016; Bucciol et al.,
2015). The literature analyzing the effect of behavioral interventions on
waste sorting behavior is much less well-developed (Briguglio, 2016). In a
town in Greater Manchester (United Kingdom), Nomura et al. (2011) ran-
domized the provision of injunctively-framed feedback on residents’ street
food waste recycling rate and found that providing such information resulted
a three percent increase in waste sorting in the three months post treatment.
Milford et al. (2015) analyzed the impact of a similar intervention – provid-
ing information on a household’s individual waste sorting compared to that
of average household in their district – among 6000 households in a city in
the south-east of Norway. Relaying this information, in the form of sending
out two letters nine months apart, resulted in a two percentage point in-
crease in recycling up to (at least) five months after sending out the second
letter. Linder et al. (2018) tested the impact on recycling rates of a so-called
community-based marketing campaign in a Stockholm suburb, aimed at in-
forming households about their fellow residents’ views on waste recycling.
They observed higher recycling rates in the treatment group up to eight
months after the information leaflet had been sent out. We complement
the insights provided by these papers by testing the relative effectiveness of
behavioral and neoclassical interventions in inducing organic waste sorting.
The setup of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we present our ex-
perimental design. In section 3 we analyze which household characteristics
are correlated with the decision to sort organic waste, and in section 4 we
present the treatment effects in both the short and long(er) run. Section 5
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discusses the survey evidence regarding the mechanism via which treatments
affect behavior, and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Experimental design
2.2.1 Setting
We implemented a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) in apartment build-
ings in the city center of Amsterdam. Recycling rates in urban areas are
notoriously low compared to less urbanized or rural areas (Callan & Thomas,
2006; Halvorsen, 2008). Amsterdam is no exception, with recycling rates of
about 16% in 2017, compared to the Dutch average of 50%.3 Waste sort-
ing is driven by a variety of factors, including convenience and feasibility
(Briguglio, 2016). In-house waste sorting typically requires the usage of
a multitude of bins, each intended for the temporary storage of a different
waste stream (such as paper, plastic, organic materials and glass) within the
home, or outdoors on a balcony or in the garden. Effective waste sorting
rates tend to be lower in multi-family dwellings than in single-family houses
because per-capita living surfaces tend to be smaller in the latter, and size-
able outdoor spaces (such as gardens or large balconies) are more likely to
be lacking (Hage et al., 2009; Abbott et al., 2013). Recycling rates thus tend
to be low in highly urbanized areas, and in the case of Amsterdam there are
also no financial incentives for households to engage in waste sorting as the
municipality charges a flat fee for household waste collection.
The city of Amsterdam wanted to learn what types of incentives are most
effective in stimulating organic waste sorting. Recovery of organic waste –
predominantly food waste and leftovers in the case of apartment buildings
– is important because of two reasons. First, because of the environmental
benefits associated with the separate collection of organic material – in the
form of re-use (as compost, but also for the production of energy and biogas;
Hogg et al., 2002), and in the form of savings in the amount of energy used
to incinerate residual waste (as the amount of gas needed for proper incin-
eration tends to be higher the larger the share of (especially humid) organic
waste). Second, because of the financial cost savings recycling yields for
the municipality – these environmental benefits translate, to a considerable
degree, into lower waste management costs.
3Calculated on the basis of data collected by the Netherlands’ Bureau of Statistics
(https://opendata.cbs.nl). The numbers exclude recycling of bulkier household waste
(like chairs, couches and mattresses).
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We partnered with the municipality of Amsterdam to experimentally test
the effectiveness of three interventions aimed at improving organic waste
recycling by households living in apartment buildings. The RCT’s pilot
area is home to 2254 individuals living in 1090 separate households. Prior
to the start of the field experiment households in the pilot area had the
opportunity to sort paper and glass (as is the case virtually everywhere in the
Netherlands), but not organic waste. Ten collective organic waste disposal
containers were scheduled to be placed in the pilot area in November 2016,
and another four in June 2017.4
To ensure that usage of the facilities was restricted to just the residents
of the selected apartment buildings, each container was equipped with an
electronic access card system. The card readers registered both the user’s
identity and date of usage, which allows us to record the frequency with
which each household made use of the collective organic waste sorting fa-
cilities. Our main variable of interest, households’ organic waste sorting
behavior, is thus measured by the frequency with which household members
made use of the outdoor organic waste containers.
At the moment at which the first ten organic waste containers were fully
functional (in the fourth week of November 2016), the municipality sent out
a letter to inform all residents in the apartment buildings about the place-
ment of the new organic waste containers. The letter was accompanied by
an access card as well as by a leaflet that contained information about the
location and usage of the organic waste containers. As the main type of or-
ganic waste produced by households living in apartment buildings is kitchen
waste – consisting of food preparation waste and leftovers – each household
was presented with a kitchen-top organic waste receptacle as well as with a
set of 100 biodegradable bags to line the receptacle with. Households were
also informed that they could replenish their supply of biodegradable plastic
bags for free in a nearby shop. Our data collection started on November 28,
2016 and ended on January 28, 2018, a period of 61 weeks. For an overview
of the timeline of this study, see Figure 2.1.
4At the same time at which the four new organic containers would be placed, one
residual waste container was scheduled to be removed. The reason for this container
phase-in and phase-out is because the municipality wanted to test how walking distance



























Figure 2.1: Timeline of the Randomized Controlled Trial.
2.2.2 The interventions
We aimed to test the relative effectiveness of three interventions on the or-
ganic waste sorting behavior. The three interventions differed in the extent
to which they appealed to households’ intrinsic or extrinsic motivations to
sort waste. The first intervention consisted of sending out two letters, ten
weeks apart, that were designed to strengthen households’ attitudes towards
waste sorting, by emphasizing the positive environmental consequences of
organic waste recycling. The second intervention aimed to harness reci-
procity by offering households an unconditional gift, combined with an ap-
peal to engage in organic waste recycling. The third intervention consisted
of informing households that they would be entitled to receive an in-kind
reward if, in the next three months, they would actively engage in organic
waste recycling. The main variable of interest is the frequency with which
households made use of the apartment buildings’ collective organic waste
collection facilities.5
We will describe the three interventions in more detail in the following
three subsections. Before doing so, we would like to stress the temporary na-
ture of our interventions. Depending on how one evaluates the implementa-
tion process, the length of the interventions were three months (in case of the
reward treatment), ten weeks (in case of the persuasive appeal treatment),
or one day (the reciprocity treatment). We conjecture that temporary in-
centives can have long(er)-run impacts because of three reasons. First, if,
once acquired, waste sorting is a habit (as conjectured by, for example, Car-
rus et al., 2008), temporary incentives may give rise to a permanent change
in behavior (Becker & Murphy, 1988). Second, organic waste sorting may
5Originally the plan was to not only record the frequency with which households use
organic waste containers, but also the weight of each individual disposal. Unfortunately,
at the time that we designed the experiment weighing mechanisms were both unreliable
and very expensive, and hence we decided to only focus on frequency and not on weight.
We will get back to this in section 2.4.3.
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be viewed as an experience good (Nelson, 1970). Especially inconvenience
and hygienic consequences may be attributes of organic waste sorting that
are difficult to properly assess ex ante (Lange et al., 2014; Briguglio, 2016).
If the intervention is able to induce households to start sorting, they may
downward adjust their assessment of these disadvantages of organic waste
sorting, making it more likely that the activity will be sustained. Third, it
may also be the case that the marginal costs of implementing the activity
fall as the household gains more experience with the activity, in the form of
learning by doing (Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995). Whether and to what extent
the three temporary interventions will be able to have long(er)-term impacts
thus depends on whether they are able to induce a short-run improvement
in waste sorting, and also whether the induced effect lasts sufficiently long
for the short-term change in behavior to become long-lasting.6
In addition, we did not only aim to assess the relative effectiveness of
the three interventions in improving waste sorting, but also whether their
effectiveness varies with household types. In other words, we were not only
interested in the average impact of the three interventions in the short- and
in the longer run, but also whether interventions were especially effective
in inducing non-sorters to start sorting, or in inducing sorter-households to
intensify their waste sorting. This distinction may be of key importance for
whether any short-run improvements are likely to have long-lasting effects, as
the scope for affecting behavior via the three mechanisms mentioned above
– habit formation, experience good considerations and learning by doing
effects – is likely to be larger among previously non-sorting households than
among households that were already engaged in the activity.
We will describe the three treatments in more detail in the following
three subsections.
6Note that purchasing waste sorting technologies (like bins and kitchen top receptacles)
can make in-house waste sorting easier to sustain, but also that human input remains
indispensable to have positive sorting rates – household members still need to do the
waste sorting themselves, and they also need to bring the bin’s contents to the collective
organic waste container. This is in sharp contrast to, for example, energy savings, which
can be achieved by changing behavior (switching off lights), purchasing technologies (like
an energy-efficient refrigerator), or both. Because human effort is indispensable for in-
house waste sorting, investing in waste sorting technologies can facilitate long-term waste
sorting, but it cannot be, by itself, a mechanism that causes temporary change in waste
sorting ending up becoming permanent.
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The persuasive appeal treatment
The persuasive appeal treatment consisted of sending out two letters, about
ten weeks apart, that provided information on the positive environmental
benefits associated with waste recycling. The first letter was delivered on
June 20, 2017. It contained information about the societal relevance and
environmental impact of organic waste sorting, and requested households to
sort their organic waste. The importance of recycling behavior was stressed
by mentioning how much biogas and compost had been produced since the
start of organic waste recycling in the area (i.e., since late November 2016;
see Figure 2.1), and how much CO2 had been saved as a result. The letter
also contained a pictogram explaining the recycling process and providing
examples of the products that can be manufactured from recycled organic
waste. This first letter also contained an invitation to visit the municipality’s
waste treatment facility, so that households could see for themselves how
useful and beneficial organic waste sorting is. The second letter was delivered
to the treatment households on September 6, 2017. This letter was aimed
at re-emphasizing the information already provided in the first letter. In
addition, the second letter was accompanied by a tangible result of organic
waste recycling – a small bar of soap made of orange peelings.
The intervention was thus aimed at directly changing people’s attitudes
towards organic waste sorting. As such, it can be characterized as a per-
suasive information treatment, aimed at changing behavior by stimulating
households to think about the issue at hand (Petty & Briñol, 2008; Dellav-
igna & Gentzkow, 2010). The letters provided information that is likely
to be new to many of the recipients – both in terms of the new products
and services that can be produced with recycled organic waste (such as en-
ergy in the form of biogas, and personal hygiene products like soap), as
well as the size of the environmental benefits. This new information may
change people’s perception (or beliefs) of the activity’s environmental bene-
fits (O’Keefe, 2015), which in turn may affect the decision to engage (more
intensively) in waste sorting (Brekke et al., 2003).
The intervention consisted of sending out two letters, about ten weeks
apart. We sent out the second letter to reinforce the message of the first, to
induce households to really take in and process the information. Compared
to more spontaneous forms of information processing (aimed at increasing
the salience of the issue; Bowles & Polańıa-Reyes, 2012), thoughtful informa-
tion processing is more likely to be retained in memory, and hence is likely
to be more effective in the long(er) run (Petty et al., 2002; Petty & Briñol,
2008). By providing households with information about the environmental
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impacts of the organic waste sorting activity in their own neighborhood, we
aimed to increase treatment households’ sense of personal responsibility to
sort (Brekke et al., 2003). Not just the information itself is relevant, but
also the reliability of the sender and the strength of the provided evidence
(Petty et al., 1981). The invitation to visit the municipality’s waste treat-
ment facility – even though it was cancelled because of a lack of interest
– was extended to also enhance (or ensure) the credibility of the provided
information.
The reciprocity treatment
On October 30, 2017, households assigned to the reciprocity treatment re-
ceived a gift – a high-end vegetable cutting board, made of bamboo. The gift
was delivered in their letter boxes, and was accompanied by a letter from
the municipality. In that letter the municipality expressed the hope that
the gift would be perceived as a token of appreciation by those households
that already actively sorted their organic waste, and as an encouragement
to start organic waste sorting by all others. This treatment was intended to
harness reciprocity – presenting households with a gift may instill feelings of
gratitude and possibly indebtedness (Fehr et al., 1993; Rabin, 1993), induc-
ing them to either start or intensify their waste sorting activities. The gift
may also be viewed to signal a high level of trust of the municipality regard-
ing the households’ intentions to implement the desired behavior, which the
recipient may be reluctant to betray (Sherry, 1983).
The role of reciprocity in economic behavior has been studied in a wide
range of contexts from labor market interactions (Akerlof, 1982) to charita-
ble donations (Falk, 2007). A substantial share of humanity is endowed with
reciprocal preferences (including conditional cooperation; see Fischbacher et
al., 2001), and offering up-front and unconditional gifts has been found effec-
tive in stimulating pro-social behaviors such as donations to charities (Falk,
2007) and to nature conservation (Alpizar et al., 2008). Whether and to
what extent one-time gifts result in (semi-) permanent (as opposed to just
transitory) effects, is an open question (cf. Charness et al., 2004; Gneezy &
List, 2006). As argued at the beginning of Section 2.2.2, in the case of waste
sorting temporary interventions may have long-lasting consequences because
waste sorting is habitual, because it is an experience good, and/or because
learning by doing results in lower costs of implementing the activity. In case
of the the reciprocity treatment there may even be a fourth mechanism at
play. If used, the cutting board may be perceived as a constant reminder of





The reward treatment consisted of sending a letter, delivered on October
30, 2017 (the same day as the letter of the reciprocity treatment; see the
timeline in Figure 2.1). The letter announced that the recipient house-
hold would be entitled to receive an in-kind reward – the nature of which
was yet to be disclosed – in the last week of January 2018, conditional on
the household actively engaging in organic waste sorting in the next three
months. The intention was to use the same high-end bamboo cutting board
of the reciprocity treatment as reward in the reward treatment. Due to
unforeseen developments the cutting boards were no longer available, and
the households in the reward treatment ended up receiving a luxury packet
with high-end soap bars (made of recycled organic materials, especially cof-
fee residue) instead. Not disclosing the nature of the reward beforehand
undoubtedly affected the reward’s effectiveness (negatively if the treatment
households dislike uncertainty, or positively if the actual reward ended up
less valuable than expected on beforehand). But it also means that our
study’s integrity was not compromised by the the fact that we were not able
to hand out the intended reward.
The reward treatment is expected to be effective in improving waste
sorting because the prospect of being able to earn a reward improves the
activity’s expected cost-benefit ratio. This may be especially effective among
households with a low intrinsic motivation to sort waste. Compared to a
pay-per-throw scheme (or a piece rate payment), rewards are expected to be
an efficient remuneration scheme. Binary reward schemes can be effective
with less than perfect monitoring (Lazear, 2000), and for the same expected
payment they tend to extract higher effort than piece rate compensation
schemes (Brown, 1992; Parent, 1999). And one-time rewards may have
long(er)-lasting effects in this context because of the habitual nature of waste
7Note that in the reciprocity treatment households received a cutting board, while
households in the persuasive appeal treatment received a piece of soap made of recycled
organic materials. Both the value and the way an item is offered, affect how it is per-
ceived. While in the reciprocity treatment the cutting board was offered with an explicit
reference to the donor’s gratitude for the household’s willingness to consider (improving
their) organic waste sorting, in the persuasive appeal treatment the soap tablet was ex-
plicitly presented as “an example of what useful items can be produced with recycled
organic waste”. Because of that framing, and its near-negligible financial value, we expect
the tablet to have reinforced the message that sorting is important as opposed to have
invoked reciprocity.
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sorting, its experience good characteristics or its learning by doing aspects
(as discussed before), but also because the receipt of a reward may generate
feelings of gratitude and appreciation, resulting in rewards having an impact
beyond the period over which performance is rewarded (Bulte et al., 2021).
2.2.3 Timeline of the RCT
The timeline of this study is summarized in Figure 2.1. The frequency of
usage of the collective waste sorting facilities was recorded from November
28, 2016, to January 28, 2018. The first letter of the persuasive appeal treat-
ment was delivered on June 20, 2017, and the second letter was delivered
about ten weeks later, on September 6, 2017. That means that we have
seven months of pre-intervention data and five months of post-intervention
data for the persuasive appeal treatment.
The letters for the reciprocity and reward treatments were both deliv-
ered on October 30, 2017. The duration of the pre- and post-intervention
periods for the reward and reciprocity treatments were thus eleven and three
months, respectively. We will refer to the two periods in which treatments
took place as intervention period 1 (persuasive appeal treatment) and inter-
vention period 2 (reciprocity and reward treatment). All observations before
the start of intervention period 1 will be referred to the baseline period.8
In addition, we fielded three surveys. Survey I was fielded in May-June
2017, Survey II in September-October 2017, and Survey III in March-April
of 2018. The surveys were intended to provide additional insight into the var-
ious interventions’ underlying mechanisms – did the treatments strengthen
attitudes towards waste sorting, did they induce people to revise their as-
sessment of the inconvenience of waste sorting, etc.? Because of the timing
of the surveys and the interventions, we can assess possible impacts of the
persuasive appeal treatment in the short run (in Survey II) and in the longer
run (in Survey III), while for the reciprocity and reward treatments we can
only assess the short-run impacts (in Survey III).
8The three treatments are thus not implemented in the exact same period. This differ-
ence in timing may result in an unfair comparison of the treatments’ relative effectiveness
if the treatment effect is likely to be season-dependent. For example, if in some periods
there is substantially more organic waste production than in others, the potential effec-
tiveness of any treatment is higher too. While this undoubtedly would be an issue for an
RCT using households living in single family dwellings (because of the strong seasonality
of garden refuse), organic waste sorting by the control group households does not vary




We used stratified-randomization to allocate our 1090 households into the
four treatment groups. The randomization was stratified on households
characteristics that have been documented to be strongly correlated with
waste sorting (Briguglio, 2016) – distance to the nearest organic waste con-
tainer, household size and composition (single adults with and without chil-
dren, non-single adults with children, non-single adults without children)
and observed sorting behavior in the baseline period. Larger families are ex-
pected to produce more (organic) waste, but they may also be more prone to
engage in waste sorting, possibly because waste sorting is subject to increas-
ing returns to scale. Family composition may matter too, as the propensity
to sort seems to increase with age (Vining & Ebreo, 1990), while the pres-
ence of children may strengthen pro-environmental preferences among adult
family members (Dupont, 2004). Finally, the larger the walking distance,
the larger the expected inconvenience of disposing waste at the waste fa-
cilities (Rousta et al., 2015). We also stratified our sample for those 179
households whose walking distance to the nearest organic waste container
would be affected by the phase-in of the four additional organic waste con-
tainers in June 2017, and also for the 39 households whose walking distance
to the nearest residual waste container would be increased, in July 2017,
because of the removal of one residual waste container.9
The last characteristic we stratified on was observed sorting behavior in
the baseline period. We counted the number of times households made use of
the collective organic waste collection facilities in March 2017, and classified
them into three different groups: those with zero usage of the organic waste
collection facilities, and those with above-median and below-median usage
(conditional on having used the organic waste containers at least once).
Using sorting behavior in the baseline period as a stratification variable is
important because of two reasons. First, if waste sorting is indeed a habit,
baseline sorting behavior is likely to be predictive of waste sorting later on.
Stratification on baseline behavior would then enable us to estimate possible
treatment effects with higher precision. Second, it allows us to test whether
the interventions’ main impact, if there is one, is via inducing non-sorting
households to to start sorting, or rather via inducing sorter-households to
step up their game.
9Note that we stratify on the changes in walking distances to mitigate the dependent
variable’s error variance – not because we view the change in walking distance as an
additional treatment. Even though the change in distance is exogenous, the number of
affected households is too small for a properly powered test.
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Table 2.1 presents the characteristics of each of our four treatment groups
(in columns (1)-(4)) as well as those of the overall experimental population
(in column (5)). On average households consisted of two individuals, and
males and females were equally represented across households. There were
relatively few households with young children in our sample (about 3 per-
cent), and about 28 percent of the households had one or more household
members above the age of 65. Apartments either had a balcony or a garden,
but never both. Not surprisingly, 98 percent of the households in our sample
had a balcony, and hence only 2 percent had a garden. More than 90 percent
of the apartments were serviced by an elevator, and hardly any households
had access to a separate storage space. The average walking distance, at
baseline, to the outdoor organic and residual waste containers was about
100 and 75 meters, respectively.
Finally, regarding baseline waste deposit behavior, a little over half of
households made use of the outdoor organic waste collection facilities at
least once in the baseline period (and hence the other half did not even use
them once). On average our sample of households used the organic waste
containers about 0.7 days per week (or about once in every 1.5 weeks).
Defining ‘regular organic sorters’ as those households that made use of the
collective organic waste sorting facilities at least once in every 1.5 weeks, we
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Regarding balance, columns (6)-(8) of Table 2.1 present the differences in
means between each of the three intervention groups and the control group.
According to standard t-tests, only two of these differences are statistically
significant – the shares of households living in an apartment with an above-
median tax value in the reciprocity and reward treatments are significantly
higher than that in the control group (both at p = 0.04). Quantitatively the
differences are small (less than 9 percentage points), and this is confirmed by
the size of the normalized differences, as presented in columns (9)-(11). The
largest normalized differences (in absolute values) are 0.172 (for the shares of
the above-median tax dwellings in the reward and reciprocity treatments),
and hence the absolute values of these (and all other) normalized differences
are well below the conventional cut-off value of 0.25 standard deviations
(Abadie & Imbens, 2011; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009; Imbens & Rubin,
2015).
In addition, we also ran tests on all the bicomparisons – not just treat-
ment versus control for each treatment and for each variable (the 51 tests
shown in columns (6)-(8) and (9)-(11) of Table 2.1), but also of each treat-
ment group versus each of the other two treatment groups (another set of
51 tests; not shown here, but available upon request). Only one of those ad-
ditional 51 bicomparisons turned out to be significantly different from zero.
Households in the persuasive appeal group are significantly more likely to
have a balcony compared to the households in the reward treatment (at
p = 0.09), and hence they are also less likely to have a garden. In short, just
three of the in total 102 bicomparisons were statistically significantly differ-
ent from zero, and the size of the (normalized) differences were quite small.
We thus conclude that our randomization procedure has been successful in
creating treatment groups that are very similar in terms of their observ-
able characteristics – and hence this probably holds for their unobservable
characteristics too.
2.2.5 Power
We thus used stratified random assignment to allocate the 1090 households
in our study to four treatment groups (persuasive appeal, reward, reci-
procity, and control). Because of both financial and statistical reasons each
of the three treatment groups was envisaged to consist of 200 households;
the control group thus consisted of almost 500 households. Because the con-
trol group is used in multiple tests (against each of the three intervention
groups), statistical power is increased if the control mean is estimated with
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more precision; see List et al. (2011).10
Statistical power – the probability of being able to detect a treatment
effect if there is one – does not only depend on the number of observations;
it also depends on the model used to estimate the treatment effects. As
will be explained in more detail in Section 2.4.2, we use a panel fixed-effects
model to estimate the treatment effects. Following Bertrand et al. (2004),
standard errors are clustered at the unit of randomization – the household
– to control for serial correlation. For each test we have about 700 cross-
sectional units (200 households in treatment, and almost 500 in control), for
which we have waste sorting information over a period of 61 weeks. That
means that we have close to 43,000 observations for each individual test, but
the statistical power of the test crucially depends on the serial correlation
in individual households’ waste sorting decisions – oftentimes in a complex
and non-linear fashion (Burlig et al., 2020).11
We used STATA package pcpanel to derive the Minimum Detectable
Effect (MDE) for the persuasive appeal treatment, and also for the reward
and reciprocity treatments. MDEs differ because of the differences in the
number of pre- and post-intervention periods. We used data on observed
waste sorting behavior of all households in the period between November
28, 2016 (the start of the registration of access card usage) and April 2,
2017 (the data available at the time of randomization).We calculated the
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic error component (0.479, having con-
trolled for household fixed effects and for week fixed effects) as well as the
serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term (0.107, assuming an AR(1)
process). The number of cross-sectional units was 700, of which 200 (or
28%) were allocated to the treatment group. The targeted significance level
was 0.05 (two-sided), and the targeted probability of being able to reject
the null of no difference (if there is, in fact, a non-zero treatment effect)
10With three interventions (with equal budgets), the power of the between-group test
is maximized if the number of units in the control group is
√
3 times the number of units
in each of the three treatment groups. Because of budgetary considerations our control
group is 2.5 as large as each of the three intervention groups (rather than the optimal 1.73
times).
11As shown by Burlig et al. (2020), the relationship between power and the level of
serial correlation is complex. On the one hand, higher levels of serial correlation facilitate
detecting differences between pre- and post-intervention observations. On the other hand,
higher levels of serial correlation imply (steeply) declining added benefits of having a
longer time series for each cross-sectional unit, because each extra observation yields less
new information. So the relationship between power and serial correlation is ex-ante
ambiguous. And the same holds for, for example the relationship between power and the
length of the panel.
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was 80 percent. With 41 pre-intervention periods and 20 post-intervention
periods, the Minimum Detectable Effect (MDE) for the persuasive appeal
treatment is an increase in the organic waste facilities’ usage frequency of
0.034 days per week. And with 49 pre-intervention periods and 12 post-
intervention periods, the MDE for the reciprocity and reward treatments
is a 0.040 increase in number of days per week the collective organic waste
sorting facilities are used. These translate into Minimum Detectable Effect
Sizes of 0.071 and 0.084 standard deviations for the persuasive appeal and
the reciprocity/reward treatments, respectively.
2.3 Analysis of the decision to sort organic waste
Before estimating the impact of the three types of interventions on waste
sorting behavior, we analyze which household characteristics are correlated
with the decision to sort organic waste. This analysis is important for two
reasons. First, it can provide insight into the behavioral mechanisms under-
lying waste sorting – once one is engaged in the activity, is the behavior likely
to be permanent, or is the decision to sort much more erratic? And second,
we hypothesize that the three interventions may differ in the extent to which
they are effective in inducing non-sorting households to start sorting, and
maybe also in the extent to which they are able to induce sorter-households
to intensify their waste sorting behavior. This section aims to identify what
types of households are likely to become sorters or non-sorters.
Figure 2.2 provides insight into households’ propensity to start sorting.
It shows, for each week in the baseline period, the number of households
that make their first-ever visit to the organic waste collection facilities in
that specific week. Overall, 53% of the sample accessed a container at least
once in the baseline period, and the vast majority of those did so, for the
first time, in the first two weeks after the facilities became available in the
last week of November, 2016. That suggests that by and large households
either used the facilities in the first few weeks after they became operational,
or they did not use them at all.
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Figure 2.2: Number of households making their first organic waste disposal
by calendar week in the baseline period.
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In the next subsection we take a closer look at the persistence of or-
ganic waste sorting behaviors, and in the second subsection we analyze what
household characteristics are correlated with organic waste sorting activity.
2.3.1 The persistence in organic waste sorting behavior
To assess the persistence of waste sorting behavior, we analyze the con-
ditional probability of a household having made use, at least once, of the
organic waste collection facilities, in three different months: the first month
of the baseline period, the month before the first intervention period, and the
month before the second intervention period. Figure 2.3 demonstrates that
the household’s decision to (not) sort waste is quite persistent. As shown in
the bottom arm of the tree diagram, 73% of households who made use of the
organic waste sorting facilities in the first month of the baseline period, also
used them in the month before the first intervention takes place, five months
later. And again 78% of those households that used the facilities, at least
once, in the month before the start of the first intervention period, also used
them at least once in the month before the start of the second intervention
period.12 And as shown in the top arm of the tree diagram, households
that had not used the organic waste collection facilities in the first month
at baseline, had a 90 percent probability to remain inactive in the month
before the first intervention period 1. And 97% of those households that
had not used the facilities in the month before the first intervention period,
also did not use them in the month before the second intervention.
12Obviously we excluded all those households in this second step of the Markov chain
that had been assigned to the persuasive appeal treatment.
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2.3.2 Identifying the types of households that are likely to
engage in organic waste sorting
We now turn to exploring what characteristics correlate with the decision to
(not) sort waste, for each of the three periods we focused on in the previous
subsection – the first month of the baseline period, the last month before
the start of the first intervention period, and in the last month before the
start of the second intervention period. We aim to uncover what types of
households made use of the facilities as soon as they became available, and
also the characteristics of those households that continued to sort in the
longer run.
The remainder of this subsection is set up as follows. In section 2.3.2 we
present our estimation strategy, and in section 2.3.2 we present the results.
Estimation strategy
Our estimation strategy is as follows. Let us use yi = 1 to denote if household
i made use of the collective organic waste sorting facilities at least once in
the month under consideration, and yi = 0 otherwise. We then estimate the
following model:
y∗i = α+ βXi + εi. (2.1)
In this equation y∗i is a latent variable; if the estimated value is positive
(y∗i > 0), the household is predicted to have made use (at least once) of the
outdoor organic waste sorting facilities in the time period under consider-
ation. Next, Xi is the vector of household characteristics at baseline (i.e.,
prior to the installation of the organic waste sorting facilities). Character-
istics include household size and composition (family size, and whether or
not children below the age of 3 and/ or people over 65 were present in the
household) as well as a set of apartment characteristics (the floor the apart-
ment was located on, the presence of a balcony (as opposed to a garden),
whether the tax value of the apartment was above or below median, as well
as the walking distances, in meters, to the nearest organic and residual waste
containers). Finally, εi is the error term. We estimate his regression using
the Huber/White/sandwich estimator, to correct for heteroscedasticity in
the error term.
Regression results
Table 2.2 presents the regression results of equation (2.1). Column (1) of
this Table identifies the characteristics of the households that made use
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of the organic waste sorting facilities at least once in the first month of
the baseline period. Column (2) shows the estimation results explaining the
sorting decision in just the last month before the start of the first intervention
period (i.e., in the last month of the baseline period), and column (3) does
the same but then for last month before the start of the second intervention
period. Comparing regression coefficients across the three columns of Table
2.2 sheds light on whether specific characteristics induce households to make
use of the facilities at once in the very short run (column (1)), in the short
run (column (2)), or also in the slightly longer run (column (3)). Note that
the number of observations in columns (1) and (2) is 968 (rather than 1090)
because of missing data; the number of observations in column (3) is even
lower because of the exclusion of the households of the persuasive appeal
treatment.
As shown in column (1) of Table 2.2, we find that in the very short
run one-person households are about 18 percentage points less likely to use
the organic waste sorting facilities than multi-person households. Regard-
ing family composition, we do not find evidence for households with small
children to be more or less likely to take up sorting, whereas households
with one or more members of 65 or older, are 12 percentage points more
likely to engage in sorting. The probability to sort increases by about 1.5
percentage point if, at baseline, the organic (residual) waste container is 10
meters closer (farther away).
Comparing the results in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.2 to those in
column (1), we find that with time, the share of households sorting does
not fall substantially over time, and also that the composition of sorter
households does not appreciably change either. As shown at the bottom
of Table 2.2 about 45% of the households make use of the organic waste
sorting facilities at least once in the first month after the facilities became
available. This share drops to 38% in the last month before the start of the
first intervention period, five months later, and to about 34%, another two
months later. Overall, this suggests that the share of sorting households is
fairly constant over time, and certainly so after the novelty of having organic
waste sorting facilities in the neighborhood wears off. And regarding the
characteristics of the households that continue to sort in the longer run, we
see that in columns (2) and (3) they are by and large the same as in column
(1), with the exception of household size (number of household members
and presence of small children).
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1-Person household -0.180∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.0491
(0.037) (0.037) (0.040)
>2 Household members -0.0474 -0.0250 0.00242
(0.044) (0.043) (0.047)
Elderly household 0.123∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.0990∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.044)
Household with kids <3 years -0.0172 -0.188∗∗ -0.180∗∗
(0.097) (0.080) (0.088)
Floor -0.00415 0.00164 -0.000144
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Elevator Access -0.0232 -0.0203 -0.0606
(0.065) (0.065) (0.075)
Home value above median (300k Euro) 0.0464 0.0323 0.0177
(0.033) (0.033) (0.036)
Balcony 0.121 0.114 0.0336
(0.101) (0.101) (0.113)
Distance to nearest organic container in mtr -0.00168∗∗∗ -0.00126∗∗∗ -0.00112∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to nearest residual container in mtr 0.00141∗∗∗ 0.00115∗∗ 0.00112∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Dep. Var. Sample Mean 0.447 0.379 0.344
Observations 968 968 786
Excl. p. appeal treatment N N Y
Model Probit Probit Probit
Container Facilities Change Controls N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.125, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The presented coefficients are average marginal effects of a probit model estimated with robust standard errors. We code a household as
sorting waste in a certain time period if we have observed the household to have disposed organic waste at least once during this period.
Finally, when we analyze the decision to sort in the month before Intervention Period 2 (Column (3)), we exclude households that have
started the persuasive appeal treatment in Intervention Period 1. The nearest container distance variables measure the distances at the
start of the experiment. As 218 households have experienced a shock in nearest container distance in the period leading up to Intervention
Period 2, we estimate effects of the container distance measures controlling for these shocks. We code these controls as indicators that equal
one when a household has experienced a shock in nearest organic or residual container distance respectively.
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2.4 Estimating the impact of the three interven-
tions on the frequency of waste sorting
Having determined the correlates of organic waste sorting, we now turn to
analyzing the effectiveness of the three interventions in increasing house-
holds’ waste sorting activities. We measure the frequency of use as the
number of distinct days per week an household used at least one of the
organic waste containers. That means that this variable takes on values
between 0 and 7, and if we report an average frequency of usage of, say, 0.5,
this means that households use their cards, on average, one day every two
weeks.13
In this section we first present graphical evidence on the (relative) impact
of the three interventions on the frequency with which households make use
of the organic waste sorting facilities, and then we turn to a parametric
analysis.
2.4.1 Graphical evidence on the impact of the three inter-
ventions
Panels (a)-(c) of Figure 2.4 present the frequency with which the outdoor
organic waste sorting facilities were used in, respectively, the persuasive ap-
peal, reciprocity and reward treatments – as well as in the control group.
The frequencies of use of the average household in each of the three inter-
vention groups are depicted using solid lines; the frequency of use by the
average household in the control group is depicted by the light-grey dashed
lines. The vertical dashed lines in each of the three panels mark the end of
the baseline period and/or the start of the intervention period of the treat-
ment under consideration. In case of the reciprocity and reward treatments
(shown in panels (b) and (c) of Figure 2.4, respectively), the two coincide
– the baseline period ends and the intervention period starts on the day at
13Alternatively, we could have used the sheer number of times households used their
card in a specific week. In 92 percent of the cases households swiped their access card just
once on a specific day, suggesting that it is not too important which of the two frequency
measures we use. However, the mean frequency of usage using the sheer number is inflated
by implausibly high numbers of times some households used their cards on a specific day
– the highest number of times a card was swiped on a specific day was 35. Using one’s
card 35 times on one day may reflect highly dedicated waste sorting; it is more likely
that the user’s card malfunctioned. Because the two frequency measures are identical
for 92 percent of the cases and the ‘number of distinct days per week’ measure is more
conservative than ‘the sheer number of times per week’, we use the former in the rest of
the analysis.
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which the letters were delivered to the treatment households (October 30,
2017). The persuasive appeal treatment, however, consisted of two contact
moments, an initial letter on June 20, 2017, and a follow-up letter about ten
weeks later, on September 6, 2017.
Comparing the average sorting frequencies between the treatment groups
and the control group in the baseline period, the temporal patterns are very
similar in all four groups, and also the levels of usage in the three treatment
groups are quite similar to those in the control group – albeit less so for the
households that were yet to receive the reward treatment (see panel (c) of
Figure 2.4). In the baseline period the average frequency of use was 0.45 days
per week (or once every 2.2 weeks). The frequency dropped substantially
during the Summer period (starting mid July 2017), and did not fully bounce
back to the pre-summer level in the Fall (as evidenced from the time pattern
of the control group).
Comparing usage frequencies in the intervention and control groups, pan-
els (a)-(c) of Figure 2.4 suggests that all three interventions were effective in
increasing organic waste sorting frequencies compared to the control group.
Interestingly, the first letter that was sent out as part of the persuasive ap-
peal treatment did not have any impact on waste sorting, while the second
letter’s impact is quite considerable. Whether this difference is caused by
the content of the second letter having been more effective than that of the
first or by the fact that the timing of the first letter was, in retrospect, un-
fortunate (as it was sent out just before the start of the Summer holidays),
is an open question.
42
2.4. ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE THREE INTERVENTIONS
ON THE FREQUENCY OF WASTE SORTING
(a) Persuasive appeal treatment versus the control group.
(b) Reciprocity treatment versus the control group.
(c) Reward treatment versus the control group.
Figure 2.4: Average frequency of organic waste facilities usage in each of the
three intervention groups, compared to the control group (dashed line).
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Regarding the relative effectiveness of the three interventions, Figure 2.4
suggests that the short-term impacts of the three treatments are quite similar
– at least when taking the arrival of the second letter as the starting point of
the persuasive appeal treatment. Yet the panels also suggest that the longer-
run dynamics are quite different. Whereas the effect of the persuasive appeal
treatment seems to be fairly stable over its five-month (post-) intervention
period, the impacts of the reciprocity and reward treatments seem to decline
over time. In the next subsections we analyze these patterns in more detail.
2.4.2 Parametric analysis
We use difference-in-difference regression models to estimate the short- and
long(er)-run effectiveness of our three interventions in inducing waste sort-
ing. We present our estimation strategy in Section 2.4.2, and the regression
results in Section 2.4.2.
Estimation strategy
We use three different regression specifications. The standard intention-to-
treat (ITT) model, to be estimated for each treatment j separately (j ∈
{Appeal, Rew,Recip}), is:
yit = αi + γt +
∑
p={1,2}
βjp T ji I
jp
t + εit. (2.2)
Here, yit is the number of distinct days in week t household i made use
of the outdoor organic waste collection facilities. Next, αi and γt are respec-
tively the household and week fixed effects, and T ji is a dummy variable that
takes on a value of one if household i was assigned to treatment j under con-
sideration, and zero otherwise. We estimate the average treatment effect for
two different subperiods. We do so because we have data up to five months
after the completion of the persuasive appeal treatment, whereas we only
have three months of post-intervention data for the reward and reciprocity





for all weeks t in months 1-3 after the completion of intervention j (and zero
otherwise), and Ij1t equals 1 for all t in months 4 and 5 since the completion
of that treatment (and zero otherwise).14 Our key parameter of interest is
βj1, j ∈ {Appeal, Rew,Recip}, as this coefficient captures the average size
of the treatment effect over the three-month period since the completion
14Note that Ij2t = 0 for all t for the reward and reciprocity treatments, but not for the
persuasive appeal treatment.
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of the treatment rollout. We are also interested in βAppeal2, as it captures
the longer-run impact of the persuasive appeal treatment. Finally, εit is
the error term, which is clustered at the unit of randomization – i.e., the
household level – to account for serial correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004).
We estimate equation (2.2) using OLS. Our dependent variable can take
on values between 0 and 7, and hence, strictly speaking, we are not allowed
to use OLS. As a robustness check we re-estimate the treatment effects
using a negative binomial model.15 Following Allison and Waterman (2002),
we include both household and week fixed effects by directly estimating
household- and week-specific intercepts. The estimated treatment effects are
reported as incidence ratios, and hence they reflect the percentage difference
in the dependent variable between the treatment and control households in
the post-intervention subperiod of interest, and in the control group.
We also estimate two other versions of equation (2.2). The first al-
ternative specification aims to provide better insight into the dynamics of
the treatment effects, by estimating them separately for each of the post-
intervention months. Equation (2.3) is identical to equation (2.2), except
that it estimates the average treatment effects of each of the three interven-
tions for each of the post-intervention months for which we have data:
yit = αi + γt +
∑
m
βjm T ji I
jm
t + εit. (2.3)
Using m to index each month in the intervention period, Imt equals 1 if
week t falls in the mth month after the completion of the intervention, and
zero otherwise. Note that equation (2.3) is estimated using m ∈ {1, .., 5} for
the persuasive appeal treatment, and with m ∈ {1, 2, 3} for the reciprocity
and reward treatments.
The second modification we implement aims to provide insight into pos-
sible heterogeneous treatment effects. If effective, does a treatment im-
prove average waste sorting because it induces intensification of waste sort-
ing among households that were already actively sorting their waste in the
baseline period, or because it induces previously non-sorting households to
15We use a negative binomial model rather than a Poisson model because the latter
assumes that the dependent variable’s variance is equal to its mean. In this study the
assumption is not likely to be met because of the fairly large number of non-sorting
households (i.e., those with zero organic waste disposal per week). The presence of a large
number of zeros is likely to give rise to overdispersion – the variance in the dependent
variable is larger than the mean. The negative binomial does not require equal mean and
variance, and hence the negative binomial model is the preferred approach (Cameron &
Trivedi, 2013).
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start sorting? We test for heterogeneous impacts of the treatments by allow-
ing the treatment effects to differ among the (at baseline) sorter households
and the non-sorting households. To this end, we re-estimate equation (2.3)
on sample splits of households based on their sorting activity in the month
before treatment.
Finally, two remarks are in order regarding our empirical specification.
First, note that equations (2.2) and (2.3) yield intention-to-treat (ITT) es-
timates, whereas it would also be very relevant to estimate the treatment
on the treated (TOT). All three treatments were implemented by means of
letters, but unfortunately we have no information on whether the recipients
actually read them. In case of the reciprocity treatment, we can be quite sure
that the ITT is, in fact, equal to the TOT. The gift, the high-end cutting
board, was small enough to fit in the letterboxes, and it is quite likely that
the recipient households were curious enough to open the package. For the
other two treatments it is less likely that all households actually opened the
letter(s), so the TOT is expected to differ from the ITT. Unfortunately we
are unable to estimate the TOT because we have no information on which
households opened the letters. Second, our treatment estimates are unbi-
ased if treatment spillovers are absent. While our RCT’s sample size too
small for us to implement a two-stage randomization design to test whether
spillovers are indeed present (Hudgens & Halloran, 2008; Baird et al., 2018),
we were able to do so in a companion RCT (Boomsma & van Soest, 2020),
in a different city but with similar interventions and much larger sample
sizes. As we did not find any evidence of spillovers in that companion study,
we are quite confident that spillovers are not likely to be substantial in the
present study either. In any case, if we are incorrect and spillovers were non-
negligible, our results would be lower-bound estimates of the true treatment
effects.
Results
The regression results of equation (2.2) are presented in Columns (1)-(3)
of Table 2.3. Column (1) of this table shows that the persuasive appeal
treatment’s impact is about 0.07 extra disposal days in the first three months
after the end of the persuasive appeal treatment (p = 0.126), and 0.10 in
months 4 and 5 (p = 0.034). Both impact estimates are well above our
RCT’s Minimum Detectable Effect (MDE). The impact thus increases over
time, and only becomes statistically significant at conventional significance
levels in the second subperiod. Compared to the average number of usage
days of about 0.35 in the control group (see the bottom panel of the table),
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the 0.07 extra days per week in the first three months imply a 20 percent
increase in organic waste sorting compared to the control group, and the
0.10 extra days in months 4 and 5 translate into a more than 30 percent
increase compared to the control group – or an increase in the frequency
from one day in every 3.3 weeks to one day in every 2.3 weeks.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.3 show that the reciprocity and reward
treatments had a very similar effect on waste sorting behavior; the frequency
of use of the organic waste facilities increased by between 0.045 and 0.048
extra days per week (compared to an MDE of 0.04). This constitutes a
percentage change of about 14%, or an increase from using the facilities one
day every 3.3 weeks to one day every 2.6 weeks. This effect is significantly
different from zero (at p < 0.10) for the reward treatment, and it only
just fails to be significant (p = 0.11) for the reciprocity treatment. When
combining all four treatment groups in one single regression (see column (4)
in Table 2.3), we obtain essentially the same results as in columns (1)-(3).
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 2.3 are obtained using OLS while, strictly
speaking, they should have been estimated using a negative binomial model.
Column (5) shows the results of this robustness check. The coefficients pre-
sented are incidence ratios, and hence they capture the percentage change
in behavior compared to that in the control group. The treatment effects
of the first three months of the persuasive appeal, reciprocity and reward
treatments are estimated to reflect a 17, 15 and 16 percent increase with
respect to the mean usage frequency of the control group. Moreover, the
effects during the fourth and fifth month of the persuasive appeal treatment
are estimated to reflect a 32 percent increase. The results are very similar
to the earlier findings of the linear model. We therefore stick to our linear
modeling strategy in the remainder of this paper.
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Table 2.3: The average impact of the three treatments on the number of
distinct organic waste container usage days per week.
Coefficients reported as: Linear Marginal Effects Incidence Ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Disposal days Disposal days Disposal days Disposal days Disposal days
Persuasive Appeal Treatment Month 1-3 0.0678 0.0597 1.167
(0.0443) (0.0427) (0.122)
Persuasive Appeal Treatment Month 4-5 0.1000∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 1.321∗∗
(0.0471) (0.0461) (0.150)
Reciprocity Treatment Month 1-3 0.0452+ 0.0464∗ 1.148∗
(0.0276) (0.0272) (0.0810)
Reward Treatment Month 1-3 0.0484∗ 0.0495∗ 1.159∗∗
(0.0280) (0.0276) (0.0816)
Constant 0.436∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗
(0.0248) (0.0243) (0.0248) (0.0194) (0.0389)
Control mean month 1-3 (P.appeal) 0.345 0.345 0.345
Control mean month 4-5 (P.appeal) 0.318 0.318 0.318
Control mean month 1-3 (Recipr/Reward) 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.323
R2 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.007
Number of hh (N) 690 688 688 1090 1090
Observations (N × T) 42090 41968 41968 66490 66490
Dependent variable is the number of organic disposal days per week. Standard errors, clustered at the household level, in parentheses. All specifications
include household- and week- fixed effects. The negative binomial is estimated using unconditional fixed effects (that is, household identifiers are included
as dummy variables in the estimation). +p < 0.125, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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The effect sizes are considerable (at least in percentage terms) and not
very different between the three interventions – at least not in the first
three months after the implementation. But the post-intervention period
averages may hide important temporal patterns. In Table 2.4 we present
the regression results when estimating the average treatment effects for each
of the post-intervention months; see equation (2.3).
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Table 2.4: The dynamics of the treatment effects, for each month in the
post-intervention period.
Persuasive Appeal Reciprocity Reward
(1) (2) (3)
Disposal days Disposal days Disposal days
Treatment × Month 1 0.0718 0.0697∗∗ 0.0792∗∗
(0.0493) (0.0311) (0.0315)
Treatment × Month 2 0.0639 0.0481 0.0450
(0.0473) (0.0316) (0.0322)
Treatment × Month 3 0.0676 0.0178 0.0210
(0.0458) (0.0323) (0.0331)
Treatment × Month 4 0.109∗∗
(0.0486)
Treatment × Month 5 0.0906∗
(0.0482)
Constant 0.436∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(0.0248) (0.0243) (0.0248)
R2 0.008 0.009 0.010
Number of hh (N) 690 688 688
Observations (N × T) 42090 41968 41968
Dependent variable is the number of organic disposal days per week. Standard errors, clus-
tered at the household level, in parentheses. +p < 0.125, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Column (1) of Table 2.4 shows that indeed the immediate impact of
the persuasive appeal treatment is sizeable (albeit that the standard error
is quite considerable too, resulting in a p−value of 0.146 in month 1), but
also that the impact actually increases over the interaction period. This is
in marked contrast to the treatment effects for the reciprocity and reward
treatments (shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.4, respectively). These
are statistically significantly different from zero in the first post-treatment
month, but then they actually drop sharply over time.16
We thus document that the initial impact of the three interventions is
roughly similar, but also that the persuasive appeal treatment still remains
effective up to five months after completion of the intervention. Because
the budgets were roughly the same for each of the three interventions, the
persuasive appeal treatment is thus found to be the most cost-effective one.
Note, however, that this conclusion is reinforced when taking into account
that the fixed costs of designing this intervention were relatively high while
the variable costs were quite low, whereas the opposite is true for the reci-
procity and reward interventions. When scaled up, the persuasive appeal
treatment is thus likely to become even more cost-effective.
So why is it that the persuasive appeal treatment is more effective than
the reciprocity and reward treatments? One possible reason is that gifts and
rewards are simply less effective than interventions aimed at strengthening
people’s attitudes toward waste sorting. But another reason may be that
these treatments operate on different types of people that make up differen-
tial shares of the population. For example, it may be the case that the one
treatment predominantly encouraged non-sorting households to start sorting
their organic waste, while the other may have induced households that al-
ready engaged in sorting, to intensify sorting. We test this using a simplified
16These results clearly indicate that the reciprocity treatment’s impact is quite transi-
tory at best. However, we cannot be so sure about the reward treatment. The results
presented in Table 2.4 indicate that the impact of the prospect of a reward extinguishes
before the completion of the evaluation period. If households are rational (as posited by
neoclassical economics, the actual receipt of the reward (by those that did well) should not
affect their behavior in the post-evaluation period. However, as suggested in section 2.2.2,
the receipt of the reward may instill feelings of gratitude, possibly inducing households
that received the reward, to continue to sort better. We cannot test this because the mu-
nicipality shut down the access card registration system because of privacy considerations.
so we do not have any information on households’ behavior after (not) having received
the reward. However, because the behavior in the third evaluation month of the reward
treatment is not significantly different from that of the control group in that same month,
the reward is very similar as a gift to those households that are sorting well. We fail
to find a long-lasting effect of the gift (also for that subgroup of sorter households), and
hence the long-run consequences of the reward treatment are unlikely to be substantive.
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version of equation (2.3) in which months two and three are pooled, and also
months four and five. We estimate these treatment effects by sample splits
based on pre-treatment sorting behavior (sorters versus nonsorters), defining
‘sorters’ as those households that made use of the organic waste containers
at least once in the last month prior to the start of the treatment.
Table 2.5 presents the average treatment effects for the two subgroups
for the three different subperiods. The results are quite striking. Columns
(1) and (2) of Table 2.5 show that the persuasive appeal treatment was
especially effective in changing the behavior of those households that had
not made use of the collective organic waste sorting facilities in the month
prior to the start of the intervention. In other words, the persuasive appeal
treatment induced non-sorting households to start sorting, and it was by and
large ineffective in intensifying the waste sorting activities of households that
were already actively sorting their waste in the month prior to the start of
the intervention.
The patterns in the reciprocity and reward interventions are markedly
different; see columns (3)-(6) in Table 2.5. As expected on the basis of
Table 2.4, the treatment impacts were very short-lived (as they are only
found to be effective in changing behavior in the first month after receipt of
the letter). But columns (3)-(6) in Table 2.5 also reveal that they were only
able to change the behavior of those households that were already actively
sorting their organic waste. In other words, they were able to induce sorter-
households to intensify their sorting behavior (albeit only very temporarily),
and they were by and large ineffective in inducing non-sorter households to
start sorting.
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Table 2.5: Impact estimates for households used the organic waste containers
at least once in the month before the start of the relevant treatment, and
those that did not.
Persuasive Appeal Reciprocity Reward
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sorter Non-Sorter Sorter Non-Sorter Sorter Non-Sorter
Treatment × Month 1 0.0484 0.0831 0.138∗ 0.0388 0.154∗ 0.0314
(0.0898) (0.0566) (0.0767) (0.0270) (0.0781) (0.0206)
Treatment × Month 2-3 0.0266 0.0871+ 0.0796 0.0115 0.0650 0.0150
(0.0759) (0.0542) (0.0762) (0.0237) (0.0745) (0.0227)
Treatment × Month 4-5 0.100 0.0963∗
(0.0867) (0.0533)
Constant 0.870∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.904∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗
(0.0538) (0.0221) (0.0542) (0.0240) (0.0556) (0.0241)
R2 0.020 0.021 0.012 0.045 0.013 0.043
Number of hh (N) 262 428 219 469 228 460
Observations (N × T) 15982 26108 13359 28609 13908 28060
Standard errors, clustered at the household level, in parentheses. +p < 0.125, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
2.4.3 Weight versus frequency
We thus documented that the three treatments were able to – at least tem-
porarily – increase the frequency with which households made use of the
organic waste sorting facilities. However, from an environmental perspec-
tive, it is not the frequency per se that is of interest, but the total amount of
organic waste deposited. Intuitively, an increase in the frequency with which
households make use of the organic waste sorting facilities is likely to also
result in an increase in the amount of organic collected. This is obviously
true for non-sorting households that were induced to start sorting. But it is
also plausible that the increased frequency of use by the sorter households
reflects an intensification of organic waste sorting. This is the case if ei-
ther the sorter household maintained the same recycling process (in which
case the increased frequency reflects a proportional increase in the waste
deposited), or they invested in the purchase of (likely larger) in-house waste
receptacles (implying that the observed percentage increase in the frequency
of use is an underestimate of the actual increase in weight).
As already stated in footnote 5, at the time of the setup of the RCT the
technology to weigh individual deposits was both very expensive as well as
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not sufficiently accurate for the municipality to be willing to purchase a per-
deposit weighing technology for each organic waste container. However, in a
companion study we were able to test the impact of behavioral interventions
not just on the frequency with which organic waste was deposited, but also
the average weight of the deposits; see Boomsma and van Soest (2020). The
companion RCT was implemented in predominantly apartment buildings in
the city of Schiedam (also located in the highly urbanized western part of
the Netherlands). We were able to measure the weight consequences of the
behavioral interventions in Schiedam because of a much larger sample size
– 4000 households making use of 42 collective organic waste containers (as
opposed to the current study’s 1090 households making use of 10 collective
organic waste containers). The larger sample size allowed us to implement
a cluster-randomized design with treatments being assigned at the level of
households making use of the same container (rather than individual-level
assignment). That means that we were able to compare the weights of
containers assigned to different treatments. We did not find any evidence for
the average weight of a deposit being reduced as a result of any of the three
behavioral interventions we implemented; if anything, the average weight
seemed to have been increased. That means that in that companion RCT,
the percentage change in the frequency of use was a lower-bound estimate
of the percentage increase in the weight collected. Although these results
were obtained from an RCT in a different municipality and with different
behavioral interventions, they provide suggestive evidence that behavioral
treatments can affect the frequency of use without decreasing the per-deposit
weight, and hence that the percentage changes in the frequency of waste
sorting in this study are likely to be lower-bound estimates of the treatments’
impacts in terms of weight.
2.5 Treatment effects on households’ perceived de-
sirability and feasibility of waste sorting
We thus find that the persuasive appeal treatment had a long-lasting effect
on organic waste sorting behavior, and that the impacts of the reciprocity
and reward treatments were rather short-lived. In this section we aim to
identify the underlying mechanisms – did the persuasive appeal treatment
indeed result in a non-transitory increase in the motivation to sort (or in the
attitude towards organic waste sorting), and is there no appreciable impact
of the reciprocity and reward treatments on motivation? Or worse, is there
evidence of especially the reward treatment actually reducing the motivation
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to sort – as predicted by motivational crowding theory (Deci et al., 1999;
Frey & Jegen, 2001; Gneezy et al., 2011)? After all, a non-negligible share of
the households in our RCT seem to have been intrinsically motivated to sort
waste, as almost 30 percent of them could be labelled as ‘sorter households’
in the baseline period.
To shed light on these issues we conducted a series of surveys; see also
Section 2.2.3 and Figure 2.1. The first survey was implemented in May-June
2017, and two follow-up surveys were fielded during periods of a little over
two weeks in September-October 2017 and in March-April 2018. The timing
of the follow-up surveys was such that for the persuasive appeal treatment,
we can measure both the short- and the longer-run impact of the intervention
on households’ motivation to sort, as the roll-out of the intervention itself
was completed in early September 2017; see Figure 2.1. For the reward and
reciprocity treatments, the final survey was implemented four months after
the start of the interventions, and hence one month after the end of the
reward treatment’s evaluation period. All three surveys had a similar setup,
and included questions eliciting households’ attitudes towards waste sorting,
their beliefs about the necessity or usefulness of organic waste sorting, their
self-efficacy, their perception of how (in)convenient waste sorting is, and
whether they perceived waste sorting to be a social norm.
All 1090 households in our RCT were invited to participate in each of
the three surveys. However, not all households accepted the invitation. The
number of responding households declined from 286 for the first survey, to
212 for the second, and to 199 for the third. Although response rates are
decent (more than 25% of the households responded to the first survey, and
still about 18% responded to the third), identifying the treatment effects
poses a challenge for three reasons. First, the total number of respondents
is still very limited especially for the second and the third survey. Second,
households that participated in one survey did not necessarily accept to
also participate in the next. More specifically, of the households that partic-
ipated in the first survey, about 60 percent participated in the second survey,
and about the same percentage responded to the third. We thus have more
statistical power when analyzing the cross-section of all households that re-
sponded to a particular survey (either the second, or the third) than when
analyzing a panel excluding all survey responses of households that failed
to participate in the previous survey. And third, we are severely hampered
by (our survey company’s interpretation of) the European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that came into effect in April 2016.
According to our survey firm, informed consent was needed to be allowed
to match survey respondents to the waste sorting frequency data and to the
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municipality registers. Because very few households gave consent, we are
unable to properly control for biases in survey responses due to potentially
treatment-induced non-random selection into the survey.17 We can, how-
ever, use the data of the households that gave explicit consent to test for
treatment-induced selection into the survey.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. We first test whether treatment
status affects the propensity to participate in the survey. This is an (albeit
weak) test of the internal validity of our survey analysis. Second, we explore
whether treatment status affects survey responses by means of simple cross-
sectional analyses.
2.5.1 Testing for treatment-induced survey selection bias
Selection into a survey is unlikely to be random. Some households are more
likely to be willing to participate than others – because some have more
time to do so than others, or because the survey’s topic is more appealing
to some than to others. That means that the survey responses may not
be representative of the opinions, motivations and preferences held by the
participants in the RCT. However, if the decision to participate in the survey
is independent of treatment status, the estimates of the treatment effects on
survey responses are unbiased for the subgroup of respondents (Gerber &
Green, 2012). In other words, the analysis is still internally valid, albeit
that any statement about the treatment impacts is only valid for the subset
of households that were willing to participate in the survey.
As already stated in the introduction to this section, the analysis of
selection into the survey is complicated because of (our survey company’s
interpretation of) the GDPR. Although we have access to the municipality’s
register for all 1090 households in the RCT, we can only assess the drivers
of selection into the survey for those households that consented to us linking
the survey data to the register and waste deposit data – about half of the
respondents in both the second and the third survey.
The results of the selection tests are presented in Table 2.6. Tests are
based on linear probability regression models estimated using OLS, with the
dependent variable being whether or not the household participated in either
the second or the third survey.18 Columns (1a)-(1c) of this table present the
17One way to correct for selection biases is to run a Heckman selection model, which
tests whether households that are more likely to participate in a survey tend to have more
positive or more negative responses on individual survey questions; see Heckman (1979).
18We use OLS and not probit because of the issues associated with properly calculating
the marginal effects in non-linear models; see Ai and Norton (2003). Conclusions regarding
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results of three different specifications of the analysis of the factors that
drive selection into the second survey. At the time of the second survey
the only intervention that had been implemented was the persuasive appeal
treatment, and hence the treatment indicator distinguishes those households
that had received the persuasive appeal treatment from those households
that had not received any intervention yet – all households from the control
group that participated in the survey, as well as those from the reciprocity
and reward treatment groups. At the time of the third survey all three
interventions had been completed In columns (2a)–(2c) of Table 2.6 we test
whether having received the persuasive appeal treatment affected selection
into the third survey (as compared to the households in the control group),
and in columns (3a)-(3c) we do the same for the combined reward and
reciprocity treatments.19 Finally, note that the a-column of each series of
analyses (i.e., columns (1a), (2a) and (3a)) includes all possible covariates,
the b-column only includes the covariates that showed up significantly in the
associated a-column (as well as the treatment indicator), and the c-column
presents the results of the set of significant coefficients interacted with the
treatment indicator.
the outcomes of all models without interaction effects are robust to re-estimating them
using probit, and hence the OLS regressions are likely to provide reliable estimates for the
models with interactions terms as well.
19The latter analysis thus tests for the pooled effect of treatment-induced selection into
the survey, and we do so for two reasons. First, the number of respondents is too low to
test for differential impacts. Second, we also believe that pooling the two treatments is
not likely to severely bias the results, because the treatments seemed to have been fairly






































































Table 2.6: Factors explaining households’ propensity to participate in either the second of the third survey.
Survey II respondent
Persuasive Appeal (T) vs. Control
Survey III respondent
Persuasive Appeal (T) vs. Control
Survey III respondent
Reciprocity/Reward (T) vs. Control
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c)
1 person hh -0.027 -0.050∗ 0.006
(0.023) (0.026) (0.023)
>2 hh members -0.007 -0.064 0.026
(0.040) (0.042) (0.038)
Children -0.016 0.052 -0.002
(0.039) (0.043) (0.037)
Elderly hh 0.053∗ 0.042∗ 0.052∗ 0.039 0.026 0.031 0.058∗∗ 0.038 0.031
(0.027) (0.024) (0.027) (0.030) (0.028) (0.032) (0.028) (0.025) (0.032)
Floor -0.004 -0.001 -0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Above Median Home value (≥ 300k Eur) -0.010 0.013 -0.003
(0.019) (0.023) (0.020)
Baseline Organic waste distance above median -0.006 0.007 0.013
(0.018) (0.023) (0.019)
Disposited organic waste at least once at baseline 0.043∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.037∗ 0.032 0.042∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026)
Regular organic waste disposal at baseline 0.149∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.036) (0.034) (0.041) (0.032) (0.032) (0.041)
Treatment 0.004 -0.000 -0.008 0.019 0.010 0.032 0.011 0.015 0.006
(0.023) (0.022) (0.017) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Treatment × Elderly hh -0.058 -0.014 0.015
(0.063) (0.066) (0.052)
Treatment × Disposited organic waste at least once at baseline 0.048 -0.046 -0.004
(0.047) (0.049) (0.040)
Treatment × Regular organic waste disposal at baseline -0.025 0.023 0.030
(0.076) (0.073) (0.064)
Constant 0.053∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.037 0.019+ 0.012 -0.008 0.008 0.012
(0.026) (0.009) (0.010) (0.032) (0.012) (0.012) (0.029) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 968 1044 1044 613 662 662 786 847 847
Results obtained using OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.125, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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The results are quite homogeneous across the two survey waves and the
two (groups of) interventions. Households that engaged in sorting at baseline
were more likely to select into the second and third survey, and the same
holds – albeit to a lesser extent – for households with one or more members
over 65. None of the other covariates show up significantly, including the
treatment indicators. We thus do not find any evidence of the treatments
affecting households’ propensity to select into the surveys – not in terms
of levels (see the a- and b-columns), but also not when interacted with the
characteristics that showed up significantly (the baseline sorting behavior
and the age indicators; see the c-columns).
We thus do not find any evidence for the treatments having affected
the composition of the set of respondents. Any treatment differences with
respect to respondents’ motivations or opinions are therefore unlikely to be
biased. However, while any differences found are valid for the group of
households that selected into the survey (on average older and more prone
to sort waste), they are not necessarily representative of the overall opinions
and motivations of our experimental population.
2.5.2 Treatment effects on the factors affecting waste sorting
The surveys were designed to gain insight into the (potential) mechanisms
by which the interventions affected waste sorting behavior. The surveys con-
tained slightly more than thirty statements on factors affecting waste sort-
ing behavior. These statements can loosely be categorized into motivation
(e.g., the perceived desirability of waste sorting), self-efficacy and perceived
(in)convenience. Ex ante, the chances of finding treatment-induced changes
in any of these categories are not very high, as households that engaged
in organic waste sorting in the baseline period are overrepresented in our
survey. These households are thus likely to already have a positive atti-
tude towards waste sorting in general, and towards organic waste sorting in
particular, and the same holds for how they score on the other categories.
Indeed, of the over thirty statements included in the second survey, we only
found a significant treatment effect on one statement, and a borderline sig-
nificant treatment effect on another, similar statement. These statements
are, respectively, whether the household thinks that it is desirable if it sorts
its waste in general, and also, more specifically, its organic waste. Table 2.7
presents the probit regression results for these two statements, and for both
surveys. Shortly after the persuasive appeal treatment had been completed
(i.e., when filling out the second survey), households in the persuasive ap-
peal treatment group are 14.4 percentage points more likely to fully agree
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Table 2.7: Treatment effects of the persuasive appeal treatment on the sec-
ond and third survey.
Survey II Survey III









Persuasive Appeal Treatment 0.144∗∗ 0.111+ 0.115∗ 0.070
(0.065) (0.071) (0.068) (0.078)
Disposited organic waste at least once at baseline 0.208 0.430∗∗∗ 0.186 0.259+
(0.148) (0.161) (0.163) (0.160)
Regular organic waste disposal at baseline 0.204∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.036 0.246∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.079) (0.079) (0.087)
Above Median Home value (≥ 300k Eur) 0.007 0.018 0.000 0.065
(0.060) (0.064) (0.072) (0.076)
Baseline Organic waste distance above median 0.033 0.061
(0.069) (0.073)
Observations 169 168 114 114
Coefficients are average marginal effects from a probit regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.125, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
with the first statement (p = 0.026), and 11.1 percentage points more likely
to fully agree with the second (p = 0.117); see columns (1) and (2) of Table
2.7. Of course, these outcomes may be false positives, because they are the
only two questions with (borderline) significant treatment differences out
of a set of 30 questions. But the likelihood of these being false positives
is reduced by the fact that we still find a significant difference for the first
statement in the third survey, five months after the implementation of the
second. Households in the persuasive appeal treatment group are still 11.5
percentage points more likely to fully agree with the first statement, and
this difference remains significant at the 10 percent level (p = 0.091); see
column (3) of Table 2.7. The persistence of the treatment impact provides
suggestive evidence that indeed the persuasive appeal treatment has been
effective in establishing a long-lasting increase in support for (organic) waste
sorting – consistent the lack of treatment decay in terms of actual (organic)
waste sorting behavior.20 For completeness we also present the third sur-
vey’s regression results for the second statement; see column (4) of Table
2.7. While the coefficient remains positive, it is not significantly different
from zero (p = 0.340).
20We are unable to test this formally using Multiple Hypothesis Testing because, to the
best of our knowledge, no procedure is available that allows researchers to test the null
of no effect on two outcome variables (in our case, on household attitude to sort in the
short-term and longer-term) using multiplicity-corrected test statistics.
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Consistent with the lack of a long-lasting impact of the reward and reci-
procity treatments on actual organic waste sorting behavior, we do not find
any significant differences for any of the factors affecting the propensity to
sort waste between households in the pooled reciprocity and reward treat-
ment group and those in the control group (not shown here; available upon
request). The only significant treatment effect that we find is a 14.1 percent-
age point increase in the likelihood of fully agreeing with the statement that
recycling is necessary to economize on natural resources (p = 0.050). We do
not attach much value to this outcome for two reasons. Scoring better on
this variable is, of course, by no means a guarantee that households’ own
motivation to sort waste has been improved, and we also cannot rule out
that this result is, in fact, a false positive.
Overall, we thus do not find convincing evidence that the reciprocity and
reward treatments affected any of the determinants of waste sorting behavior
– self-efficacy, motivation, and perceptions of the (in-)convenience of sort-
ing. We also find no evidence of the persuasive appeal treatment affecting
these determinants, except for changes in the perceived desirability of in-
home waste sorting by the household itself. Therefore the persuasive appeal
treatment did not just affect households’ perceived benefits of waste sorting
or the desirability of household participation in general; it also strength-
ened their appreciation of the relevance of their own actions in this domain.
This result provides support for the role of personal responsibility in driving
waste sorting behavior, in line with the theory of Brekke et al. (2003).
2.6 Conclusion
Increasing households’ propensity to sort waste poses a challenge because of
the private (monetary and/or non-monetary) benefits of waste sorting tend
to be small, while the costs can be substantial – for example, think of the
inconveniences of in-house waste sorting in general, and of sorting organic
waste in particular. The challenge is even greater because waste sorting is
typically viewed as habitual behavior; inducing humans to shed old habits
and acquire new ones is notoriously difficult.
In this paper, we presented the results of three interventions aimed at
stimulating households to sort (organic) waste. We implemented a Random-
ized Controlled Trial among 1090 households living in apartment buildings
in downtown Amsterdam. We observe the frequency with which households
make use of newly installed collective organic waste sorting facilities. We
find considerable support for the hypothesis that waste sorting is habitual.
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Hardly any of the households that did not make use of the organic waste
facilities in the first month after they became available, started using them
at a later date. Similarly, we find that the characteristics of the households
that were still engaged in waste sorting nine months after they became
available, are very similar to those that took up waste sorting in the period
immediately after the facilities were put in place.
The interventions tested in this study were a persuasive appeal treatment
aimed at strengthening households’ positive attitude toward waste sorting, a
treatment in which households were promised an in-kind reward conditional
on active waste sorting, and treatment aimed at harnessing reciprocity –
offering a gift in the hope of households being willing to reciprocate in the
form of improved waste sorting. Our interventions thus differ in whether
they aim to strengthen households’ intrinsic or extrinsic motivations to sort
waste, and hence whether they can be classified as more behavioral pol-
icy instruments (the persuasive appeal treatment) or as more neoclassical
policy instruments (the reward treatment), with the reciprocity treatment
being somewhere in the middle. Because the treatments’ financial budgets
were roughly the same, we view our RCT as an experimental test of the
relative effectiveness of our neoclassical and behavioral interventions – in
the short run and in the longer run, and also whether they are more ef-
fective in inducing non-sorting households to start sorting organic waste,
or rather in increasing the activity’s intensity among households that are
already engaged in the activity.
We find that the direct impact of each of the three interventions is pos-
itive and very similar. We document an increase in the frequency of waste
sorting of over 20% in the first month after the start of the interventions
(albeit that in case of the persuasive appeal treatment behavior was too
noisy for this impact to be statistically significant). We provide tentative
evidence that the observed increase in the frequency of organic waste sort-
ing is likely to be a lower-bound estimate of the increase in organic waste
collected. While the direct impact is roughly the same in all three treat-
ments, we find marked differences in both the permanence of the impact,
as well as in whether they were especially effective in inducing new waste
sorting behavior or in intensifying existing behaviors. While the persuasive
appeal treatment’s impact strengthens over time and is especially effective
in encouraging non-sorting households to start sorting, the reciprocity and
reward treatments’ main impact is via a highly temporary intensification of
waste sorting by households that were already engaged in the activity. Re-
sults from two survey waves, implemented about one month and six months
after the completion of the persuasive appeal treatment, provide corrobora-
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tive evidence of the persuasive appeal treatment’s long-lasting impact.
We thus find that with similar budgets, the behavioral intervention – the
persuasive appeal treatment – is more effective in inducing pro-environmental
behavior than the neoclassical intervention – offering a conditional reward.
We document this result in an environmental domain and in a context that
are not very conducive to pro-environmental behavior – organic waste sorting
in apartment buildings. Whether these insights spillover to other environ-
mental behaviors that can be characterized as habits – such as commuters’
modal transportation choice – is an open question.
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Chapter 3
What do my neighbors do?
Leveraging social learning
3.1 Introduction
Combatting climate change and natural resource depletion are among the
greatest challenges of our times. Recovery and subsequent reuse of waste
materials can contribute to solving both issues – because materials recycling
reduces the need for extracting new resources, and because typically less
energy is required to produce goods from recycled materials than from virgin
resources (Ferrara & Missios, 2005; Dijkgraaf & Gradus, 2004). Residential
waste sorting and recycling are thus key ingredients of any policy aimed at
fostering the circular economy and at mitigating global warming (Hogg et
al., 2002).
Despite the considerable environmental – and hence societal – benefits
of residential waste recycling, the bulk of recyclable materials in household
waste ends up being incinerated or land-filled (Bartl, 2014). One important
This chapter is based on joint work with Daan van Soest, under the working title
’What do my neighbors do? Leveraging social learning to stimulate organic waste sort-
ing’. We gratefully acknowledge the very fruitful collaboration with the municipality of
Schiedam (and then especially Jeffrey van Steenes and George Derksen) and with the mu-
nicipality’s waste collection firm. We also gratefully acknowledge the financial support by
the Netherlands’ Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (IenW), the Depart-
ment of Waterways and Public Works (Rijkswaterstaat), and the Associations of Dutch
Waste Collection Firms (VA), of the Dutch Waste Management Sector (NVRD), of Dutch
Municipalities (VNG). We also thank Odette van de Riet, Jessanne Mastop, Reint Jan
Renes, Jorn Horstman, de Goede, and especially Addie Weenk, Cees Midden, and Gijs
Langeveld, for their help and support in setting up the experiment, as well as Tom Melis
for his excellent research assistance.
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reason for this is that waste sorting and materials recovery are valuable to
society, but costly for the household. Residential waste recycling requires
a series of actions for each of the separate waste flows, from the temporary
storage of waste materials on the premises to their actual disposal. Costs
include the space taken up by the various waste flow receptacles for tempo-
rary storage as well as the time and effort needed for sorting and disposing –
and then there may be hygienic considerations too (Briguglio, 2016). Many
municipalities in developed countries facilitate residential waste sorting by
offering all sorts of services, such as placing bottle banks and waste paper
containers in neighborhoods, and organizing the curbside collection of plas-
tics and organic waste. But because most municipalities charge flat waste
handling fees, households typically do not face any financial incentives to
sort their waste (Matheson, 2019; Chamizo-Gonzalez et al., 2016).
Waste collection charges that vary with the amount of non-sorted waste
collected may provide proper incentives for households to recycle (e.g. Fuller-
ton & Kinnaman, 1996; Usui, 2008; Dijkgraaf & Gradus, 2004; Bel &
Gradus, 2016). The effectiveness of waste-based taxation schemes is, how-
ever, predicated on the regulator’s ability to monitor and deter evasive be-
havior, as they may result in recyclable waste flows being contaminated by
non-recyclable materials, and also in illegal dumping or burning (Fullerton &
Kinnaman, 1995). Because monitoring and enforcement typically do not en-
joy much popular support in the domain of residential waste sorting, there
is a policy demand for softer interventions that can be used to stimulate
recycling – as a substitute for regulatory approaches, or maybe as a com-
plement.1
In this paper we present the results of a Randomized Controlled Trial,
implemented in a mid-sized city in the Netherlands, aimed at improving sort-
ing of organic waste. Using a sample of close to 4000 households, we test
the separate as well as the combined impact of two interventions that aim to
improve recycling by providing information about fellow residents’ engage-
ment in the waste sorting activity. One intervention consists of providing
information on the waste sorting behavior of local role models – residents
in the neighborhood who actively sort their waste and who are willing to
help convince their fellow residents of the desirability and feasibility of in-
home waste sorting by (i) demonstrating that they themselves are actively
engaged in the activity, and (ii) showing how they organized the waste sort-
1Policies requiring monitoring and enforcement may pose a political risk, but this does
not mean that they cannot be effective; see for example Vollaard and van Soest (2020) for
evidence to the contrary. For studies on policy interventions to prevent illegal dumping,
see for example Dur and Vollaard (2015, 2019).
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ing process in their homes. The other intervention consists of providing
information on the waste sorting behavior of a household’s direct peers, in
the form of providing feedback on the average amount of organic waste col-
lected in the nearest collective organic waste container. We will refer to
these interventions as the social modelling and social feedback treatment,
respectively.
Our interventions aim to harness elements of social learning to improve
organic waste sorting by households. Social learning is a process by which
new behaviors can be acquired by observing and imitating others (Bandura
& Walters, 1963; Bandura, 1977). We conjecture that (enabling) social
learning is particularly relevant in the context of (organic) waste sorting for
four reasons. First, lack of information on how to sort ranks high among
the reasons households state why they fail to engage in waste recycling
schemes (Hornik et al., 1995; Gamba & Oskamp, 1994; Vollaard & van
Soest, 2020). Seeing how others sort their waste may then be an efficient
way for the household to acquire the relevant information. Second, the fact
that other households are observed to engage in waste sorting may provide
a signal about the (societal) relevance of the activity that is more persuasive
than individually acquired information. For example, Banerjee (1992) and
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) show that agents may be more inclined to base
their decision on imperfect signals transmitted by others than on their own
private information; see also Asch (1956). Third, people tend to infer what
“normal” behavior is from the behavior of others (Goldstein et al., 2008).
Because people have a preference for conforming their behavior to what
is perceived to be normal (Schultz et al., 2007), information on the pro-
social behavior of others (either by personal observation, or via explicit
communication) may induce the recipient to start acting pro-socially too
(see for example Allcott, 2011; Allcott & Rogers, 2014; Ferraro et al., 2011;
Ferraro & Price, 2013; Giaccherini et al., 2019). Fourth, the perceived
benefits of contributing to a public good may depend on how many others are
willing to do so as well. Ostrom (2009) identified “conditional cooperation”
as a key preference that helps support collective action, and Fischbacher et
al. (2001) documented its prevalence in humans (see Vringer et al. (2017)
for a field test).
We find that both the social modelling and the social feedback treatment
are effective in improving organic waste sorting – as measured by increases
in the average frequency with which the collective organic waste sorting fa-
cilities are used, as well as by increases in the share of households using
them. We also find that both treatments seem to be especially effective in
improving organic waste sorting by households that were already engaged
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in the activity before the start of intervention (albeit that the evidence for
a heterogeneous impact is much weaker for the social modelling treatment
than for the social feedback treatment). We document these positive im-
pacts during the treatment implementation period, and we also find that the
impacts of both treatments remain positive and significant, on average, over
the nine month post-implementation. However, while we find no evidence
of the social feedback treatment’s impact deteriorating over time, the social
modelling treatment’s effect sizes do decrease over time. Last but not least,
we fail to document any added impact of combining the two interventions
(above and beyond the impact of just the social feedback intervention).
The design of our Randomized Controlled Trial is fairly complex, but it
provides high-powered tests for a variety of key aspects of the behavioral in-
terventions. For example, it allows us to explicitly test for possible spillover
effects from treatment to control households – for which we find no evidence
– and it also allows us to explicitly test whether indeed an increase in the
frequency of organic waste disposals actually translates into an increase in
the weight of organic waste collected. More specifically, we document that
the percentage increases in the frequency with which the organic waste fa-
cilities are used provide a lower-bound estimate of the percentage increase
in the amount of organic waste collected.
In addition to collecting information on households’ usage of the col-
lective organic waste sorting facilities, we also gathered survey evidence
providing insights into the mechanisms via which the treatments affected
waste sorting behavior. We find that, on average, having been exposed to
one of the three treatments significantly strengthened the household’s atti-
tude towards waste sorting. We also find that the treatments increased the
perceived benefits of organic waste sorting, a result that seems to be driven
by especially higher confidence in the waste recycling process. However, we
also find (somewhat weaker) evidence that self-efficacy was improved too.
Households for instance reported to find it easier to remember the sorting
rules and reported to have better insight in sorting performance. The survey
outcomes thus document an improvement in the (perceived) cost-benefit ra-
tio of organic waste sorting, making it more likely that the improved organic
waste behaviors are likely to be sustained in the future.
The insights obtained from this study are important for two reasons.
First, for all those waste flows and/or waste collection situations where ex-
post waste sorting (i.e., sorting not at home but at the waste treatment
facility) is either not feasible or too costly, our Randomized Controlled Trial
provides evidence on whether (and to what extent) recycling rates can be
improved by means of fairly simple information-provision interventions. In
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terms of the contribution to the literature on behavioral policies (or nudges,
see Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), this is important because unlike domains like
energy and water savings, engaging in waste sorting is a pure public good
without any (direct) private financial benefits. And because of the fact that
we have data up to nine months after the completion of the interventions, we
are able to assess not just the interventions’ short-run impact but also their
effectiveness in the longer run. Second, and related, waste sorting behav-
ior is typically thought of as a behavior that is driven by habits (Knussen
& Yule, 2008; Carrus et al., 2008). Changing them thus poses a major
challenge (as getting rid of past non-sorting habits is difficult), but also
that, if the behavior is changed in the short run, we may expect waste sort-
ing behavior to continue long after the interventions themselves have been
discontinued. And because many other environmental behaviors are also
habit-driven (Carrus et al., 2008; Gsottbauer & van den Bergh, 2011), the
insights of this paper may spill over to other environmental policy domains
as well.
The literature on residential waste sorting is quite rich and has covered a
large variety of topics. These include analyzing the importance of economic
incentives for recycling (see for example Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995,
1996); Fullerton and Wolverton (2000); Kinnaman and Yokoo (2011); for
overviews see Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2015) and Bel and Gradus (2016)),
but also the role of non-financial drivers therein (Aadland and Caplan (2003)
and Kinnaman (2006); for an overview see Briguglio (2016)). Theory that
can explain the decision to sort – even in the absence of financial returns
– has been developed by Brekke et al. (2003, 2010) and also by Bénabou
and Tirole (2006), highlighting the relevance of, among others, self-image
and reputational concerns; for empirical tests see for example Viscusi et
al. (2011); Czajkowski et al. (2019); Hage et al. (2009); Kirakozian and
Charlier (2015); Nyborg et al. (2006). The literature using Randomized
Controlled Trials to assess the effectiveness of different (behavioral) policy
interventions on recycling is, however, much less well-developed (Briguglio,
2016). Linder et al. (2018) tested the impact on recycling rates of a so-called
community-based marketing campaign in one of the suburbs of Stockholm.
They found that informing households about their fellow residents’ views
on waste recycling resulted in a significant increase in recycling rates up
to eight months after the information leaflet had been sent out. Nomura
et al. (2011) randomized the provision of information on street-level food
waste recycling rates in Greater Manchester, and found that providing such
information resulted a three percent increase in waste sorting up to three
months post treatment. Milford et al. (2015) analyzed the impact of a
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similar intervention: providing households in a city in the south-east of
Norway with information on how their waste sorting performance compared
to that of the average household in their district. The information was
relayed by means of two letters, sent out nine months apart. Milford et
al. (2015) found that relaying this information resulted in a two percentage
point increase in recycling up to (at least) five months after sending out
the second letter. Linder et al. (2018), Milford et al. (2015) and Nomura et
al. (2011) all document positive effects with little decay. We contribute to
the insights they provided by testing the impact of interventions harnessing
social learning over a substantially longer time horizon, allowing us to better
test whether indeed the behavioral impacts are long-lasting.
The remainder of this paper is set up as follows. Section 3.2 introduces
the study context as well as our experimental design. Our identification
strategy is presented in Section 3.3, and the results are presented in Sec-
tion 3.4. The survey results, aimed at probing the treatments’ underlying
mechanisms, are presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Design and Methods
3.2.1 Background and experimental setting
We implemented our Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) in a neighbor-
hood in Schiedam, a city of about 80,000 inhabitants that is part of the
Rotterdam–The Hague metropolitan area in the highly urbanized West-
ern part of the Netherlands. As is the case in most municipalities in the
Netherlands, increasing organic waste recycling rates – and then especially
of cooking waste and food leftovers – ranks high on Schiedam municipal-
ity’s policy agenda. Schiedam’s standard system of organic household waste
collection is via the use of wheelie bins, to be placed at the curbside on
organic waste collection days. The wheelie bins are quite sizable and require
outdoor storing space with easy access from the storage location to the road-
side. That means the wheelie bin system is not well-suited for a considerable
share of households (in Schiedam, but also elsewhere in the Netherlands).
This includes households living in multi-family dwellings (such as low- and
high-rise apartment buildings). But it also includes all households living in
single-family homes with insufficient outdoor storage space for the wheelie
bin, and/or without easy access from the storage location to the wheelie
bin collection point at the curbside. At the time we implemented the RCT
all households in the municipality of Schiedam had access to waste sorting
facilities for some waste fractions (such as paper and glass), but only those
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households that had been provided with wheelie bins were able to separately
sort their organic waste.2
To facilitate organic waste sorting by households living in dwellings not
serviced by the wheelie bin system, collective organic waste collection facil-
ities were introduced in our pilot neighborhood in the Fall of 2017. The
neighborhood covers about one square kilometer and is home to about
4,000 households (or 9,000 individuals), most of whom live in multi-family
dwellings. Forty-four outdoor collective organic waste containers were placed
in the neighborhood’s public spaces; see Figure 3.A1 in Appendix 3.A.1 for
a picture of one of these containers. Usage of these facilities was intended
for all those households that were not serviced by individual curbside or-
ganic waste collection using wheelie bins. Access to the collective organic
waste containers was restricted by means of a card system; opening the lid
required swiping a card that was made available only to those households
that could not be serviced by wheelie bins.
The municipality realized that while the availability of collective waste
collection facilities is a necessary condition for the targeted households to
sort their organic waste, engagement in the activity is not automatic. Or-
ganic waste recycling rates – and then especially those for cooking waste
and food leftovers – are typically fairly low even among households ser-
viced by way of wheelie bins, and they are even lower among households in
multi-family dwellings. Organic waste sorting is typically viewed as one of
the most inconvenient types of recycling activities – because the temporary
in-house storage requires space and may be perceived as unhygienic, and
because walking distances to the collective outdoor organic waste containers
can be considerable (Sidique et al., 2010; Lange et al., 2014). The munic-
ipality therefore combined the introduction of the collective organic waste
containers with an information campaign aimed at emphasizing the envi-
ronmental and societal benefits of organic waste sorting. Each household
2The situation in Schiedam is very much representative of the overall situation in the
Netherlands. A substantial share of the Dutch population engages in recycling, and then
especially of paper and glass. Paper waste is often collected at the curbside by sports clubs
(as a supplementary source of revenue for these club in addition to their membership fees),
and bottle banks are conveniently located next to supermarkets so that households can
dispose of their glass waste when shopping for groceries. Metals, textiles and household
chemical waste can be deposited at the municipality’s waste treatment site. Organic
waste is typically collected only from households that can be serviced by means of wheelie
bins; the availability of (collective) organic waste sorting facilities for households living
in multi-family dwellings or in bin-inaccessible single-family dwellings is still novel in the
Netherlands. The same holds, to a large extent, for plastics. The waste sorting system in
Schiedam is thus representative of that in the Netherlands.
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in the research area received a package that contained information on how
to sort waste (e.g. what types of waste are suitable for organic waste recy-
cling) in the form of a leaflet, a cheat-sheet and a sticker for quick reference.
Households were also offered a receptacle to be placed on the kitchen top,
to facilitate the temporary storage of cooking waste and food leftovers to be
disposed of later in the outdoor collective organic waste collection facilities.
Each receptacle was accompanied by a roll of compostable bags to line the
receptacle with.
3.2.2 Treatment description
Despite all the efforts described in the previous Subsection, use of the col-
lective organic waste facilities was very modest at best, as evidenced by our
baseline data. In the baseline period (from November 5, 2018, to Febru-
ary 4, 2019), less than 10 percent of the households made regularly use of
the organic waste collection facilities. We teamed up with the municipal-
ity of Schiedam to test whether (and how much) organic waste sorting can
be increased by means of three interventions aimed at harnessing elements
of social learning; an intervention presenting fellow residents of the neigh-
borhood as a role models (the social modelling treatment), an intervention
aimed at providing feedback on the actual sorting behavior of one’s peers
(the social feedback treatment), as well as the combination of the two (the
combined treatment). The time line of the experiment is depicted in Figure
3.1. The two core treatments (that are implemented in isolation as well as
combined), are presented in more detail in the next two subsections; the
added benefits of also testing the combined treatment, are discussed in the
third subsection.
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The social modelling treatment
The social modelling treatment was designed and implemented as follows.
We aimed to identify four residents of the neighborhood, two male and two
female and of different age classes, (i) who were (likely to be) engaged in
organic waste sorting, and (ii) were likely to be well-known in the neighbor-
hood, for example because they were active in the local community center
etc. Age and gender mattered for the selection, because the persuasiveness
of a message tends to vary with its recipient’s sense of shared identity with
its sender (Petty et al., 1981; Bandura, 1988; Goldstein et al., 2008). We
asked the municipality to use their contacts in the neighborhood, to suggest
four names; the municipality was well-positioned for this task because of
the close connections the municipality’s community workers had with the
neighborhood. The four individuals suggested were subsequently contacted,
again via the intermediation of the neighborhood’s community workers, to
ask them whether they would be willing to help set up an information cam-
paign in the neighborhood to improve organic waste recycling rates. All
four agreed. They were then asked to participate in a photo shoot in which
they demonstrated the steps they take when sorting their organic waste,
and they were also interviewed about their motivations to sort waste. We
then created four comic-like types of leaflets, one for each model. Figure
3.A2 in Appendix 3.A.1 presents one of those leaflets. The social modelling
households received all four leaflets, one at the time and accompanied by a
letter, at four-week intervals. The first leaflet was sent out on February 4,
2019, and the fourth on April 29, 2019.
The essence of each of the four leaflets is the role model informing the
recipient of her motives to engage in (organic) waste sorting, as well as
demonstrating how she has organized her in-house waste sorting process to
make it as convenient as possible. Both aspects, but especially the latter,
are key aspects of social learning as defined by Bandura and Walters (1963)
and Bandura (1977). By watching the actions of the role model the observer
learns how an activity is done best. The information on the social model’s
behavior and her in-house organic waste sorting process, may enhance the
recipient’s perception of the attainability of the task, or how well he is
able to implement waste sorting himself (e.g. Bettinger et al., 2005; Oster
& Thornton, 2012; Eble & Hu, 2020). It may so enhance the recipient
household’s self-efficacy in the domain of in-house waste sorting, as defined
by Bandura (1982). But the observer is also led to infer that, because the role
model engages in the activity, she is of the opinion that organic waste sorting
is an important societal cause to contribute to. The fact that we added
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explicit information on the role model’s motivations to sort thus simply
reinforced the conclusions the observer would have drawn himself by just
observing the model’s behavior.3 The social modelling information may
so induce households to update their beliefs regarding the (environmental)
benefits associated with the activity.
While social learning is the key mechanism via which the leaflets are
expected to induce behavioral change, other mechanisms may be at play as
well. The information that a specific individual thinks that waste sorting is
important may also be perceived as an appeal to moral preferences (Brekke
et al., 2003, 2010) or even as the communication of an (injunctive) social
norm (Goldstein et al., 2008).4
The social feedback treatment
The social feedback intervention consisted of informing households of the
average amount of organic waste that was collected and deposited by all
households in their direct vicinity.5 We first identified which of the newly
installed collective organic waste containers was closest to each treatment
household ; for each social feedback household, its ‘households in the direct
vicinity’ were then defined as all those households for which that container
was also the nearest. Households were then sent a series of four letters,
at monthly intervals, that informed them of the amount of organic waste
that was deposited by the – on average 100 – households in their direct
vicinity. We also added an injunctive norm in the form of a clear objective
(an average amount of organic waste sorted, per household per month, of 1
kg) as well as a yardstick (in the form of a star system) for households to
3The main reason why we explicitly added the social model’s motivations to the in-
structions in the leaflet is that instructions without motivation can be construed as quite
paternalistic.
4As argued in a recent paper by DellaVigna and Linos (2021), large-scale field experi-
ments typically do not allow for a clean estimate of a single possible mechanism. The main
reason for that is that implementation of large-scale field experiments requires the cooper-
ation of an implementing partner (typically a firm, or a government body). These partners
are typically more interested in identifying an intervention that generates an impact than
in obtaining insight into the exact mechanism via which the impact is generated. Because
of that reason, treatments in large-scale field experiments are better described as package
interventions (moving various variables at the same time) than as clean experiments in
which just one variable differs between each two treatment groups. Our study is not an
exception.
5The implicit assumption is that if households engage in organic waste sorting, they
most likely use the container that is closest to their home. We find that indeed in 82% of
the cases households use the container nearest to their home.
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Average organic weight per household








Table 3.1: Threshold weights of the weekly amount of organic waste de-
posited as used to compute the number of stars in the social feedback treat-
ment.
easily evaluate the organic waste sorting performance of the other households
in their direct vicinity. Every week the amount of organic waste deposited
in each container was weighed. If that weight, divided by the number of
households in the vicinity and averaged over the previous four weeks, was
below 150 grams, the feedback letter sent to all households in the container’s
vicinity would depict one star. Two stars would be awarded if the average
weight was between 150 and 350 grams; to receive five stars, the average
weight of organic waste deposited per household over the past four weeks
needed to be a 1000 grams, or more. Table 3.1 shows the cutoff weights
per household that are used to determine the star scores. An example of a
social feedback letter is presented in Figure 3.A3 in Appendix 3.A.1. The
timing of the letters coincided with those of the social modelling treatment;
the first was thus sent on February 4, 2019, and the fourth and last on April
29, 2019.
As was the case with the social modelling intervention, the social feed-
back intervention also consisted of several elements. Two of the social learn-
ing elements that may be present in the social modelling treatment, may also
be at work in the social feedback treatment. The information that a certain
amount of organic waste has been deposited by households in one’s direct
vicinity may induce treatment households to update their beliefs about the
feasibility of organic waste sorting; if others can do it, they themselves are
likely to be able to do it too (see for example Bramoullé & Kranton, 2007).
And the fact that other households in one’s direct vicinity engage in organic
waste sorting may induce households to update their beliefs about the so-
cietal relevance of organic waste sorting: if sorting happens in one’s direct
vicinity, this is a signal that at least some neighbors find recycling a worthy
cause to contribute to.
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Of course, other mechanisms may be at work too. Being provided with
information that at least some of the neighbors engaged in waste sorting may
have been perceived as a signal of what responsible behavior looks like, thus
providing an appeal to moral preferences and/ or self-image considerations
(Nyborg et al., 2006). Information about the average sorting behavior of
all neighbors in one’s direct vicinity may also have been perceived as a
descriptive social norm the treatment household may want to conform to
(Goldstein et al., 2008); we added the star system as an injunctive norm to
prevent possible boomerang effects that might be caused by the very low
pre-intervention organic waste sorting rates (Schultz et al., 2007). The star
system also provided a collective waste sorting challenge households may
have been sensitive to (Gómez-Miñambres, 2012; Ashraf et al., 2014).6
The combined treatment
The above description of the social feedback and the social modelling treat-
ments presents the possible mechanisms via which they may affect house-
hold behavior. The fact that households are informed that other households
engage in organic waste sorting (regarding the role model’s behavior, or
because of the information on the weight collected in the container closest
to them over the previous month) may induce them to update their beliefs
about (i) the feasibility of organic waste sorting (if others can do it, they
themselves are likely to be able to do it too) and (ii) the social relevance of
organic waste sorting (if others do it, this is a signal that at least some neigh-
bors find recycling a worthy cause to contribute to). These mechanisms may
thus be at play in both the social modelling and social feedback treatments
— albeit possibly to different degrees. The main difference between the two
is that the social modelling intervention explicitly shows, in the form of the
comic, the steps taken by the role model of how to sort waste. Demonstrat-
ing these steps, as well as the tips and tricks associated with that, can help
increase the recipient household’s self-efficacy – a mechanism that cannot
be present in the social feedback treatment. The social feedback letters did
not provide tips and tricks on how to organize one’s (organic) waste sort-
ing process, and one cannot derive such information from observing others
6Households may have perceived the star scores as a challenge to reach a specific
collective waste sorting target (1 kg per household per week, for all households making
use of that container). This mechanism may well have been in place, but it is unlikely
that this has resulted in a competition between neighborhoods, as households were not
informed of the (star score) performance of other neighborhoods. For evidence on the
impact of harnessing between-neighborhood competition, see Nomura et al. (2011).
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depositing their organic waste in the outdoor collective container. We thus
decided to test not just the effectiveness of the social feedback and the social
modelling treatments, but also of the combination thereof. The treatment
thus consisted of adding the social modelling flyer (the comic) to the social
feedback package.
3.2.3 Experimental design
We thus implemented three different treatments – the social modelling treat-
ment, the social feedback treatment, a treatment that combined both types
of interventions – to test whether the two core treatments are mutually rein-
forcing when implemented jointly. Waste sorting outcomes in each of these
treatment groups were compared against those of the fourth group that
did not receive any information – the control group. In terms of outcome
variables, we have information on the daily waste sorting behavior of 3987
households (consisting of, in total, 8990 individuals), as well as on the weight
of organic waste deposited, per week, in 42 container-units7 (from here on,
‘containers’). Frequency of use of the collective organic waste sorting facil-
ities is available in the form of the number of times households used their
card to get access to the collective organic waste containers. The weekly
weight data are available because we asked the municipality to weigh each
organic waste container’s content before it was emptied. Usage data are
thus available at the household level, the weight data only at the container
level.
From an environmental (and cost-effectiveness) perspective, the key treat-
ment impacts of interest are those on the amount of organic waste collected
(i.e., the change in weight). Behaviorally, however, we are also interested in
the impact of the treatments on the frequency with which households made
use of the facilities – for example because we are interested in establishing
whether the treatments are effective in inducing non-sorting households to
start sorting (the extensive margin), or whether they are especially effective
in intensifying waste sorting of those households that were already engaged
in the activity (the intensive margin). If frequency and aggregate weight
are perfectly correlated – that is, if the treatments affected the frequency
7As stated before, 44 containers were installed in the research area. One of those
containers was used by just seven households, and one organic waste collection location
housed two containers. We excluded the former container as well as its seven users because
the number of users is too low to be able to weigh the amount of organic waste deposited
therein with sufficient precision. Regarding the latter two containers, households in the
vicinity were equally likely to use the one or the other, and hence we treat the two as just
one single container-unit.
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of use but not the average weight per deposit – we can design the RCT to
maximize our chances of detecting treatment effects on the frequency of use.
If we cannot rule out that the treatments affected the weight per deposit,
the optimal design is slightly more complicated.
The assumption of the per-deposit weight being independent of the treat-
ment may be valid, because households are likely to postpone making the
next trip to the collective waste sorting facilities until their in-house tem-
porary storage receptacle is full. So for a receptacle of a given size, the
(unobserved) total weight deposited by a household would be proportional
to the (observable) number of times it made use of the outdoor organic
waste collection facilities. Yet frequency and weight may not be perfectly
correlated for two reasons. First, for households that already engaged in
some organic waste sorting at baseline, the weight per deposit may change
if the treatment induced them to purchase a larger bin for their temporary
in-house organic waste storage. The number of trips to the outdoor organic
waste container may then have remained constant or may even have de-
creased, while the amount of waste deposited (and hence the weight) was
actually larger. Second, for households that previously did not sort but were
induced by the treatment to start sorting, changes in the average frequency
would only be a good indicator of the changes in total weight collected if
the average weight of the waste they deposit happened to be equal to the
average weight deposited by those households that already engaged in the
activity.
We thus cannot assume that the average weight per deposit is unaffected
by the treatments, and hence we face the following trade-off regarding the
design of our RCT. On the one hand we can maximize the statistical power to
detect changes in behavior by implementing our (stratified) randomization
at the level of individual households. With about 4000 households in the
RCT and with four treatment arms, we would expect to then have very good
balance on all characteristics (observable and unobservable) that affect waste
sorting. We would then also expect to be able to obtain precise estimates
of the treatment effects on the frequency with which the average household
made use of the organic waste collection facilities – assuming that there
were no treatment spillovers between neighbors (see below). And we would
also have maximum power for any test on heterogeneous treatment effects
– including those on whether a treatment was especially effective in moving
the intensive or the extensive margin of waste sorting. With randomized
assignment at the individual level, however, the share of deposits made
by households in each of the four treatment arms would be the same for
each container, and hence it would be impossible to estimate the treatment
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impact in terms of weight collected.
On the other hand we could maximize our chances of being able to es-
timate our treatments’ weight impacts by allocating all households in the
vicinity of a specific container to one and the same treatment. Assuming
that households are most likely to make use of the nearest organic waste
container, we could create 42 household-container clusters, each contain-
ing all households for which a specific container was most proximate to,
and subsequently randomize each household-container cluster to one of the
four treatment arms. While a full cluster-randomized design would max-
imize our chances of being able to estimate the treatment impacts on the
amount of weight collected, estimating the treatment impacts on households’
waste sorting behavior would be more hazardous because households within
a household-container cluster are likely to be more similar to each other than
households in different household-container clusters. Dwellings in the same
location are more similar in terms of characteristics like size and sales price
than those in different locations, and they may also attract occupants that
are more similar to each other (in terms of preferences, but also in terms
of disposable income) than to those that end up living in different types of
dwellings elsewhere in the neighborhood. This would imply that outcomes
of households in the same cluster are likely to be correlated, and hence,
for the same sample size, statistical power would be (much) lower with a
cluster-randomized design than with individual randomization. Because we
are interested in the treatment impacts on both weights and frequency of
use, we opted for a mixed design, combining a cluster-randomized approach
for the estimate of one treatment effect and a within-location individual-
level randomization to estimate the impact of the other two treatments.
Our experimental design is summarized in Figure 3.2; details about the ac-
tual randomization process, including stratification, is relegated to Section
3.2.4.
We decided to use cluster-level randomization to estimate the impact of
the social feedback treatment. The main reason for this is that social feed-
back on the average weight collected needs to be implemented at the con-
tainer level, and hence estimating the impact of this treatment necessitates
the implementation of a cluster-randomized design. Of the 42 household-
container clusters, we allocated 11 to just the control group, and 10 to just
the social feedback treatment; see Figure 3.2.8 The impact of the social
8Figure 3.2 summarizes the design, with the number of containers allocated to one or
more treatments in the first stage of the randomization and the numbers of households to
be allocated to each individual treatment in the second stage. On average there are about
95 households per household-container cluster (about 4000 households making use of 42
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feedback treatment can then be estimated by means of a simple two-way
difference-in-difference estimator using these two groups of households, with
standard errors clustered at the unit of randomization – at the household-
container cluster level (Bertrand et al., 2004). We will refer to this as Test I;
see the bottom part of Figure 3.2. A more detailed discussion of the actual
empirical strategy is deferred to Section 3.3.
Next, to estimate the impact of social modelling, we applied individual
randomization to the households in 11 household-container clusters. Half of
the households in each of these household-container clusters were to receive
the social modelling treatment, and the other half ended up in the control
group. With individual randomization we can again implement a simple
two-way difference-in-difference estimator with standard errors clustered at
the unit of randomization – the individual household. This test is referred
to as Test II in Figure 3.2.
The third treatment combines all elements of both the social feedback
and the social modelling intervention. To estimate whether there is any in-
teraction effect between the two constituent interventions, all of the house-
holds in the remaining 10 household-container clusters were to receive the
social feedback treatment, and a randomly selected half of the households
in each household-container cluster were to also receive the social modelling
treatment. Treatment assignment is again based on individual random-
ization, and estimation is therefore by means of a two-way difference-in-
difference model with standard errors clustered at the level of individual
households. Because all households in this test receive the social feedback
intervention, the coefficient on the social modelling treatment indicator cap-
tures the treatments’ interaction effect. In Figure 3.2 we refer to this test
as Test III.
containers); the exact number of households ending up in a treatment is the result of the
actual randomization, to be discussed in Section 3.3. This also explains why the number of
household-container clusters to be allocated to the pure control and pure feedback groups is
not exactly the same; the average number of households per household-container cluster is
slightly lower in the Pure Control household-container clusters than in the Pure Feedback
household-container clusters.
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Our design serves three purposes. First, the two-stage randomization
process allows for properly powered tests of each of the three main treat-
ment effects on household waste sorting behavior – the frequency with which
they use the collective organic waste sorting facilities. Despite the fact that
relatively few household-container clusters are used for Tests II and III (11
and 10, respectively; see Figure 3.2), these tests are adequately powered
because randomization is at the individual level, and takes place within spe-
cific household-container clusters. The latter implies that the randomiza-
tion is stratified on location, and hence implicitly on a fairly large number
of other characteristics, observed and unobserved, such as dwelling type,
sales price and possibly even disposable incomes. That households within
a household-container cluster are more similar than between clusters thus
enhances statistical power for Tests II and III, but it also implies less sta-
tistical power, all else equal, for Test I (the impact of the social feedback
intervention), because of its cluster-randomized design. To compensate for
this, we assigned relatively many household-container clusters to Test I (21
in total; all those households in the household-container clusters that have
been labelled Pure Control and Pure Feedback in Figure 3.2).
By adjusting the number of household-container clusters assigned to each
of the three tests depending on the type of randomization, we thus ensure
that we have adequate statistical power for all three. We calculated the Min-
imum Detectable Effects (MDEs) using the STATA package pc simulate,
developed by Burlig et al. (2020). Power analyses of panel data are compli-
cated because the statistical power of the test crucially depends on the serial
correlation in individual households’ waste sorting decisions – oftentimes in
a complex and non-linear fashion (Burlig et al., 2020). On the one hand,
higher levels of serial correlation facilitate detecting differences between pre-
and post-intervention observations. On the other hand higher levels of serial
correlation imply (steeply) declining added benefits of having a longer time
series for each cross-sectional unit, because each extra observation yields
less new information. Burlig et al. (2020)’s STATA package pc simulate
allows the researcher to derive the MDE for difference-in-difference models
in which within-unit and/or between-unit correlation in the error terms is
controlled for using clustered standard errors. We find that with 80% power,
the MDE for Test I is equal to an increase in the frequency of use of the
collective organic waste sorting facilities of 0.021 extra days per week, and
for Tests II and III it is 0.034 extra days per week.
Second, this design also allows us to test for the presence of spillovers
(Baird et al., 2018). The claim that Tests I-III provide reliable estimates of
the actual treatment effects is predicated on two assumptions. For test I, we
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assume that there is partial inference, there may be spillovers between neigh-
bors located in the same container-cluster in the social feedback treatment,
since these households receive a letter informing them of the sorting efforts
of their neighbors, but spillovers between container-clusters are absent. Un-
der this assumption, the difference in behavior between social feedback and
pure control clusters equals the total effect of treatment (Hudgens & Hal-
loran, 2008). This effect embeds both the direct and indirect effect of the
treatment, which may materialize when households react to a new feedback
letter communicating changes in the sorting behavior of their neighbors.
For test II and III we invoke the Stable Unit Value Assumption (SUTVA);
see (Rubin, 1978). Both these assumptions imply that spillovers from the
treated to control group households to which they are compared are ab-
sent. While Test I is likely to yield unbiased impact estimates of the social
feedback treatment, this is not necessarily the case for the impact estimates
of the social modelling and the combined treatments (Tests II and III, re-
spectively). As neighbors can be randomized into different treatment arms,
the effectiveness of the treatment may be underestimated if households in
the treatment group (the social modelling treatment for Test II, and the
combined treatment for Test III) affect the behavior, directly or indirectly,
of nearby households that had been assigned to the other treatment arm
(the control group in case of Test II, and the households that only received
the social feedback in case of Test III). Our two-stage randomization de-
sign allows us to explicitly test for the presence of such spillovers (Hudgens
& Halloran, 2008). More specifically, we can test for possible spillovers
of the social modelling treatment by comparing the organic waste deposit
frequencies of the control group households in the Mixed Control/ Mod-
elling household-container clusters to those of the households in the Pure
Control household-container clusters; see Test IV in Figure 3.2. Similarly,
we can also test for the impact of neighbors’ having received the combined
treatment on those that only received the social feedback treatment – by
running tests on the differences in behavior between the households in the
Mixed Feedback/ Combined household-container clusters that just received
the social feedback intervention and the social feedback households in the
Pure Feedback household-container clusters; see Test V in Figure 3.2.
Third, this design does not only allow us to estimate the treatment
impacts on the frequency of organic waste sorting; it also allows us to de-
termine whether the estimated percentage changes in the frequency of use
is an overestimate or an underestimate of the percentage change in organic
waste collected. The first randomization step provides us with 42 containers
that are allocated to four groups that differ in the shares of nearby house-
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holds that are treated by a specific intervention – zero, fifty or one hundred
percent. The differences in the shares of treated households making use of
the various household-container clusters yield the variation needed to test
whether the average weight of organic waste deposits is affected by each
treatment, and hence whether the observed change in frequency of use is
an under- or an overestimate of the treatments’ impact on the amount of
organic waste collected.
3.2.4 Data, randomization procedure and treatment balance
Measuring organic waste sorting activity
We construct two measures of organic waste sorting activity. The digital
log books of the collective containers’ access card readers provide us with
information on the number of times each household accessed the outdoor
organic waste collection facilities. It is safe to assume that if a household
accessed an organic waste container, it was to deposit (some of their) organic
waste.9 Our first measure of organic waste sorting activity is the number
of unique days in a week a household used their card to get access to an
organic waste container. This variable, which we will refer to as “the number
of disposal days”, can take on a value between 0 and 7. If, for example,
we report the average frequency with which households used the organic
waste collection facilities is 0.2 days per week, this means that the average
household deposits its organic waste once every 5 weeks.10
Our second measure of organic waste sorting activity captures whether
or not a household made use of the organic waste sorting facilities in a week.
9Ideally, of course, (i) all of a household’s organic waste ended up in the collective
organic waste containers, and (ii) no non-organic materials were deposited in them (no
glass, paper, textiles, and also no residual waste items). We have no information on the
total amount of organic waste produced by each household, so we cannot measure what
share was recycled. However, we were able to monitor to what extent the organic waste
fraction was polluted by non-organic materials. Pollution rates were very low, and hence
we can safely assume that if households made use of the organic waste collection facilities,
it was to dispose near-unpolluted organic waste.
10In 84% of the cases in which households used their card to gain access to an organic
waste container on a specific day, they just used it once. However, there are also instances
in our data set in which the system registered that a household swiped their card multiple
times on the same day – up to 59 times. While swiping one’s card 59 times on a day may
reflect highly dedicated waste sorting, it is more likely that the system malfunctioned,
and the lid failed to open the first time the card was used. Information on the number of
distinct days in a week the facilities were used is thus more likely to properly capture the
intensity of waste sorting behavior than the total number of times the card was used in a
week.
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Changes in this variable reflects the extensive margin of organic waste sort-
ing, and hence the comparison with the treatment impact on this variable
and that on the number of disposal days gives insight into whether the treat-
ment affected the intensive margin of waste sorting, the extensive margin,
or both.
Our two main dependent variables are thus households’ frequency of
use of the collective organic waste sorting facilities, as well as the share of
households making use of them. These are important behavioral variables,
but ultimately the success or failure of the interventions depends on whether
or not they were able to increase the weight of organic waste collected. We
were unable to weigh individual deposits, but we have access to the total
weight of organic waste deposited in each container, for a large number of
weeks. The total amount of weight deposited is thus our third key outcome
variable of interest.
Stratification procedure and treatment balance
Our two-stage randomization process, as explained in Section 3.2.3 and sum-
marized in Figure 3.2, was implemented as follows. In the first stage, 11 of
the 42 household-container clusters were to be assigned to the just control
group, 10 were to be assigned to the just the social feedback group, 11 were
to be selected whose households were subsequently to be split, 50-50, to
either social modelling or control, and 10 were to be selected whose house-
holds would subsequently be split, 50-50, to either just social feedback or
the combined social feedback and social modelling intervention. We will
refer to these four groups of household-container clusters as Pure Control,
Pure Feedback, Mixed Control/ Modelling and Mixed Feedback/ Combined,
respectively.
Randomized assignment of the 42 household-container clusters to each
of the four groups was stratified on (i) whether the average value of the
homes of the household-container cluster was above or below the median,
(ii) whether or not the number of households in the household-container
clusters was above or below median, and (iii) whether the average weight
of the organic waste collected by each container over the last four weeks
preceding the randomization was above or below the median. Because we
stratified on both the number of households in a household-container cluster
and on the average weight collected, we also implicitly stratified on the
average intensity with which households engage in organic waste sorting.
We also stratified on the average tax value of the homes because it is likely
to capture a variety of dwelling and occupant characteristics (e.g., type of
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dwelling, size, disposable income) which may affect households’ ability to or
perceived relevance of waste sorting (Briguglio, 2016).
The randomization process for the social feedback intervention (Test I)
consisted of just one stage – because of the cluster-randomized approach. A
second randomization stage was implemented for all households in the Mixed
Control/ Modelling and Mixed Feedback/ Combined household-container
clusters (Test II and Test III, respectively). The second-stage treatment
allocation of households within each household-container cluster was strati-
fied on characteristics that have been documented to be strongly correlated
with waste sorting (Briguglio, 2016): (i) a median split indicator for distance
to the nearest organic waste container, (ii) family size (whether or not the
number of individuals in a household was 3 or more), and (iii) whether the
household made use of the collective organic waste container at least once
in the time period between November 12, 2018 and January 9, 2019 – the
two-month period between the start of the data collection and the moment
at which the randomization was executed. As explained in Section 3.2.3, our
design implies that the randomization for Tests II and III was also stratified
on location, as randomization is within household-container clusters. And
because dwellings (and hence occupants) are more likely to be similar within
a geographic area than between, that means that we expect to have good
balance on quite a number of other variables too – think of dwelling type,
size, and tax value, and hence also family size, composition and disposable
income.
Table 3.2 provides the descriptive statistics of the full household sample
(in column (1)), as well as those of the households that ended up in the
treatment groups that are used for our main tests (i.e., Tests I – III); see
columns (2)–(7). As shown in column (1), the average household in our
sample consists of 2.25 persons, with a by and large equal representation of
single-person, two-person and more than two person households. At least
one household member is above 65 in about 21 percent of the households, and
just above nine percent of the households have one or more children below
the age of three. The average home surface is about 100 square meters, and
almost 70 percent of the households in the sample lives in a multi-family
dwelling. The average (tax) value of a home is 141,000 euros, and about
56 percent of the dwellings are owner-occupied. The walking distance to
the nearest organic waste container is between 15 and 100 meters, with an
overage of about 70 meters (or about a one-minute walk).
Regarding sorting behavior in the baseline period (see 3.1), the average
household made use of the collective residual waste containers on about 1.8
separate days per week, but it used the collective organic waste containers
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less than 0.12 days per week (i.e., about once every eight weeks); see the
bottom rows of column (1) of Table 3.2. The average frequency of use
of the organic waste containers was thus quite low, but this average hides
substantial variation in organic waste sorting behavior. Slightly less than 17
percent of the households made use of the organic waste sorting facilities at
least once during the baseline; 83 percent did not use them at all. The share
of households that made regular use of the organic waste sorting facilities was
even smaller. Defining “regular sorters” as those households that made use
of the organic waste containers on at least two different days every 3 weeks
in the baseline period, we find that they make up about 7 percent of the
sample. These data suggest that simply offering households the possibility to
sort their organic waste does not automatically result in active engagement
in organic waste sorting.
Next, columns (2)-(7) of Table 3.2 present the means and standard devi-
ations of the households in our key treatment groups – those that are used
for Tests I, II and III. Columns (2) and (3) present the means and standard
deviations of those households that have been been assigned to the pure
control group and to the pure social feedback group, respectively. Together
they form the sample of 2146 households (1103 and 1043 respectively) that
will be used for Test I. Columns (4) and (5) present the means and stan-
dard deviations of the 926 households that are to be used in Test II, on
the impact of social modelling. All households in this sample belong to the
Mixed Control/ Modelling household-container clusters (see Figure 3.2, with
458 households receiving the social modelling treatment and 468 households
ending up in the control group. The characteristics of the two subsamples
employed in Test III (460 of the households in those household-container
clusters that were assigned to the combined treatment, and 455 to just the
social feedback treatment) are presented in columns (6) and (7).
Comparing columns (2)–(7) of Table 3.2, the means and standard devi-
ations are very similar in the six subsamples. This observation is confirmed
by columns (8)-(10) that provide the absolute differences between the char-
acteristics of the relevant pairs of treatment groups, as well as the outcomes
of a series of t-tests on these differences. We fail to reject the null hypothesis
of no difference for most t-tests. Of the 45 tests implemented, we reject the
null of no difference for just five at the 5 percent level, or lower. In absolute
values the differences are quite small, but they are statistically significant
because of the fairly large number of observations. An alternative test for
balance is on the basis of normalized differences, which present scale-free
comparisons (Imbens & Rubin, 2015; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009; Abadie
& Imbens, 2011). The normalized differences are presented in columns (11)-
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(13) of Table 3.2. Only one normalized difference is larger than the critical
value of 0.25 that is typically used in this literature, and that is the dif-
ference in mean distances to the nearest collective organic waste container
between the Pure Control and the Pure Feedback household-contained clus-
ters. While the absolute difference in distance of 9.6m is not significant
according to the t-test provided in column (8) of Table 3.2, the normalized
difference is close to 0.5 standard deviations. Overall we conclude that the
randomization has been successful in creating six groups of households that
very similar in all observable characteristics, and hence they are very likely
to be similar in all unobservable characteristics as well.
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As already announced in Section 3.2.3, we estimate our treatment effects
using a standard two-way difference in difference model:







βp Ipt Ti + εict. (3.1)
In this equation, yict reflects the organic waste sorting behavior of house-
hold i in household-container cluster c in week t. Household fixed effects are
captured by αi, and to improve precision we allow the week fixed effects
to differ between those households that were already engaged in regular or-
ganic waste sorting in the baseline period, i.e. those households that used
the facilities at least on two separate days every three weeks (γRSt ; with RS
referring to “regularly-sorting households”), and those households that did
not regularly use the waste sorting facilities in the baseline period (γINSt ;
with INS referring to “irregularly-sorting and non-sorter households”). We
use two different types of week fixed effects, because seasonal influences are
less likely to affect sorting activities for the latter type. Variable Ti reflects
the treatment household i in household-container cluster c was assigned to;
we estimate equation (3.1) separately for each of the three treatments. We
estimate the average treatment effects for two subperiods – the period in
which the treatments are implemented (p = T , between February 4, 2019,
and April 29, 2019), and the post-intervention period (p = P , between
April 30 and December 29, 2019). Indicator function Ipt is equal to one in
all weeks t either during or after the treatment implementation period (that
is, if p = T or p = P , respectively), and zero otherwise. Hence βT is the
average treatment effect during the intervention period, and βP captures
the average treatment effect in the post-intervention period. The last term
in equation (3.1) is εict, the error term. We follow Abadie et al. (2017) and
cluster the standard errors at the level of the unit at which treatments were
assigned – at the household-container cluster level for Test I, and at the level
of individual households for Tests II and III (see also Section 3.2.3).
In our core anlyses we use OLS to estimate equation (3.1) even though
yict is either a count variable (with integer numbers between 0 and 7, for the
number of separate days on which a household used the organic waste facili-
ties in week t) or a binary variable (capturing whether or not the household
used the facilities in week t, yes or no). We do so for both technical reasons
as well as for ease of interpretation, but we also probe the robustness of the
OLS results using negative binomial and probit models too.
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Equation (3.1) is our key model, but we estimate two other specifications
as well. The first alternative specification is designed to provide insight
into possible heterogeneous treatment effects. If effective, does a treatment
improve average waste sorting because it induces intensification of waste
sorting among households that were already actively sorting their waste in
the baseline period, or because it induces previously non-sorting households
to start sorting? We construct an indicator variable ISic which takes on
value one if the household i in household-container cluster c has used the
organic waste sorting facilities at least once in the baseline period, and zero
otherwise. We specify the following regression model:







(βp + βpS ISic) I
p
t Ti + εict. (3.2)
Here, βp captures the treatment’s impact on those households that never
used the waste sorting facilities in the baseline period, and βp+βpS then cap-
tures the treatment’s impact on those household that were already engaged
in waste sorting – at least to some extent – in the baseline period.
The second alternative specification is designed to provide better insight
into the dynamics of the treatment effects, by estimating them separately
for each each month – in the intervention period itself, but also in the post-
intervention period. Equation (3.3) is identical to equation (3.1), except
that it estimates the average treatment effects of each of the two treatments
for each of the treatment months for which we have data:







βm Imt Ti + εict. (3.3)
Here, Imt is an indicator function that equals one if week t falls in the m
th
month since the start of the intervention (with m ∈ {−4, ..., 11}), with neg-
ative numbers identifying pre-treatment months), and zero otherwise. All
other variables are defined as specified in equation (3.1). We explicitly esti-
mate pre-treatment differences (as well as post-treatment effects) to obtain
insight into the extent to which the treatment and control groups have sim-
ilar pre-treatment organic waste sorting patterns (and hence whether there
is support for the implicit parallel trend assumption). In both equations
(3.2) and (3.3) standard errors are clustered either at the household level or




Our two key behavioral outcome variables are the number of unique days
per week households made use of the collective organic waste collection
facilities, and the number of unique households accessing the facilities per
week. Figure 3.3 presents the time patterns of each of these two variables,
in the top and bottom panel respectively, for the three treatment groups
and the control group. The graphs need to be interpreted with caution, as
they are based on household-level treatment assignment, and hence possible
treatment spillovers are not accounted for. Yet the time patterns provide
suggestive evidence that all three treatments were effective in increasing
the intensity of organic waste sorting. Before the start of the interventions
organic waste sorting behavior was fairly similar in all four groups, and as
of the start of the interventions there is a marked increase in the overall
frequency of usage in the three treatment groups (top panel), as well as
in the number of unique households using the facilities per week (bottom
panel). Finally, the two graphs also suggest that the impacts of the three
treatments seem to be fairly permanent, as the difference between each of
the three intervention groups and the control group does not appreciably
decline from the fourth post-intervention month onward.
In the remainder of this section, we present the results of our statisti-
cal analyses. Section 3.4.1 presents our estimates of the average treatment
effects, Section 3.4.2 tests for the presence of treatment spillovers, Section
3.4.3 explores whether some types of households respond more strongly to
the treatments than others, Section 3.4.4 tests whether the size of the treat-
ment effects change over time and Section 2.4.3 tests whether or not the
estimated changes in the frequency of use of the organic waste collection fa-
cilities are likely to be an over- or an underestimate of the treatment impacts
on the amounts of organic weight collected.
3.4.1 Main treatment estimates
We start by presenting the results of our three main tests, Tests I-III, es-
timated using equation (3.1). The results are presented in Table 3.3. The
odd-numbered columns present the treatment effects, during the interven-
tion period and in the post-intervention period, on the average number of
unique days households use the organic waste facilities per week; the even-
numbered columns present the effects for the share of unique households
making use of the facilities per week.
The impacts of the social feedback treatment (Test I) are presented in
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(a) The average number of households’ unique organic waste dis-
posal days per week.
(b) Share of unique households having used the organic waste
collection facilities per week.
Figure 3.3: Temporal pattern of the average organic waste sorting perfor-
mance, measured by the number of unique usage days per week (panel (a))
or by the share of unique user households per week (panel (b)), in each of
the four treatment groups.
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columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.3. We find that this treatment had a posi-
tive impact on both measures of organic waste sorting in both sub-periods;
all estimated coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level, or better.
Moreover, the effects are sizeable; the social feedback treatment increased
the frequency of use of the organic waste collection facilities by 0.058 days
per week during the intervention period (or a 46% increase compared to the
control group’s mean frequency of 0.126 visits per week; see column (1)) and
there was a 3.7 percentage point increase in the average number of unique
households that made use of the organic waste sorting facilities (or a 48%
increase compared to the control group’s mean percentage of 7.6% unique
sorting households per week; see column (2)). The effect sizes for the two
dependent variables are thus fairly similar in percentage terms, and hence
the social feedback seems to have been equally effective in increasing the in-
tensive as well as the extensive margins of organic waste sorting. Moreover,
columns (1) and (2) also show that the effect does not seem to decrease
over time, even when the feedback information is discontinued; the average
impacts are, if anything, larger in the nine-month post-intervention period
than during the three-month intervention period (although this difference
is not significant; see the results of the appropriate F -test at the bottom of
Table 3.3).
The results of the social modelling treatment (Test II) are presented in
columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.3. We find that this intervention also affected
both measures of organic waste sorting activity – during the intervention
period, and also in the post-intervention period. During the intervention
period, the treatment resulted in a 35% increase in the frequency of use
and a 30% increase in the number of distinct users. And while we do not
find that the treatment effect increased over time, we also do not find much
evidence of effect size attenuation – the average effects are very similar in
the last nine months for which we have data to the average effects during
our three-month intervention period. Overall, the qualitative impacts of the
social modelling treatment are thus similar to those of the social feedback
treatment: the intervention seems to be equally effective in increasing both
the intensive and extensive margin of sorting behavior as evidenced by the
similarity in effects on both the number of disposal days and the number
of weekly container visitors, and we observe no significant reduction in the
size of the treatment effect between the intervention and post-intervention
periods.11 However, the sizes of the impact estimates of the social modelling
11The fact that we find significant effects for the social modelling treatment, imple-
mented “old school style” via leaflets delivered via mailboxes, is in a stark contrast to the
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treatment seems to be smaller than those of the social feedback treatment.
As shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.3, we fail to find evidence
for the social modelling and social feedback interventions to be mutually
reinforcing (Test III). The estimated impacts on the frequency of use of the
organic waste collection facilities are very close to zero, both during the in-
tervention and after the intervention has been completed. The estimated
impact on the share of unique households having used the facilities is some-
what larger, but the coefficients are not measured with sufficient precision
for them to be significantly different from zero.
The results in Table 3.3 are obtained using OLS regressions. The esti-
mation procedure therefore does not take into account that our dependent
variable is either a count variable with values between 0 and 7 (in case of
the impact estimates on the frequency of use, as measured by the number
of unique days a household made use of the collective organic waste sorting
facilities), or a binary variable (in case of the impact estimates on whether
or not a household made use of the facilities at least once in a week). We
test the robustness of our results by re-estimating equation (3.1) using neg-
ative binomial 12 and probit models; for more details, see Appendix 3.A.2.
We find that the results presented in Table 3.3 are robust, both qualita-
tively and also quantitatively, to using these alternative regression models;
see Table 3.A2. As a second robustness check, we test whether our results
are robust to correcting for multiple hypothesis testing. The test results
are presented in Appendix 3.A.2. We find that all but one of the results of
the social feedback intervention (as measured by the frequency of use of the
organic waste sorting facilities or the share of households using them, both
during the intervention period and thereafter) are robust to correcting for
multiple hypothesis testing (MHT). The p-values are p = 0.032, or better,
for the ones that remain significant after the MHT correction, and p = 0.155
for the one that does not survive the MHT correction. The social modelling
treatment’s impacts on the frequency of sorting remain borderline significant
lack of an effect of an intervention, aimed at reducing food waste, implemented via social
media; see Young et al. (2017). Whether this difference in outcomes is due to (i) the deliv-
ery method (Facebook versus leaflets, (ii) the method of harnessing social influence (with
self-selected role models posting hints how to reduce food waste versus our hand-picked
models) or (iii) the targeted behavior (reducing food waste versus stimulating organic
waste sorting) is an open question.
12We use a negative binomial model rather than a Poisson model because the latter
assumes that the dependent variable’s variance is equal to its mean. The number of
unique visits per week is, however, likely to be overdispersed because of the fairly large
number of non-sorter households. The negative binomial model is the preferred approach
because it does not require equal mean and variance (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013).
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within and post intervention (with p = 0.091 and p = 0.107, respectively),
but the treatment’s impact on the share of households using the facilities
(about p = 0.174 for each of the two subperiods) now fail to be significant.
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The treatment effect estimates of Test II and III presented in Section 3.4.1
are predicated on the assumption that there are no within-cluster spillovers
from households receiving a specific treatment to those that did not directly
receive it. So the question is whether there are significant differences, after
the start of the interventions, in the (trends in) behavior of control group
households that are very likely to have neighbors who received the social
modelling intervention (i.e., the control households in the Mixed Control/
Modelling household-container clusters), and of control group households
whose neighbors also did not receive any treatment (i.e., those in the Pure
Control household-container clusters). And similarly, are there significant
differences between social feedback households that are likely to have neigh-
bors who received the combined intervention (i.e., the social feedback house-
holds from the Mixed Feedback/ Combined household-container clusters),
and social feedback households whose neighbors also just received the social
feedback treatment (i.e., those from the Pure Feedback household-container
clusters)?
As explained in Section 3.2.3, our design allows us to explicitly test for
spillovers; see Tests IV and V in Figure 3.2. Before presenting the test re-
sults, we first verify the absence of major imbalances at baseline that may
affect treatment outcomes and therefore bias our spillover estimates. The re-
sults of these balance tests are presented in Table 3.A1 in 3.A.1, and indicate
that the randomisation was also successful in creating balanced treatment
arms for the spillover tests. We only find one significant difference between
the two groups within the sample of households used for Test IV, and also
just one between those used for Test V; with values of 0.101 and 0.139,
both associated normalized differences are well below the typical imbalance
threshold of 0.25.
The results of the spillover tests are presented in Table 3.4. Columns (1)
and (2) of this table report the results of Test IV on the presence of spillovers
from the social modelling treatment to the control group. The results are
clear-cut; there is no evidence for any spillover effects of the social modelling
treatment on non-treated households in the vicinity. The lack of positive
spillovers suggests that whatever induced treatment households to better
sort their waste did not have any direct or indirect effects on the behavior of
non-treated households (think of strengthening the social norm of organic
waste sorting – e.g., via direct communication, or via learning by watching
others – or by affecting personal norms).
Results are less straightforward, however, for the spillover test of the
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combined treatment – Test V. As shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table
3.4, social feedback households living in areas in which (a random) half
of the households received the combined treatment (i.e., the social feed-
back households from the Mixed Feedback/ Combined household-container
clusters) use the organic waste sorting facilities more frequently during the
intervention period than the social feedback households living in areas in
which all households received the social feedback intervention (i.e., those
from the Pure Feedback household-container clusters). During the interven-
tion period the frequency of usage by the former is about 20% higher than
that of the latter (0.038 days per week more often, compared to a baseline
rate of 0.188), and also the share of households making use of the facilities is
15% higher (a 0.018 percentage points increase compared to a baseline user
share of 0.118).
The results for Test V are puzzling. On the one hand we find that there
is no significant difference between households that received the combined
treatment and those that just received the social feedback treatment; see
columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.3. This suggests that our social modelling
information does not enhance the effectiveness of the social feedback infor-
mation. On the other hand, columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.4 show that
social feedback households located in household-container clusters of which
half of their neighbors received the combined intervention engaged in more






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 3. WHAT DO MY NEIGHBORS DO? LEVERAGING
SOCIAL LEARNING
We see two possible explanations. The first is that the combined inter-
vention does create spillover effects to social feedback neighbors, but that
our previous analysis is not able to detect these effects because of its focus
on average effects may hide temporal differences. If the impact of the com-
bined treatment is stronger than that of just the social feedback treatment,
we would expect to observe a stronger short-term impact of the combined
treatment, with that of the social feedback treatment catching up later. The
second possible mechanism is that the results are driven by small differences
in baseline sorting behavior. From Table 3.4 we know that the households
in the Pure Feedback household-container cluster were very similar to those
in the Mixed Feedback/ Combined household-container cluster. But the es-
timate of the spillover effect may be affected by small differences in group
organic waste sorting performance in the month prior to sending out the
first letter.
To provide insight into the validity of the first explanation, Figure 3.4
presents the temporal pattern of organic waste sorting of all households
in the Mixed Feedback/ Combined household-container clusters, as well as
that of all households in the Pure Feedback household-container clusters.
This figure clearly suggest that if there are spillovers from the combined
to the social feedback treatment group, these spillovers must have been
instantaneous and perfect; there is no evidence for the households in the
combined treatment group taking the lead and those in the social feedback
group following suit. We therefore conclude that it is unlikely that the
difference is caused by spillovers.
Figure 3.4 does, however, also suggest that small differences at base-
line may indeed have resulted in biased estimates of the treatment effects.
Compared to the households in the Pure Feedback treatment group, aver-
age waste sorting was slightly higher among the social feedback households
in the Mixed Feedback/ Combined clusters at baseline, and the first letter
of the social feedback treatment seems to have had a stronger effect. We
also observe, however, that this difference in waste sorting intensity does
not last, as the level of waste sorting in the Mixed Feedback/ Combined
household-container clusters decays in the first months post-treatment to a
level more similar to that observed in the Pure Feedback groups. Figure
3.4 therefore seems to support the hypothesis that small baseline differences
may have been key in driving the difference in social feedback performance
between these two groups.
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Figure 3.4: The average number of unique organic waste disposal days per
week of each of the two types of social feedback households (in the Pure
Feedback and in the Mixed Feedback/ Combined household-container clus-
ters) and of the combined households (in the Mixed Feedback/ Combined
household-container clusters).
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To statistically test the relevance of small differences at baseline, we use
an alternative regression strategy than the difference-in-difference approach
presented above – one that explicitly controls for any baseline differences
in household-container cluster waste sorting performance. More specifically,
we estimate the following ANCOVA model:







ηp Ipt Sic + εict. (3.4)
The essence of ANCOVA is that the outcome variable of interest, yict, is
regressed on its average level before the introduction of the treatment, ȳic0,
and possibly also on a set of baseline covariates. In our specification, we
control for household-container clusters’ waste sorting behavior in the last
month before the start of the intervention. We do so by including a vector
of dummy variables, denoted by φic, that capture (intervals of) the average
amount of organic waste deposited by the household-container cluster in the
month prior to the receipt of the first letter. The treatment period indicator
(Ipt ) and the time fixed effects, separate for household that regularly sorted
at baseline (γSt ) and for those that did not (γ
INS
t ), are defined as before; see
equation (3.1). Defining dummy variable Sic = 1 if household i in cluster c
is a social feedback household in a Mixed Feedback/ Combined household-
container cluster and 0 otherwise, coefficient ηp captures the extent of a
possible spillover from the combined treatment group households on their
neighbors who only received the social feedback intervention in treatment
period p. We conclude that spillovers are absent if we cannot reject the null
of ηp = 0 for p = {T, P}. Estimation is via OLS, and the standard errors
are clustered at the household-container cluster level.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.5. We first verify the
extent to which our ANCOVA analysis is able to replicate the results of the
difference-in-difference approach presented in Table 3.4. Columns (1) and
(2) of Table 3.5 present the ANCOVA regression results, for respectively
the frequency of use and user shares, without controlling for the baseline
waste sorting performance dummies. The results are very similar to those
obtained with the two-way difference-in-difference approach, as shown in
columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.4. Replacing the difference-in-difference
strategy by an ANCOVA strategy does not affect outcomes; the coefficient
capturing possible spillovers is positive and highly significant.
So are the difference in waste sorting performance between the Pure
Feedback households and the feedback households in the Mixed Feedback/
Combined household-container clusters the result of small differences in
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waste sorting performance at baseline? When we control for baseline neigh-
borhood waste sorting performance (see columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.5),
the spillover coefficients become insignificant, with p-values of 0.358 or
higher.
We thus conclude that there is evidence of treatment spillovers between
treated and non-treated households for neither the social modelling treat-
ment nor the combined treatment, and hence that the treatment estimates
presented in Table 3.3 are unbiased.13
13The letters received as part of the social learning treatments may thus have induced
households to update their beliefs about (i) the feasibility of organic waste sorting (if others
can do it, they themselves are likely to be able to do it too) and (ii) the social relevance
of organic waste sorting (if others do it, this is a signal that at least some neighbors find
recycling a worthy cause to contribute to). Similar considerations may have been evoked
by observing increased sorting behavior by neighboring households – when noticing that
more people make use of the facilities, or when observing more people carrying waste
bags in the streets. “Direct observation” is unlikely to be an important channel for social
learning, however – if only because we do not find any evidence for spillovers between
treated and non-treated households. We therefore conclude that treatment effects occur
via our letter interventions – not via households observing a (substantial) increase in the
number of sorting households, and subsequently follow their example.
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We thus established that both social feedback and social modelling were
effective in increasing organic waste sorting behaviors; see Table 3.3. We
also documented that that there is no added benefit from combining the
two interventions (compared to just implementing social feedback). We now
turn to answering two – related – questions. First, were the treatments
effective because they induced households that did not previously engage
in organic waste sorting to start separating their organic waste? Or were
the treatments effective because they were especially successful in inducing
households that already participated in organic waste sorting, to step up
their game? And second, does the star score received affect the size of the
treatment response? After all, policy makers who want to use the social
feedback mechanism can choose how to set the thresholds for the various
star scores. Does more positive feedback (in the form of awarding a higher
star score for a given performance) encourage households to do even better,
or does it make them more complacent instead?
We aim to answer these two questions in the following two subsections.
Before doing so, we pool all data into three groups – the control group (pool-
ing the control households in the Pure Control and in the Mixed Control/
Modelling household-container clusters), the social feedback group (pooling
the households in the Pure Feedback and in the Mixed Feedback/ Combined
household-container clusters), and the social modelling group (consisting
of only the social modelling households in the Mixed Control/ Modelling
household-container clusters). We pool these groups of households because
this increases the power of our analysis; we are allowed to do so because we
found evidence of neither treatment spillovers nor of any added impact of
social modelling above and beyond the impact of the social feedback inter-
vention.
Estimating the treatment effects on sorter and non-sorter house-
holds
To test whether the treatment effects differ between those households that
were already engaged in some organic waste sorting prior to the introduction
of the treatment, we estimate equation (3.2). This specification allows the
treatment effect to differ depending on households’ baseline sorting status
– having used the organic waste collection facilities at least once during
the baseline period, or not. For brevity, we will refer to these as ‘sorter
households’ and ‘non-sorter households’, respectively.
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Table 3.6 presents the results of our regression analyses using equation
(3.2). Columns (1) and (2) of this table show that the social feedback inter-
vention has been effective in increasing organic waste sorting among both
sorter and non-sorter households, but especially so for the sorter households.
For example, whereas the non-sorter households in the social feedback treat-
ment increase the frequency with which they use the facilities by 0.05 extra
days per week during the intervention period, the sorter households increase
their frequency of use by (0.0498 + 0.152 =) 0.20 days per week; see column
(1) of Table 3.6.
We thus find heterogeneous impacts for the social feedback treatment,
but the evidence for the social modelling treatment is less compelling. As
shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.6, the estimates indicate a stronger
response among sorter households than among non-sorter households, but
the coefficients are estimated with insufficient precision for these differences
to be statistically significant. We interpret these outcomes as absence of
evidence for the existence of heterogeneous treatment effects in the social
modelling intervention – not evidence of absence.
The impact of star score feedback on organic waste sorting behav-
ior
The second type of heterogeneity we test for, is the impact of the number of
stars received in the social feedback letters. If the amount of sorting is such
that a container just fails to receive an extra star, does that stimulate or
rather discourage sorting compared to the case in which the star cutoff had
been set slightly more leniently? That is, does it matter whether thresholds
are set such that they are either just above or just below the current sorting
level?
To answer this question we resort to regression discontinuity analysis
(Lee & Lemieux, 2010). More specifically, we compare the social feedback
treatment’s impact on households assigned to household-container clusters
with per-household average container weights just below the threshold that
merits an extra star, to that on households with per-household average con-
tainer weights just above that threshold. Regression discontinuity analysis
is predicated on the assumption that clusters similar in average household
organic waste weight deposited are likely to be similar in other dimensions
as well, and thus that there are no fundamental differences between house-
holds located in household-container clusters just above or just below a star
cutoff level.
Figure 3.5 presents the amount of organic waste deposited, averaged
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Figure 3.5: The distribution of the amount of organic waste collected in
the containers of the 42 associated household-container clusters in the last
month before the start of the social feedback intervention.
Solid vertical lines indicate the threshold weights for the number of stars. All
containers received at least one star; extra stars are earned when crossing 150 grams
(**), 350 grams (***), 675 grams (****) and 1000 grams (*****). The dashed
lines indicate the interval of 75-225 grams per household, which is the interval of
household-container clusters selected for the regression discontinuity analysis.
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over all households in a household-container cluster and measured in grams,
in the final pre-treatment month. The uninterrupted vertical lines in this
figure indicate the threshold levels for the second, third, fourth and fifth
star (with levels 150, 350, 675 and 1000 grams; see also Table 3.1). As
is clear from Figure 3.5, the bulk of the containers received either one or
two stars. We thus focus our analysis on all households in those household-
container clusters of which the container’s average per-household weight was
just above or just below the second-star cutoff. More specifically, we focus on
the impact on the behavior of the households in the 12 household-container
clusters of which the container’s average per-household weight was less than
75 grams away from the 150 gram threshold (i.e., between 75 and 225 grams;
see the dashed vertical lines in Figure 3.5). This interval contains more than
500 households whose container received 1 star in the first social feedback
letter, and more than 700 households whose container received 2 stars in
that first letter. The regression discontinuity model is specified as follows:







δp Ipt Ic(wc > 150) + εict, (3.5)
where Ic(wc > 150) is an indicator function that takes on value 1 if
container c’s average amount of organic weight collected over the last pre-
intervention month is between 150 and 225 grams per household in the
household-container cluster, and zero otherwise. We cluster the standard
errors at the household-container cluster level. The other regressors are
defined similarly as in equation (3.1). The coefficients of interest are δT and
δP , which capture the difference in the frequency of organic waste sorting
caused by the first feedback letter containing two stars rather than one in,
respectively, the intervention period and the post-intervention period.
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Table 3.7 presents the results. The evidence for the surprise of receiving
a two-star letter at the start of treatment affecting sorting behavior – either
in the short run, or also in the longer run – is weak at best. The impact on
the share of households making use of the organic waste sorting facilities in
the intervention period is positive and significant. But the size of the effect
is small (less than 1.6 percentage points), and only marginally significant
(p = 0.060). None of the other coefficients are significant at the 10 percent
level, or better.14
We thus conclude that baseline cluster performance as measured by being
just above or below the second star-threshold at baseline is not associated
with significantly higher sorting behavior after treatment.
3.4.4 Treatment dynamics
We thus found that both the social feedback and the social modelling treat-
ments were effective in improving waste sorting behavior, both during the
intervention period as well as in the post-intervention period. Estimating
the average effect over each of these sub-periods may, however, hide tempo-
ral patterns in treatment response. To analyze the treatment dynamics, we
estimate equation (3.3). Figure 3.6 presents the estimated treatment effects
for each month – the four months prior to the start of the intervention, and
the twelve months thereafter (including month 0, the month in which the
first letters were sent). The coefficients capture the difference in sorting
behavior between the treatment and control households, compared to the
difference observed in the month preceding treatment (month -1). Panel A
of Figure 3.6 presents the treatment effects on the number of distinct days
households made use of the organic waste sorting facilities per week, and
Panel B the share of households having used them at least once during a
week.
As is clear from Figure 3.6, pre-treatment differences are relatively small
and statistically insignificant. Regarding the treatment impacts, the effects
of the social feedback treatment are sizeable both during the intervention as
well as after the interventions have been completed; Panels A and B suggest
that from the fourth month since the completion of the intervention (i.e.,
from month 6 onwards), both the frequency of use and the share of users
14As a robustness check, we enlarge the number of household-container clusters from 12
to 16 by estimating equation (3.5) using all households in household-clusters within 150
grams of the two-star threshold (i.e., those with per-household weights collected between
0 and 300 grams). The results – not shown here, available upon request – are both
qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to the ones presented in Table 3.7.
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stabilized at a level that is about 0.05 days per week (or about two-thirds)
higher than that of the control group. In contrast, the effects of the social
modelling intervention are smaller and they also tend to attenuate over time.
We thus conclude that the social feedback treatment has not only been
successful in motivating households to better sort their organic waste in the
short run, but also in the long(-er) term – and maybe even permanently.15
The social modelling treatment’s impact are, however, found to be transitory
at best.16
15This permanent change in behavior may be due to habit formation (Becker & Murphy,
1988), or due to waste sorting having experience good characteristics (because of the
difficulty of properly assessing the costs and benefits of waste sorting ex ante; (Nelson,
1970; Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995), or both. Unfortunately, our RCT does not allow us to
differentiate between these different channels, but based on the extant literature both are
plausible candidate causes for the short-term interventions having permanent effects.
16We also formally tested whether the social feedback intervention is significantly more
effective than the social modelling treatment – in terms of the frequency of sorting as well
as in terms of the share of households using the facilities, during the intervention period as
well as thereafter. We were able to reject the null of no difference for all four comparisons
at p-values of 0.105, or better.
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(a) Frequency of use (days per week)
(b) User fraction
Figure 3.6: Treatment estimates per month, for the social feedback and the
social modelling interventions
The estimates are the coefficients obtained using estimating regression (3.3) using
the number of separate usage days per week (panel (a)) or the fraction of households
making use of the facilities in a week (panel (b)) as dependent variable. The
indicator for final month of the baseline period is the omitted category. A month
is defined here as four weeks, with the exception of months -4 (1 week) and 11 (3
weeks). The period in which the interventions were implemented (the ’intervention
period’) is demarcated by the vertical lines.
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3.4.5 The relationship between usage frequency and weight
We documented that the social modelling and social feedback treatments
resulted in a significant increase in the frequency with which households
made use of the organic waste sorting facilities. From an environmental
perspective this increased frequency is beneficial only if it translates into
an increase in the total weight of organic waste sorted. After all, for the
environment it is not the frequency of visits per se that matters, but the
amount of waste collected (in terms of improved composting, reuse as organic
fertilizer, and fuel and CO2 emission savings when incinerating the cleaned-
up residual waste flow). So did our treatments increase the total amount of
weight collected?
Obviously, an increase in the frequency of use of the collective organic
waste collection facilities results in an increase in the amount of organic
waste collected if the weight per deposit does not decrease. A sufficient
condition for this is that the percentage reduction in weight per visit is
smaller than the concomitant percentage increase in the visiting frequency.
Average weight per visit may go down if a treatment induces households to
wait less long before they go out and dispose of the organic waste collected.
It may also go down if the treatment induced non-sorting households to start
sorting, but at lower intensity than households that already sorted prior to
the treatment implementation. Did our treatments result in a reduction in
the average weight of organic waste deposits?
We empirically verify the impact of an increased waste sorting frequency
on the average weight per deposit as follows. We regress the weight of
container c in week t, Wct, on (i) the total number of disposals made at
container c in week t (NumbDepositsct, as measured by the aggregate num-
ber of unique disposal days registered at container c in week t), and (ii) a
series of dummy variables capturing the accompanying household-container
cluster’s type (Pure Control, Pure Feedback, Mixed Control/ Modelling, or
Mixed Feedback/ Combined), interacted with dummies capturing either the
intervention or the post-intervention period:







t + γc + µt + εct. (3.6)
In this model, coefficient α measures how the total weight collected in
container c in week t varies with the number of deposits made in that week.17
Next, Zkc is a dummy variable capturing whether or not container c had
17That is, we still retain the definition that a household made one deposit if the number
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been assigned to a specific container type k, with k ∈ K, and K ={Pure
Feedback, Mixed Control/ Modelling, Mixed Feedback/ Combined}). As
before, Ipt is an indicator function that is equal to one in the weeks during
or after the treatment implementation period (that is, for p = T and p = P ,
respectively), and zero otherwise. Having interacted Zkc and I
p
t , coefficient
βpk then captures whether, having controlled for the number of deposits
having been made, the total amount of weight collected in containers of
type k is higher or lower than that in the Pure Control containers in period
p). Finally, γc and µt capture the container and week fixed effects; standard
errors (εct) are clustered at the container level.
Note that this method is, in essence, a simple production function ap-
proach. The container fixed effects capture any time-invariant factors af-
fecting the weight of organic waste collected in the container, and the week
fixed effects correct for possible seasonal influences. The weight of organic
waste collected in a container is assumed to vary with the total number of
deposits the container receives. This total number of deposits varies with
the treatment status of the households to which the container is nearest
to, as all three treatments have been documented to increase the frequency
of organic waste deposits; see Section 3.4.1). The approach assumes that,
independent of whatever caused the number of deposits to differ between
containers, an extra deposit results in the container’s weight to increase by
α kilos. The coefficients on the container’s type therefore capture whether
the observed container weight is larger or smaller than predicted by the
number of disposals under this assumption, controlling for container and
week fixed effects. If none of the β-coefficients are negative and significantly
different from zero, we can conclude that any change in the frequency of use
did not result in a lower average weight per deposit.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.8. The coefficient
on the number of visits shows that Pure Control households that made use
of the organic waste container facilities dropped off, on average, 1.16 kilos
of organic waste per visit. Next, and importantly, all coefficients on the
container-type dummies have a positive sign – in the intervention period,
and also in the post-intervention period. While not all coefficients are signif-
icantly different from zero, none of them is negative either. For example, in
case of the Mixed Control/ Modelling containers, the total weight collected,
of times it swiped its card to get access to the container, is strictly positive. Having
swiped their card twice or more on the same day is thus coded as one deposit for that day.
As already explained in footnote 10, we do so because swiping the card more than once
very likely to be the result of a system malfunction, in the form of the lid not opening
immediately at the first swipe.
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averaged over the intervention period is 6.65 kilos higher (p = 0.052) than
one would expect if the weight per deposit would have been equal to that
in the pure control group. That means that weight per deposit in the inter-
vention period is thus higher for these mixed-usage containers than for the
containers that are exclusively (or at least predominantly) used by house-
holds in the control group. And the same conclusion holds for the other types
of household-container clusters, and also for the post-intervention period.
This analysis thus shows that the average weight per deposit is not lower
in any of the (mixed) treatment containers than in the pure control contain-
ers. That means that the percentage change we documented in the change
in frequency with which households made use of the organic waste container




per container in a week
Number of unique organic waste disposal days in week 1.164∗∗∗
(0.177)
Intervention period × Pure Feedback container 8.698∗
(5.068)
Intervention period × Mixed Control/Modelling container 6.647∗
(3.311)
Intervention period × Mixed Feedback/Combined container 4.414
(4.208)
Post intervention period × Pure Feedback container 8.807∗∗
(4.321)
Post-intervention period × Mixed Control/Modelling container 5.536
(4.208)





Pure Control container mean (Intervention period) 26.80
Pure Control container mean (Post-intervention period) 29.17
Number of containers (N) 40
Number of observations (N × T) 1104
Container fixed effects Y
Week fixed effects Y
Standard errors, clustered at the container level, in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.8: Analysis of the weekly amount of weight collected in a container.
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3.5 Identification of the underlying mechanisms
In Section 3.4 we documented that both the social modelling and the social
feedback treatments significantly affected waste sorting. We also find that in
case of the social feedback treatment the impacts are long-lasting. These re-
sults do, however, raise the question via which mechanism these treatments
affected waste sorting. Is it because the treatments increased the house-
holds’ motivation to sort? Did the exposure to the intervention improve the
extent to which households felt capable of properly sorting their waste, as
they became more knowledgeable on what type of waste needs to be dis-
posed of how? And were the effects long-lasting because (a more intensive)
engagement in waste sorting resulted in mitigating concerns regarding how
cumbersome (or inconvenient) organic waste sorting is?
Based on Briguglio (2016) we selected a number of factors that are
thought to be important determinants of organic waste sorting behavior,
ranging from households’ attitudes towards waste sorting to their perceived
self-efficacy in waste sorting.
These (categories of) variables can be considered potential mediator vari-
ables via which the treatments have improved organic waste sorting. We de-
veloped a survey instrument to elicit households’ scores on different aspects
of each mediator; an index was then constructed for each mediator by ag-
gregating the survey answers to all questions within the mediator category
under consideration (for details, see below).
We administered the survey instrument twice, with a one-year interval.
The first survey was implemented in June and July 2018, roughly 5 months
before the start of the baseline period, while the second survey took place
in June and July 2019, about one month after the intervention period ended
(see the time line in Figure 2.1). The surveys were conducted in person,
with the survey team knocking on the doors of pre-selected households. We
did not have budget to contact all 4000 households in our study. For the
baseline survey we contacted, in total, 1324 households, of which 242 (or
18%) responded, and for the second survey we had budget to visit 1093
households. With relatively few respondents, statistical power is increased
substantially if the regression model can be estimated as an ANCOVA model
(regressing endline variables on baseline values, treatment status and other
controls) rather than as a simple cross-section; see McKenzie (2012). To
increase our chances of being able to estimate ANCOVA models, we revisited
the baseline respondents for the second survey. We also revisited baseline
non-respondents, but only a subsample of those – if they were unwilling or
unable to participate in the first survey, they may not be willing or able
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to participate in the second survey either. We thus spent the rest of the
remaining budget for the second survey on trying to recruit households that
had not been contacted for the baseline survey. Of the 1093 households that
were visited for the second survey, 222 (or just over 20%) ended up filling
out the survey, of which 105 also had participated in the baseline survey.
We face two challenges. First, we need to choose whether we wish to
analyze the second survey data using ANCOVA (i.e., using the baseline value
of the dependent variables as a control), or whether we analyze the data as a
cross section (using just the data of the second survey). With an ANCOVA
we have 105 responding households to work with; with a cross section, we
have 222 households. Second, as is the case with any survey, the sample of
households that answered the survey is not necessarily representative of the
population of households in the RCT; there may be non-random selection
into the survey. We decided to opt for the cross-sectional analysis because
the number of households having filled out both surveys is too low to be
able to properly correct for non-random survey participation.
The set-up of this section is as follows. Section 3.5.1 presents our identifi-
cation strategy to uncover possible avenues via which the treatments affected
waste sorting activity. Here, selection into the survey plays a key role, and
Section 3.5.2 documents whether non-random selection was indeed an issue
in our study. Section 3.5.3 then presents the results of the analysis.
3.5.1 Mechanism identification strategy
In the endline survey we asked a series of questions to gauge five mediator
categories relevant for waste sorting behavior: households’ attitudes towards
waste sorting, the extent to which they view waste sorting to be a personal
norm, their beliefs about the benefits of waste sorting, their beliefs about the
(in-)convenience of waste sorting, and their perceived self-efficacy in waste
sorting. Each mediator category consisted of between 3 and 11 questions
(or survey items), and households could answer using a five-point Likert
scale. We normalized households’ answers to each question by subtracting
the item’s mean score and subsequently dividing this difference by the item’s
standard deviation. We then created an index for each mediator category
by taking the average of all normalized items in that category.
Determining which of the mediator categories had been affected by the
treatments – if any – is not straightforward. While allocation to the treat-
ment arms is random, the decision to answer the survey (when invited to
do so), is not. If the households that filled out the endline survey were a
representative sample of the population of households that participated in
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our RCT, we could simply regress each of the indices on treatment status
using OLS, to uncover the impact of treatment (β). We would then estimate
the following model:
yi = βTi + γXi + εi. (3.7)
Here, yi is household i ’s score on the mediator index under consideration,
Ti denotes the treatment household i was assigned to, and Xi is a vector of
covariates that includes a constant term as well as those household charac-
teristics that are potentially correlated with outcome variable yi. Finally, εi
is the error term that is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2.
Our parameter of interest, β, is an unbiased estimate of the treatment
effect on yi if selection into the survey is (quasi-) random. Let us use binary
variable pi to denote whether or not household i participated in the endline
survey (pi = 1), or not (pi = 0). We can model the decision to select into
the survey as follows:
p∗i = µTi + δXi + νZi + ϕi. (3.8)
In this equation p∗i is a latent variable such that pi = 1 if and only
if p∗i > 0. Next, Xi is the vector of household characteristics that may
affect moderator values (see equation (3.7)), and Zi is a vector of household
characteristics that affect the decision to participate in the survey, but not
the survey outcome variable yi. Finally, ϕi is the error term. Household i ’s
survey responses are observed (i.e., pi = 1 in (3.8) and yi is non-missing in
(3.7)) if and only if p∗i > 0. Equation (3.8) can be estimated using probit. As
shown by Heckman (1976, 1979), not taking into account sample selection
gives rise to an omitted variable problem in the outcome equation (3.7). A
necessary condition for the OLS estimate of β in (3.7) to be unbiased, given
selection as shown in equation (3.8), is that ρ ≡ corr(ϕi, εi) = 0; see also
Vella (1998). If ρ 6= 0, an unbiased estimate of β can be obtained by jointly
estimating (3.7) and (3.8) using Maximum Likelihood (Puhani, 2000).18
The key test for selection bias is thus whether ρ 6= 0. The reliability
of this test depends crucially on the availability of instrumental variables
that are strongly correlated with the decision to participate without being
correlated with the survey outcome variable of interest (i.e., those variables
in Zi); see Wolfolds and Siegel (2019)). We will address this issue in the
next subsection.
18We use the Maximum Likelihood estimator (and not Heckman’s two-step estimator)
because it has better small sample properties; see Puhani (2000).
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3.5.2 Selection into the survey
The vector of covariates of selection model (3.8) must thus include (i) all
covariates that are expected to affect households’ responses to the survey
questions making up the various mediator categories (i.e. Xi in equation
(3.7)), as well as (ii) additional covariates Zi that strongly affect the decision
to participate (p∗i in equation (3.8)), but that are unlikely to be correlated
with the answers to those survey questions (yi in equation (3.7)). We selected
these two sets of variables as follows.
Potential candidates to be included in Xi and Zi can be selected from
the set of available baseline characteristics (see Table 3.2). As explained
before, information on most of these variables are obtained from Schiedam
municipality’s register data; those on sorting behavior in the baseline period
have been collected as part of the RCT. In addition to these variables we
possibly also need to control for whether households participating in the
endline survey also participated in the baseline survey. Households that
participated in both surveys are likely to have stronger pro-sorting opinions
and behaviors than others. We explicitly need to control for this because for
the endline survey we deliberately oversampled households that had already
participated in the baseline (in our attempt to obtain panel survey data
rather than a cross-section).
Regarding the choice of instrumental variables in the Heckman selection
model (those to be included in Zi), we have two candidate variables: whether
a household was not just invited to participate in the endline survey but for
the baseline survey as well, and whether the household was at home when
the interviewers passed by for the endline survey. These two variables are
unlikely to have a direct influence on the mediator variables of interest, and
hence may serve as potential instruments in the Heckman selection model.
The invitation to participate in the baseline survey was extended randomly
to households in selected blocks deemed representative of the study area, and
their propensity to accept the invitation to participate in the second survey
may be higher or lower than for households that have not been contacted
before. Also, whether or not an adult member of the household was at
home when the interviewers came by is another variable that is likely to
affect households’ probability to participate in the survey without an obvious
correlation with the mediator variables of interest.
The regression results of model (3.8) are presented in Table 3.9. All
variables in the top panel of this table (i.e., above the dashed horizontal
line) are candidates to be included in Xi; those in the bottom panel are
our potential instruments (Zi). Column (1) presents the regression results
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from the full model. Three of the variables in the top panel are found to be
significantly correlated with the decision to participate, and may also affect
households’ appreciation of the various aspects of the waste sorting process.
Households that were already engaged in waste sorting at least to some
extent in the baseline period are more likely to participate in the survey, and
– having controlled for baseline sorting behavior – so are households living
farther away from the organic waste sorting facilities. The third variable is
whether the household had participated in the baseline survey, 12 months
earlier; those who participated in the baseline survey were also more likely
to participate in the endline survey.
As shown in column (1) at the bottom part of Table 3.9, our two po-
tential instruments significantly affect the probability of participating in the
endline survey. The coefficients of both variables are positive and signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 5% level; the coefficient of having been at
home at the time of the endline survey is particularly large. The result of the
test whether our two instruments are relevant is presented at the very bot-
tom of Table 3.9. The value of the appropriate F -test is 120 (p < 0.01), and
hence we conclude that our two instruments are indeed strongly correlated
with the decision to participate in the endline survey.
The number of variables included in column (1) of Table 3.9 is large, and
a large share of them turns out to not significantly different from zero. Mul-
ticollinearity may cause variables not to show up significantly, and hence we
reran equation (3.8) in search of a more parsimonious model. We therefore
kept the treatment indicator and sorting variables (the latter were impor-
tant characteristics relating to treatment effect heterogeneity), but removed
those variables of which the average marginal effect was smaller than its
standard error. As shown in column (2) of Table 3.9, omitting them re-
sulted in one of the previously insignificant variables to become significant:
households with larger homes are now also found to be more likely to par-
ticipate in the survey. However, we also find that the coefficient of the
variable does not appreciatively differ between columns (1) and (2). This
also holds for the coefficient on treatment status, which remains small and
not statistically different from zero (p = 0.623). We thus find no evidence
of treatment-induced selection into the survey.
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(1) (2)
Received any of the three treatments 0.0116 0.0101
(0.0205) (0.0205)
Used organic waste facilities at least once during baseline 0.0935∗∗∗ 0.0950∗∗∗
(0.0307) (0.0306)
Regular sorter during baseline 0.0363 0.0355
(0.0398) (0.0398)
Distance to nearest organic waste container (in m.) 0.00167∗∗∗ 0.00164∗∗∗
(0.000482) (0.000474)
Share of households living in multi-family dwellings -0.0176
(0.0260)
Household with at least one member over 65 -0.0347 -0.0336
(0.0228) (0.0226)
One person household 0.0225
(0.0234)
Household with three or more members -0.0172
(0.0272)
Surface of the dwelling (ln) 0.0506 0.0445∗
(0.0416) (0.0266)
Household with children 0.0306 0.00999
(0.0290) (0.0214)




Participated in baseline survey 0.210∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.0304) (0.0305)
Was invited to participate in the baseline survey 0.0539∗∗ 0.0519∗∗
(0.0232) (0.0231)
Was at home when contacted for the endline survey 0.472∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(0.0309) (0.0303)
Number of households (N) 1091 1093
Relevance test: χ2-statistic 120.315 122.206
Relevance test: p-value 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable is whether the household filled out the survey. Estimation using probit; the co-
efficients are average marginal effects. Variables included as instruments in the Heckman model, are
“Was Contacted for the Baseline Survey”, and “Was at Home when Contacted for the Endline Survey”.
Relevance tests capture whether the instruments have sufficient predictive power in predicting survey
participation.
Table 3.9: Household characteristics correlated with the propensity to par-
ticipate in the survey.
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3.5.3 Identification of the treatment mechanisms
We now turn to estimating whether the treatments had any impact on (the
categories of) variables that are thought to be important for households’
decision to engage in organic waste sorting. We distinguish five types of
intermediate variables – those related to households’ motivation to sort:
their attitudes towards organic waste sorting, their personal norms regarding
waste sorting, their beliefs regarding the benefits of waste sorting, the extent
to which they feel empowered to properly sort waste (self-efficacy), and their
perception of how (in)convenient it is to sort organic waste.
To probe different aspects of our mediators, each mediator category con-
sisted of between 3 to 11 survey questions, which were subsequently aggre-
gated into mediator indices as follows. Answers to each of the questions
within a mediator category were normalized by subtracting the question’s
mean and dividing by its standard deviation (‘I do not know’ answers were
coded as missing). To construct an index for each mediator category, we
took the mean of the normalized values of the answers to all the questions
(or items) that make up a specific mediator category.
As explained in Section 3.5.1, the parameters of equations (3.7) and (3.8)
are estimated jointly, using Maximum Likelihood. Table 3.10 presents the
parameter estimates of equation (3.7) for each of the five mediator cate-
gories, as well as the test of whether or not selection bias is an issue (i.e.,
whether ρ 6= 0, or not). We find ρ to be significantly different from zero
(p < 0.10) in column (4) and bordeline (in)significant (p < 0.125) in column
(1)); correcting for selection bias using the Heckman selection model is thus
not strictly necessary for the other three mediator categories. For consis-
tency, Table 3.10 presents the Heckman results for all five models; rerunning
columns (2), (3) and (5) using OLS yields results that are very similar to
those presented in Table 3.10 (available upon request).
As shown in Table 3.10, we find that having received any of the three
treatment significantly strengthened the household’s attitude towards waste
sorting (see column (1); p = 0.014) as well as their belief that waste sorting
is important for society (column (3); p = 0.067). When we inspect treat-
ment effects on the underlying items, we find that the treatments affect
attitudes especially because of their impact on attitude towards in-house
organic sorting (p = 0.001), while the item probing the respondent’s belief
in proper waste processing exhibits the largest treatment-induced change
(p = 0.014) in the sorting benefits mediator category.
Furthermore, we also find some evidence that the treatments improved
the treated household’s self-efficacy, albeit it that the impact just fails to be
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statistically significant at conventional levels (column (5); p = 0.101). The
questions in this index gauged households’ appreciation of the difficulty of
various issues related to organic waste sorting. The self-efficacy result seems
to mainly reflect household improved knowledge of the sorting rules (which
waste material should be sorted with what other materials; p = 0.034)
accompanied with better insight in how well one is sorting waste (p = 0.083),
with borderline significant impacts on the items probing the difficulty of
both bringing the bag to the container and using the container (p = 0.114;
p = 0.112).
Finally, the treatments failed to significantly affect people’s moral moti-
vations (column (2); p = 0.215), and the same holds for their appreciation
of (the lack of) inconvenience of waste sorting (column (4); p = 0.666). We
therefore find evidence for treatment effects on both household motivations
to sort and aspects that might inhibit waste sorting. The survey results sug-
gest that the treatment effects on waste sorting may have been caused by
strengthened positive attitudes towards waste sorting, by higher perceived
benefits, and to a lesser extent by an increased perceived ability to engage
in waste sorting.
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Households can contribute to reducing natural resource scarcity as well as
mitigating climate change by better sorting their waste. While the public
benefits of improved waste sorting are substantial, the private benefits are
negligible. In this paper, we examine whether providing information about
the behavior of neighbors can be leveraged to stimulate households to sep-
arately sort their organic waste. We find that providing information about
the average weight of organic waste deposited by other households in one’s
block and in combination with setting group goal, is an effective strategy to
persistently increase sorting rates – in terms of the frequency of use of the
organic waste collection facilities, as well as in the amount of organic waste
deposited. In contrast, we find that providing information about the behav-
ior of a specific fellow resident in the neighborhood, a local ‘role model’, does
not result in similar increases in waste sorting – neither when this informa-
tion is provided in isolation (as a stand-alone intervention), nor when it is
implemented in combination with the information on the actual behavior of
the households in their direct vicinity.
Our study contributes to the scant literature on the impact of soft be-
havioral interventions to improve household waste sorting. We interpret
our two key interventions as attempts to harness social learning to improve
environmental outcomes in a context where the costs of environmentally
friendly behaviors are (perceived to be) considerable, and of which the pri-
vate monetary benefits are essentially zero. We do acknowledge, however,
that our interventions, and then especially the social feedback intervention,
also include aspects other than those typically associated with social learn-
ing. The fact that in the social feedback treatment information is provided
about the actual amount of waste sorted by one’s peers may be perceived
as a (descriptive) social norm, and the fact that a star evaluation system
is used to convey information about actual performance implies that the
treatment also has elements associated with collective goal setting. Further
research is needed to uncover the exact mechanism by which the provision
of information on the behavior of one’s peers affects outcomes.
135
CHAPTER 3. WHAT DO MY NEIGHBORS DO? LEVERAGING
SOCIAL LEARNING
3.7 References
Aadland, D., & Caplan, A. J. (2003). Willingness to pay for curbside
recycling with detection and mitigation of hypothetical bias. American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85 (2), 492–502.
Abadie, A., Athey, S., Imbens, G. W., & Wooldridge, J. (2017). When should
you adjust standard errors for clustering? (NBER Working Paper No.
24003). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Abadie, A., & Imbens, G. W. (2011). Bias-corrected matching estima-
tors for average treatment effects. Journal of Business and Economic
Statistics, 29 (1), 1–11.
Allcott, H. (2011). Social norms and energy conservation. Journal of Public
Economics, 95 (9-10), 1082–1095.
Allcott, H., & Rogers, T. (2014). The short-run and long-run effects of
behavioral interventions: Experimental evidence from energy conser-
vation. American Economic Review , 104 (10), 3003–3037.
Allison, P. D., & Waterman, R. P. (2002). Fixed-effects negative binomial
regression models. Sociological Methodology , 32 , 247–265.
Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: A minority of
one against a unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs: General
and Applied , 70 (9), 1–70.
Ashraf, N., Bandiera, O., & Jack, B. K. (2014). No margin, no mission? a
field experiment on incentives for public service delivery. Journal of
Public Economics, 120 , 1–17.
Baird, S., Bohren, J. A., McIntosh, C., & Özler, B. (2018). Optimal design
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Figure 3.A1: Photograph of one of the collective organic waste containers
that were introduced in the research area.
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Figure 3.A2: Example of one of the four social modelling flyers.
Title Translates as: [Name model] cleans up the dining table. In the final panel the
model states ‘Sorting waste is fun and good for the environment’.
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3.A.2 Robustness checks main analysis
Negative binomial and probit models
In this Appendix we test whether results of Table 3.3, obtained via OLS, are
robust to using econometric models that are able to address the discrete-
value nature of our dependent variables: the negative binomial model to
address the issue of the frequency-of-use data taking on values between 0
and 7, and the probit model to address the binary nature of the choice to
dispose waste at the organic facilities in a specific week.
In our robustness analyses, we either include household or container fixed
effects as covariates in the negative binomial models, and always container
fixed effects in the probit models. Our choice of the different types of fixed
effects is driven by the discussion on how to deal with the ‘incidental pa-
rameter problem’ in nonlinear models with fixed effects (Neyman & Scott,
1948). Specifically, as fixed effects cannot be easily partialled out of the es-
timation in nonlinear models, they all need to be estimated. This can cause
the model parameter estimates to not converge in probability to their true
values if the number of cross-sections is large (because the number of fixed
effects is increasing in the number of cross-sectional units). This concern
is valid for the probit model (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005), and hence we use
container-level fixed effects to save on the number of fixed effect parameters
to be estimated. In contrast, Allison and Waterman (2002) show that the
incidental parameter problem does not bias the estimates of the negative
binomial model even if the number of fixed effects is large. We thus probed
whether the negative binomial regressions converged when using household
fixed effects; if not, we present the results using container fixed effects.
The results of the negative binomial regressions are presented in columns
(1), (3) and (5) of Table 3.A2. The coefficients presented are incidence
ratios, and hence they capture the treatment effect as measured by the
percentage change in the dependent variable. The results obtained using the
negative binomial are qualitatively identical to those of the OLS regressions
(as presented in Table 3.3). The largest treatment effects are found for
the social feedback intervention, those of the social modelling are smaller,
and the combined treatment did not improve sorting above and beyond
what has been achieved by the social feedback treatment effect. Also in
quantitative terms the results are similar. The negative binomial results
estimate the social feedback treatment to increase sorting by 69 and 83
percent during and after the intervention period, respectively, as compared
to 45 and 71 percent according to the OLS estimates. The difference in
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estimated treatment effects of the social modelling intervention are even
smaller; the negative binomial model documents 29% and 26% increases
in the frequency of use in and after the intervention period, respectively,
compared to 35% and 30% increases according to the OLS estimates. And
regarding the robustness of the treatment estimates on the share of unique
households that made use of the facilities per week, we find that the marginal
effect estimates of the probit model are virtually identical to the marginal
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Multiple hypothesis testing
In this subsection we analyze whether the results of our main tests, Tests
I-III, are robust to correcting for multiple hypothesis testing (MHT). We
follow the approach developed by List et al. (2019) using STATA’s mhtexp
command. List et al.’s procedure acknowledges the possible dependence
between the p-values of the various tests (think of the test results of an
intervention’s impact on two alternative measures of essentially the same
outcome variable of interest), and hence is better able to detect truly false
rejections than, for example, the corrections proposed by Bonferroni (1935)
or Holm (1979); see also Romano and Wolf (2005). We perform this pro-
cedure for our four key outcome variables: the frequency of organic waste
sorting and the share of households using the collective organic waste facil-
ities, in the intervention period as well as in the post intervention period.
Table 3.A3 presents the results.
The results are as follows. Having corrected for MHT, the social feedback
treatment significantly increases the share of households using the facilities
both within the intervention period (p = 0.032) as well as thereafter (p =
0.000). The treatment’s impact on the frequency of of use also remains
significantly different after the intervention has been completed (p = 0.000),
but not so in the period in which the treatment was in the process of being
rolled out (p = 0.155).
Next, the social modelling impacts turn out to be less robust to MHT –
in line with the earlier finding that these impacts are both smaller and less
persistent than those of the social feedback treatment. The social modelling
treatment’s impacts on the frequency of sorting remain borderline significant
within and post intervention (with p = 0.091 and p = 0.107, respectively),
but its impact on the share of households using the facilities fail to remain
significant both within and after the intervention period (p = 0.172 and p =
0.174, respectively). And consistent with the earlier results of a lack of an
additive effect of the combined treatment compared to the social modelling


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The impact of real-time
consumption feedback on gas
and electricity use
4.1 Introduction
In the world-wide effort to reduce global carbon emissions, much of the
policy makers’ attention is directed towards the residential energy market.
Not only is the residential sector responsible for a substantial share of emis-
sions (in the Netherlands, this share is about 15-20 percent; (PBL, 2020)),
its level of energy consumption and associated energy costs may be ineffi-
ciently high too. Households often do not take measures that are known
to increase energy efficiency even if they are cost-effective (e.g. Allcott &
Greenstone, 2012; Gillingham & Palmer, 2014), and there is also evidence
This chapter is based on joint work with Kees Vringer, under the working title ’The
impact of real-time and disaggregated energy consumption feedback on residential gas and
electricity usage’. We thank foundation !Woon, the Woonbond, Agem Energieloket (for-
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tenants platform MEVM, housing association UWoon and residents initiative Energierijk
Houten for the opportunity to execute the experiment and for their help with the field
work. In particular we thank Eef Meijerman, Ingrid Houtepen, Kelly Schwegler, Jaap van
Leeuwen, Marion Overberg, Justin Pagden, Jeroen aan het Rot, Belinda Haverkamp, Cees
Veerman, Henk Oostland, Pier Schipper, Iris Uittien, Annet Bultman and Katrin Larsen.
Furthermore, we thank Ernestine Elkenbracht and Erik van Lidth de Jeude (Quintens) for
their excellent project management of the field work as well as Cheyenne Ramada for her
excellent research assistance. We thank Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO) and The
Dutch Ministry for Internal Affairs for their financial project support. Finally, we thank
Daan van Soest and Ben Vollaard for their valuable comments.
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that they do not respond in a rational manner to energy price changes (Ito,
2014). Some economists have argued that the residential energy market
does not just suffer from traditional market failures (such as the carbon
emission externality problem associated with energy consumption), but also
from behavioral anomalies preventing households to make energy efficient
decisions (Tietenberg, 2009; Allcott et al., 2014; Price, 2014). For instance,
households have been shown to misperceive the energy cost of different uses
(Attari et al., 2010), and to pay limited attention to energy costs when these
are not explicitly made salient (Allcott, 2011; Sexton, 2015).
The recognition that households may make mistakes when consuming
energy opens up a new set of behavioral strategies to improve energy deci-
sion making. Studies analyzing such strategies demonstrate their potential
(Allcott & Rogers, 2014; Jessoe & Rapson, 2014; Ito et al., 2018). One strat-
egy in particular, consumption feedback, has received a lot of attention (see
the meta-reviews by Abrahamse et al., 2005; Darby, 2006; Fischer, 2008;
Ehrhardt-martinez et al., 2010; Delmas et al., 2013; Karlin et al., 2015).
These studies generally find that feedback improves the efficiency of energy
consumption. Yet, the different impacts documented suggests that feedback
mediums vary in their energy saving potential, raising questions about why
these effect sizes are different. With the large investments made in smart
meter infrastructure, research into the determinants of effective feedback
and the mechanism by which it induces savings becomes also increasingly
policy relevant.1
In this paper we estimate the impact of providing real-time and dis-
aggregated energy consumption feedback on residential gas and electricity
consumption. We do so by implementing a field experiment involving over
800 households. We recruit households – living in gas-heated dwellings and
interested in receiving technology, an In-Home Display, that is able to pro-
vide (close to) immediate insight in the consumption of both heating and
cooking (gas) and appliances (electricity) – in seven locations across the
Netherlands. Identification of the treatment effect is by means of a random
rejection design, via which half of the applicants receive a device, and the
1It is European policy to provide at least 80% of consumers with intelligent metering
systems (Directive (EU) 2019/944, 2019). For instance, van Gerwen et al. (2010) cal-
culated for the Netherlands that a smart meter roll out would be cost effective if these
smart meters would realize energy savings of 3.5%, or more. Other EU countries also
expect energy savings of 2-3%, for example in the UK (1.5-5%), Sweden and Belgium
(1-2%) (Vringer & Dassen, 2016). However, Vringer and Dassen (2016) concluded that
the promotion of smart meters in the Netherlands did not realize the projected savings:
actual energy savings amounted to less than 1 percent, presumably due to the low take
up of smart meter applications that provide consumption feedback.
154
4.1. INTRODUCTION
other half does not. We evaluate energy savings by comparing daily electric-
ity and gas consumption data that we collected for at least 7 months after
the displays were installed. To better understand how the display affected
behavior, we provide survey evidence concerning the impact of the device
on household knowledge of the largest contributors to their energy bill and
their monthly energy charges.
We find the display to induce substantial energy savings. On average,
households that receive the display realize gas savings of 6.9 percent and
electricity savings of 2.2 percent. The gas savings seem to be highest dur-
ing colder days, a pattern suggestive of changes in the energy consumption
of space heating. Though households save energy on one of the most en-
ergy intensive categories within their home, we do not find evidence that
households targeted this use due to being better informed of space heat-
ing’s relative energy intensity compared to other uses. However, we do find
evidence that households became better informed of the amount of money
spent on gas consumption. As households report to continue actively use
the display long after having received it, (sustained) energy cost salience
seems to have been an important mediator driving the observed changes in
energy consumption.
Our study is thus unique due to its combination of two aspects. First,
we complement the feedback literature by providing evidence on an in-home
display that distinguishes the consumption by energy-intensive uses (in our
case gas, predominantly reflecting heating-related consumption) from the
energy use of electric appliances.2 There is various research suggesting that
the impact of electricity feedback on electricity savings can be increased by
adding other information as a complement (see e.g. Abrahamse et al., 2005;
Tedenvall & Mundaca, 2016). Feedback on the underlying sources of energy
consumption has been found to increase the impact of aggregated forms of
feedback by 5 percent (Gerster & Andor, 2020), while Schleich et al. (2017)
finds that IHD feedback generates an additional 5 percent savings when
households are offered the option to also receive web-portal or standard mail
feedback. Asensio and Delmas (2015) find feedback to generate 8 percent
more electricity savings when provided with reminders of the environmental
and health externalities involved with energy consumption. Yet the potential
of display feedback on separate energy uses is underexplored. This framing
2Electric air-conditioning devices are also very energy-intensive. However, although
air-conditioning is becoming increasingly popular in the Netherlands, it remains atypical
for a household to have air-conditioning. We therefore assume cooling technologies to be of
limited concern in our sample. Based on the seasonal patterns in electricity consumption,
we do not find evidence suggesting otherwise, see section 4.2.4.
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of feedback information is not only relevant for contexts with dual-fuelled
residences, such as the Netherlands, but is also relevant for electricity-only
homes, due to the development of new technologies recognizing the footprint
of individual uses in metered energy consumption.3
Second, we complement the existing line of work by analyzing the effect
of display feedback using a field experiment that involves a larger sample
size and a longer time period than typical in this literature. Our study
involves a sample size of over 800 households monitored for over 7 months
post treatment. We so contribute to a number of peer-reviewed studies
(e.g. Schultz et al., 2015; Aydin et al., 2018; Westskog et al., 2015; Lynham
et al., 2016; Schleich et al., 2017)4 and a large number of utility pilots
and policy reports (see e.g. Faruqui et al., 2010; McKerracher & Torriti,
2013; Ehrhardt-martinez et al., 2010) analyzing the effect of energy in-home
displays. The peer-reviewed literature typically involves sample sizes below
150 households (Westskog et al., 2015; Lynham et al., 2016; Aydin et al.,
2018) while utility pilots tend to be of larger scale (Faruqui et al., 2010;
McKerracher & Torriti, 2013). The study by Schultz et al. (2015) monitors
the energy consumption of about 431 households, but over a relatively short
period of time (up to three months after the installation of the display).
Both the time since installation and sample size are important features
for further study. Treatment exposure generally has been identified as a
factor important for feedback impact, although the direction of the effect re-
mains unclear (Darby, 2006; Fischer, 2008; Ehrhardt-martinez et al., 2010).
Moreover, the combination of the field experimental method combined with
a larger sample size is important. Current research tends to suffer from low
statistical power compared to the larger scale utility pilots, but at the same
time the peer-reviewed work tends to be more explicit in supporting their
claim to causal inference. This study aims to bridge this gap by analyzing
the effect of an energy display in a randomized field experiment using a
3A notable study analyzing the impact of targeted feedback using in-home displays is
the policy report by CER (2011). This report analyzes effective gas demand-side man-
agement programs using a randomized controlled trial, with treatment arms of about 300
households. One treatment is involves in-home displays providing gas consumption feed-
back as part of a combination treatment (also including bimonthly energy billing and a
detailed energy usage statement). The authors find this combined treatment to induce 2.9
percent gas savings measured over a period of 11 months. See also Harold et al. (2015)
for further analysis.
4Note that there are additional studies analyzing high-frequency feedback as a comple-
ment to dynamic price incentives (Jessoe & Rapson, 2014; Ito et al., 2018). Since research
has shown price incentives to strongly influence the impact of feedback (Faruqui et al.,
2010), we exclude these here.
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larger sample size and time horizon.
Our results highlight that real-time and disaggregated energy consump-
tion feedback mitigates consumer mistakes. We find evidence that the feed-
back results in households’ becoming better informed of the size of the gas
bill. The induced reduction in energy consumption is thus likely to reflect a
better alignment of households’ actual energy consumption with their pri-
vately optimal consumption.
Yet it remains an open question to what degree households depend on
continued interaction with the device to remain informed (salience effects),
or whether they internalized the information (learning effects) (Jessoe &
Rapson, 2014; Lynham et al., 2016). Our experimental design does not al-
low us to distinguish the (relative) impact of salience and learning as drivers
of this result. Instead, we use the survey answers to provide descriptive
evidence for the household engagement with the device. Our study so con-
tributes to discussions in the literature regarding the engagement fostered
by display devices, and the degree to which they allow the users to learn
from the feedback (Buchanan et al., 2015).
The set-up of this paper is as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the ex-
perimental design, a random-rejection design with participants recruited at
seven different locations. The section also explains how we expect the in-
home display to affect household energy behavior. Section 4.3 discusses
our energy data set and the empirical strategy we use to analyze this data.
Section 4.4 covers the results of this analysis. Section 4.5 analyzes survey
answers to gain insight into the determinants of energy savings. Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 Experimental Design
4.2.1 Background and Experimental setting
When households consume energy, they typically do not receive feedback
on their level of energy use or the financial consequences of their choices.
This lack of feedback makes it difficult for households to learn the energy
cost associated with their consumption decisions, which may lead households
to overconsume energy and not properly evaluate the energy costs of new
appliances or energy conservation measures. The difficulty to observe this
cost is inherent in the way households consume energy: households consume
energy indirectly through other consumption decisions, while the ex-post
and aggregate nature of energy billing obscures the underlying consumption
behaviors that gave rise to the energy bill. In the Netherlands for instance,
157
CHAPTER 4. THE IMPACT OF REAL-TIME CONSUMPTION
FEEDBACK ON GAS AND ELECTRICITY USE
nearly all households pay their energy costs in advance by a fixed monthly
installment, while the actual bill is settled with the advance payment after
a year.
With the rise of smart meters, the possibility has opened up to collect
high-frequency energy data to be employed in informational technologies,
such as in-home displays. These devices, also referred to as energy moni-
tors, do not only allow households to receive better insight into their energy
consumption patterns, but also allow households to receive this feedback in
at a location within their home of their choosing.
To analyze the effect of an energy in-home display on household energy
consumption, we partnered with seven local organisations to recruit a large
pool of households interested in receiving a free in-home display to be used
for one year. Our partners included municipalities, energy offices and so-
cial housing- and tenants associations, operating in seven different areas in
the Netherlands. As a result, our experiment took place at seven locations.
Recruitment occurred over a period of almost two years (from Fall 2017 un-
til June 2019), and consisted of various approaches, including social media
campaigns, leaflets, and advertisements in neighborhood magazines. The
display was introduced as a device that provides insight in actual energy
usage which could help households cut costs on their energy bill. The mate-
rials informed households interested in receiving the device to sign up using
a local project website.
The sign-up process included a short pre-experiment questionnaire and
the experimental participants were restricted to those that met the require-
ments for participation: the household should live in one of the partner areas,
should not be planning to move within the near future, have a modern (non
DSMR 2.2) smart meter that can be accessed by their energy company, and
live in a gas-fired dwelling. Last, the household had to agree to share their
energy data for research purposes. These recruitment campaigns led to an
experimental population of 802 households for which electricity and gas data
were available. Figure 4.1 shows the location of the experimental population
by postal code. The three largest experimental locations are recognizable
on the map as the three largest non-overlapping circles. Identification of
the causal impact of the display on energy consumption is by randomizing
which households were offered the display. Because our experimental sample
consisted of households having applied to receive an display, we essentially
use an “random rejection” approach.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Experimental population by postal code 2-region.
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4.2.2 Treatment
The in-home display analyzed in our study is a small monitor that provides
direct feedback on gas and electricity consumption. The direct feature of the
device, as defined by Darby (2006), implies that the energy use information
has not been processed in some form, and thus can be provided relatively
quickly to the user. In our case, the electricity feedback is given (close to)
instantaneously, while the feedback on gas consumption is provided after at
most 10 minutes. The consumption data is visualized by means of a simple
color-coded dashboard. The dashboard allows households to choose whether
the feedback is provided in terms of current hourly energy consumption, or
in comparison to a daily budgetary goal. In addition, a colored light is fitted
to the top of the display that signals the level of current electricity usage as
determined by a self-learning algorithm. The display is also able to provide
feedback information on past energy consumption (e.g. per week, or per
month). Figures 4.2 and 4.3 provide examples of the display and the energy
dashboard.
Figure 4.2: The Energy In-Home Display
Arguably, the display feedback increases the salience of a household’s
energy costs. As in the absence of feedback, the energy use implications of
consumption decisions within the home only become apparent at the later
moment of billing, it is likely that households pay little attention to this
aspect when consuming energy. The display makes energy costs salient at
the moment of consumption, by drawing attention to energy costs through
both the mounted light and the color-coded dashboard. Salience has been
found to affect decision making in various field experimental studies (see for
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(a) First tab home screen - current usage
(b) Second tab home screen- today’s budget
Figure 4.3: Key functions of the energy in-home display
Translations when reading from left to right, from above to below:
Panel (a):
Now - Today, Electricity - gas.
Panel (b):
Now - Today, Electricity- gas, Forecast: Above budget, Forecast: Below budget.
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a review of the literature DellaVigna, 2009).
Besides reminding households of energy costs, the display’s informational
content may facilitate learning. In particular, as the display provides infor-
mation on the real-time electricity and gas usage, households are able to
update beliefs regarding (the costs of) their aggregate level of electricity
and gas consumption. Typically, households are uninformed about the size
of their energy bill, providing substantial scope for improvement. Brounen
et al. (2013) finds that only about half of Dutch households that participated
in a representative survey was able to provide an estimate of their monthly
energy charges. A possible reason for this lack of attention are automatic
electronic billing plans that allow households to pay for their utilities with-
out needing to review their bill first (Sexton, 2015).
Moreover, with more frequent exposure to consumption feedback house-
holds may deduce the importance of energy intensive measures in driving
these bills. Households can for instance compare their level of energy use
before and after consumption decisions to infer the level of energy use asso-
ciated with specific actions. As such, the consumption feedback may help
households to learn what processes are important contributors to their en-
ergy consumption and become better able to identify what behaviors, appli-
ances and technologies are most conducive to conserving energy. This type
of learning may be especially facilitated by the gas feedback, as the feed-
back involves at most three types of processes and behaviors: space-heating,
water-heating, and cooking. The electricity feedback in contrast, may in ad-
dition reflect many other (electrical) appliances, making it more difficult to
judge the energy intensity of the underlying measures. To help households
uncover effective energy saving strategies, we provided households with an
accompanying booklet, which helps households conduct the necessary cal-
culations to estimate yearly savings. The booklet pays special attention to
uncovering the yearly cost of low-energy intensive appliances that always
use energy as opposed to high-energy intensive appliances that only create
infrequent peaks in usage. Previous studies have found substantial scope
for improvement on energy consumption beliefs. Attari et al. (2010) finds
that households systematically underestimate the energy costs of processes
in the home and the potential for energy savings by a factor of three. In
addition, households seem to be overly focused on behaviors as opposed to
investments, as they tend to perceive behavioral changes such as switching
off lights as the most conducing to conserving energy (Attari et al., 2010).
As false beliefs regarding the profitability of energy saving measures may
reflect mistakes in how households process information, the display and the
accompanying booklet help households to properly process the energy con-
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sumption feedback. Examples of such mistakes, relevant in the domain of
energy efficiency, are present bias or bias of concentration (Allcott, 2016).
The first bias refers to mistakes in decision making when households over-
value payoffs closer to the present compared to the future when comparing
trade-offs between two future dates (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999), while the
second refers to mistakes resulting from households overweighing the cost
of behaviors and devices whose cost accrue in occasional sharp increases
as compared to cost that accrue in sustained smaller amounts over time
(Koszegi & Szeidl, 2013).
The display aims to prevent households from making such mistakes when
processing the energy consumption feedback. The dashboard allows house-
holds to see projections of current energy costs relative to an energy bud-
get, with goal setting being an effective strategy in the energy domain to
counteract the present bias internality (Andor & Fels, 2018). The provided
booklet helps households calculate the (yearly) energy savings of conserva-
tion measures. Households that have trouble making these calculations may
be helped by this guidance, which could help them more effectively evaluate
the savings potential of conservation strategies (see for instance Brent &
Ward, 2018). By guiding households through these calculations, the treat-
ment aims to help households form the right beliefs regarding the financial
savings potential of energy saving measures.
4.2.3 Treatment assignment
Because of our long period of recruitment, we allocated households to the
treatment (being offered a display) or control group by batch. We moni-
tored the number of households that signed up for the project, and regularly
grouped newly recruited households into location specific batches within
treatment was assigned. We verified whether these households met the par-
ticipation requirements and checked the households’ smart meter compati-
bility with the display. If the households met the requirements we assigned
them to treatment and control.
The original design was to create a treatment and control group of equal
size, by randomly assigning half of each batch to treatment. During the
project however, we learnt that our treatment display was incompatible
with two smart meter types due to a software malfunction.5 This affected
our design, as the number of households with incompatible smart meters
5Specifically, at all locations the display was incompatible with DSMR 2.0 and ISKRA
smart meters. For one location (number 5) we were able to update the software which
solved the incompatibility issues with ISKRA meters.
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was sufficiently large to substantially reduce the power of our design when
excluded from the project. We therefore asked practitioners out of the field
about the meter type assignment procedure and explored the option of us-
ing meter type assignment as an instrument. Based on this qualitative
evidence, we decided to exclude one type of unsuitable smart meter (DSMR
2.0 meters) from the project. This particular meter was predominantly
installed in households that had actively requested to receive their smart
meter even before the national roll-out of smart meters had started. We did
include a second type of unsuitable meter (ISKRA meters), as we did not
find evidence that households were able to self-select into this type of meter.
Specifically, both this meter and suitable meters are predominantly installed
free-of charge by network operators in the Dutch national smart meter roll-
out. In this national program, network operators contact households region
by region and offer them a free smart meter replacement. Households cannot
choose which smart meter type they receive, the type installed is dependent
on the available meter stock at their network supplier. As network opera-
tors use multiple meter suppliers to avoid dependence on one supplier, which
meter households receive is quasi-random.
The validity of our randomization procedure is therefore predicated on
the smart-meter roll-out having been quasi-random. In accordance with
the qualitative evidence from the field, we expect a positive but imperfect
correlation in meter type among neighbors. Neighboring households are
contacted at the same time in the smart meter roll-out and thus receive
a meter from the supply-side mix of meters available at the time of meter
installation. We find a positive intra-cluster correlation of 0.17 (p<0.05) in
meter type (suitable, or unsuitable ISKRA meter) installed at the 2-digit
postal code level – a neighborhood of about 1750 households.
Taking into account this knowledge about the meter installations, we
analyze whether households assigned to either one of the two meter types
are comparable, considering that some regions may be over-represented in
one of the two meter type groups. Table 4.1 shows the balance test on
observables for both households with and without suitable meter in the 6
locations where we relied on meter type assignment. Specifically, we show
the two group means, and then test whether these means are significantly
different once we control for region fixed effects. Out of the 28 tests, we only
find evidence for a slightly different distribution of residences by construc-
tion year and a different self-reported baseline energy efficiency score. The
group of households with a suitable meter has a 4.5 percentage point larger
fraction of homes built between 1975 and 1984, and a slightly smaller frac-
tion (of 6.6 percentage points) of homes that were built after 2014. Though
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the households with non-suitable meters are more likely to live in older
homes compared to households with suitable meters, a characteristic that
typically correlates with higher space heating energy requirements, we also
find evidence that these households report their energy efficiency score to
be higher. This may indicate that these households have more often taken
isolation measures effectively equalizing heating demand. Our results there-
fore do not suggestive of different levels of energy consumption in one of
the groups. In addition, we note that the fraction of newly built residences
is the only one with a normalized difference larger than 0.25 – the cutoff
typically used in this literature above which imbalances are thought to be
a concern (Imbens & Rubin, 2015; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009; Abadie &
Imbens, 2011). Based on the results we therefore conclude that we cannot
reject the assumption of as-if random meter type assignment on the regional
level. Based on observable characteristics and reported energy efficiency, we
do not find the energy consumption of households with a display-suitable
energy meter to differ from the energy consumption of households without
a suitable meter.
We have therefore verified the validity of meter type as instrument for
treatment assignment on the regional level. However, we did not use meter
type as the sole determinant of treatment assignment. When we only assign
households by meter type, we have no control over the size of the treatment
arms which could lead the control group size to deviate substantially from
the size of the treatment group, negatively impacting power when we make
between group comparisons (List et al., 2011). We therefore decided to em-
ploy a hybrid design instead. Our randomization process can be formalized
as follows. Let Njk denote the number of applicants in randomization batch
j in location k. Of those Njk, we first assign all households with an un-
suitable meter to the control group. We then assigned households with a
suitable meter to treatment with probability πjk ∈ [0.5, 1]. Specifically, this
probability is decreasing in the number of unsuitable households already as-
signed to the batch control group (Fjk) , and in some cases, decreasing in












. In most batches Cjk equals the number of households
with an unsuitable smart meter (Fjk). In a few cases, we chose to redefine
Cjk = Fjk +αjk with αjk > 0, to enlarge the probability of treatment group
assignment within the batch. We set αjk > 0 when previous batches con-
tained many unsuitable meters, leading the the cumulative treatment arm to
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(1) (2) (3) T-test Normalized
Total Non-Suitable meter Suitable meter Difference difference
Variable N Mean/SE N Mean/SE N Mean/SE (2)-(3) (2)-(3)




































































































































































































Notes: Balance test comparing the characteristics of the households with suitable and nonsuitable smart meters (ISKRA type meters). The
Table excludes outliers and the 186 households at location 5 where we did not rely on meter type treatment assignment. Energy efficiency
score denotes the answer to the question: ’How energy-efficient are you?’, where the person filling in the survey could give their answer on
a scale from 0 (’Not energy efficient’) to 6 (’Very energy efficient’). The ’Imagine you receive a energy display. How much energy do you
think you will save with this energy display? Households give their answers on a scale from 0 (’Nothing’) to 6 (’Very much’). We perform
the balance t-tests using a linear regression model where each covariate is regressed on the meter type indicator, with region fixed effects
included in all estimations. Standard errors are robust. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level. Table
adapted from table constructed using the iebaltab command of the ietoolkit package (DIME Analytics, 2019).
Table 4.1: Balance test on the two meter types
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lag behind the cumulative control arm size at the location.6 The randomi-
sation dates, batches and accompanying treatment assignments are listed in
Table 4.2.
6In 2 batches involving 12 households in total (1.5 percent of experimental population),
there were supply-side constraints, reducing scope for treatment assignment. We assigned
these households to control.
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As households that have signed up for the project filled in a baseline ques-
tionnaire, we have access to baseline characteristics relating to household
energy usage. In addition, we collected energy data during the project by
reading the households’ smart meters. To evaluate whether our randomiza-
tion procedure was successful, we discuss these two data sources and evaluate
balance.
Baseline characteristics
After excluding households of the unsuitable meter type installed before the
national smart meter roll-out, we end up with an experimental population
of 802 households in our experiment for whom we have energy data.7 The
descriptives of these households are depicted in Column (1) in Table 4.3.
Most households are two-person households (57%), followed by a substan-
tial share of one-person households (30%). One-third of households has one
or more children of school age, while only 10 percent has one or more chil-
dren below the age of 4. About a quarter of households have one or more
household members aged over 65. Furthermore, close to half of households
have at least one member with tertiary education. Only 2.5% reports pri-
mary school as highest education level in the household. About 29% of the
households in our sample live in semi- or fully- detached homes, while an
about equal share (25%) lives in an apartment. Only few of these residences
were built after 2014 (only 5 percent), while close to two-thirds was built
before 1984. About half of the homes are owned-occupied. About 40 percent
are classified as having no solar panels at baseline, as we did not observe
these households to sell electricity before randomisation.
We conduct balance tests on the overall treatment and control group
sample to determine whether our randomization procedure resulted overall
in two groups that are similar on observables. Columns (2) and (3) of Table
4.3 show the sample means of the control and treatment group, while the
final two columns show their (normalized) mean difference. We cluster the
standard errors of all tests at the regional level if the respective location
employed meter type assignment. We cluster at the household level instead
if the location did not assign unsuitable meters to the control group. We
7We also exclude 8 outlier households from our analysis as their estimated yearly
amount of electricity purchased was above 9000 KWh, a number well above the elec-
tricity requirement for a 5-person household living in a large (detached house) in the
Netherlands (5*1631,8=8159 KWh based on CBS data). Data based on CBS data for
2018, website consulted on 10-7-2020 https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/cijfers/detail/83882ned.
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(1) (2) (3) T-test Normalized
Total Control group Treatment group Difference difference













































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Balance test using the ISKRA smart meters and the smart meters suitable for the display. Excluding outliers. There are 2 households for which the baseline
survey was incomplete. In addition, the energy efficiency score and energy savings potential score have some missing responses as these questions were optional.
Energy efficiency score denotes the answer to the question: ’How energy-efficient are you?’, where answer was given on a scale from 0 ( ’Not energy efficient’) to 6
(’Very energy efficient’). The ’Imagine you receive a energy display. How much energy do you think you will save with this energy display? Answers were given on
a scale from 0 (’Nothing’) to 6 (’Very much’). The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. The t-tests are conducted on the
treatment coefficients obtained by regressing each covariate on the treatment indicator. Standard errors are clustered by region if meter type assignment was used
at the location the household belongs to, and clustered on the household level otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical
level. Table adapted from table constructed using the iebaltab command of the ietoolkit package (DIME Analytics, 2019).
Table 4.3: Balance test on the two treatment arms
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only find 3 out of the 28 tests to be statistically significant, suggesting that
the treatment and control group have on average similar characteristics.
Importantly, we do not find differences in terms of home size and age, two
characteristics that moderate the effect of smart-meter interventions tested
as part of Ireland’s Smart Metering Gas Consumer Behavioural Trial (Harold
et al., 2018).
We have also verified whether the treatment and control groups within
locations are comparable, using the same procedure as before but this time
comparing the treatment and control groups within each location. The
number of significant differences in the 196 tests8 is not larger than the
number of false rejections consistent with the significance criterion applied
(test results available on request).
Energy Data
We have data on households’ daily (net) amount of gas and electricity pur-
chased, collected over the period from December 7, 2017, until June 14, 2020.
The gas data are measured in cubic meters (m3) while electricity is recorded
in Watt hours (Wh). For gas, energy purchased equals energy consumed,
but for households with solar panels we rely on smart meter data reflecting
energy purchases and energy returned to the grid to calculate the amount
of electricity consumed. For those households, we estimate the electricity
production capacity of their solar system by measuring the amount of elec-
tricity produced as a function of the sun’s strength on a number of different
days, and use that function to estimate how much electricity they produced
on all other days. By subtracting the observed amount of electricity the
households puts back on the grid, this analysis provides insight into the
household’s self-consumption of the electricity it produced. More detailed
information about our estimation strategy can be found in Appendix 4.A.1.
Our energy data panel is unbalanced, and consists of more than 346,000
observations. This unbalance is a direct result of our rolling recruitment
design, which creates variation in the date at which the smart meter of
households become readable. Once the smart meter of a household becomes
readable, we track their energy data until the end of the experiment. In
addition, some energy observations were set to missing (less than 0.1 percent
of observations) as we observed a data entry error to take place in the
first data entry after the number of digits of total energy purchased or sold
recorded by the smart meter changes.
87 treatment-control comparisons for 28 variables
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To better understand our panel data set, we plot the number of energy
observations by calendar date. Figure 4.4 shows the number of observations
by calendar day for the gas and electricity data. The number of observations
per calendar day increased gradually the during the recruitment period,
with a large influx in households signing up for the project just before the
end of June 2019, when the final recruitment rounds were concluded. The
Figure demonstrates that we had a few technical errors in the data recording
infrastructure, causing no data to have been collected at certain calendar
dates. The largest energy data readability error occurred in the heating
season of 2019/2020, from the start of January to halfway March 2020. As
these errors induce missing values for all households, the errors do not affect
our ability to causally interpret our treatment effect estimates.
Figure 4.4: Number of observations per calendar
The actual values of daily mean gas and electricity consumption are
shown in the two panels of Figure 4.5. We clearly observe seasonality in
energy consumption: the larger energy consumption during the cold winter
months, and the lower energy requirements in the warmer months. It is
impossible to detect treatment effects in the Figures due to the high vari-
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ability of consumption, and hence we need to resort to regression analysis
to formally test for the presence of treatment effects.
4.2.5 Power
We determine the statistical power of our study using the power calculation
procedure for two-way difference-in-difference models developed by Burlig
et al. (2020). The procedure developed by Burlig et al. (2020) takes into
account that the errors of these models typically are correlated over time
(Bertrand et al., 2004). The relationship between this correlation and power
is complex, as power can be increased by adding pre-treatment obervations
that are correlated with post-treatment observations; but extra pre- or post-
treatment observations provide less incremental information when they are
correlated to those in the existing data-set.
We calculate power analytically using the pc analytic STATA package.
To this end, we estimate equation (4.1) using the control group households,
and save the error terms (εit). We then model the auto-correlation in the
error term as an autoregressive process of the first order, and calculate
the Minimum Detectable Effect (MDE) given the observed variance and
autoregressive coefficient observed in the error data. To calculate the MDEs
for gas and electricity, we assume a conventional level of power (0.8) and
the regular significance level (0.05). We perform the calculations assuming a
data-set of 802 households, observed for 94 days before the start of treatment
and 264 after. We pick these numbers by plotting the number of observations
by day until treatment as defined in equation 4.1, and picking the minimum
and maximum date at which we observe at least 80 percent of households.9
We find the MDE to be 0.0732 m3 for gas, and 142.62 Wh for electricity.
4.2.6 Treatment Compliance
We randomly assigned households to treatment groups by means of a ran-
dom rejection design. After treatment group assignment, those households
assigned to treatment were contacted to schedule display installation. How-
ever, not everyone assigned to treatment complied with their treatment sta-
tus, and thus ended up owning the treatment display. We were able to
(successfully) install the display with 83 percent of the treatment group
households. The majority of non-installations (75 percent) were a direct
result of households having lost interest and not accepting the offer. For a
9We therefore ignore that we observe some households for for longer times, but also
ignore missing data within this interval.
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minority other constraints (such as technical difficulties) prevented instal-
lation. The display installations were coordinated by randomisation batch,
with the waiting time between randomisation and display installation vary-
ing across households. Half of the display installations took place within
64 days, while the some of the other half of households had to wait much
longer (see Figure 4.6). Besides the waiting time, the date of installation
varies within the sample. As can be seen in Figure 4.7, display installations
were regularly scheduled during the recruitment period (until June 2019),
with a spike in installations in the months after as then the relative large
number of households randomised at the end of this period received the
display.
Because of the endogeneity involved in the decision to accept the dis-
play, it may be that those who did receive the display differ systematically
from those who did not. This could lead the group of households that re-
ceived a display to be systematically different than the overall treatment
group. To analyze whether we find evidence for households with and with-
out display installation to differ in terms of observables, we use a probit
model to regress an indicator that equals one if the display was accepted
and installed, and zero otherwise, on household and residence characteris-
tics. We control for the display roll-out procedure by including location and
randomisation date fixed effects, as proxies for the waiting time until display
installation. Column (1) of Table 4.4 demonstrates that only two variables
are (borderline) significant. We find that single-member households have a
10 percentage point lower probability of successful display installation when
we control for other characteristics (p=0.041), and that home ownership is
associated with a similar sized decrease (p=0.125). In the second column
we analyze whether these characteristics are collinear with other variables
by dropping the non-significant observables from the equation. We now fail
to find evidence that home ownership reduces the probability of a success-
ful installation (the coefficient more than halves to -3.7 percentage point,
p=0.493) while being a single household is again associated with a decrease
of about 10 percent (p=0.024). In conclusion, the treated households seem
to only deviate in terms of the share of single households from those who did
not receive display installation. As we find no significant evidence highlight-
ing the importance of other household sizes, we find only limited evidence
for household composition to correlate with display installation, while we
do not find other important predictors of energy usage (such as residence
type, year built or highest education level as proxy for income (Brounen et
al., 2012)) to correlate with display installation status. Based on observable
characteristics, we therefore find treatment and control to be very similar.
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We only find a slightly larger share of single households in the treatment
group as compared to control, but we do not find reason to believe that
energy consumption differs between these two groups.
4.3 Empirical strategy
4.3.1 Intention to Treat Effect
We estimate the impact of the IHD technology using two steps. As a first
step, we measure the average impact of offering IHDs (without making the
distinction yet of whether a household accepted it, or not) and estimate
the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. In our setting, this effect captures the
impact of offering an IHD to a random subset of households that has declared
interest in receiving one. Equation (4.1) shows our key specification. Here,
yirt denotes the amount of energy consumed by household i on day t in
location r. Tir is a variable that equals one if household i in location r
has been assigned to the treatment group, and zero otherwise. POSTirt is a
variable that equals one for household i either from the moment onwards that
the IHD had been installed successfully (for the treatment group households)
or from the batch’s median installation moment onwards (for the households
that ended up not accepting the IHD), and zero otherwise. Tirt denotes the
dynamic treatment indicator, and is defined as Tirt = Tir × POSTirt.
We include household fixed effects (αi) as well as location-calendar day
fixed effects (γrt). Finally, Xirt is a vector of weather controls that vary over
time, and depending on the location, also within locations. The variables
included in Xirt are daily average temperature, and daily average tempera-
ture squared and global solar radiation10. The error term is denoted by εirt,
which is clustered at the 2-digit postal code (region) level if household i’s
location r was a location where we assigned households with an unsuitable
meter to control, and household level otherwise. The regression equation is
as follows:
yirt = βITTTirt + αir + γrt + δXirt + εirt. (4.1)
10All weather data included in Xirt come from the Dutch Meteorological Institute’s
website (KNMI). Each household is assigned the weather information as collected by the
nearest weather station. For four locations all households live closest to the same weather
station, creating no within location variation in these variables, while for three locations
there are multiple weather stations that account for that location’s weather data.
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Table 4.4: Correlates of receiving a display.
(1) (2)




1 person hh -0.101∗∗ -0.107∗∗
(0.0492) (0.0473)
>2 hh members -0.0112
(0.0564)
Household with children below 18 0.0458
(0.0413)
Bachelor level education or higher 0.0578
(0.0405)
Larger residence type 0.0456
(0.0424)
Home owner -0.0914+ -0.0369
(0.0595) (0.0538)
Residence built after 1984 0.0161
(0.0393)
Observations 408 408
Dependent variable is whether a household has accepted and received the
display. Only treatment households are included. Observations by house-
hold. Robust standard errors between parentheses. All coefficients are
average marginal effects estimated using a probit model. All regressions
include display roll-out fixed effects, by including a set of indicators for the
locations, and the randomisation dates. The larger residence type refers
to corner houses, semi-detached houses, and a small share of unclassified
houses (farmhouses,houseboats).
+ p < 0.125, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.3.2 Treatment Effect on the Compliers
As a second step, we analyze the impact of the display on energy usage on the
sample of households that accepted the display, and were able to actually re-
ceive the display. To this end, we estimate a Local Average Treatment Effect
(LATE), the Average Treatment Effect on the Compliers. To estimate the
LATE, we need to assume instrument exogeneity and monotonicity (Angrist
et al., 1996).11 Instrument exogeneity holds because of random treatment
assignment. The monotonicity assumption holds as well, since we did not
install any displays among control group households. Therefore, having been
assigned to treatment makes all households (weakly) more likely to end up
owning a display.
We estimate the LATE using 2SLS, and use our dynamic treatment
group indicator (Tirt) as an instrument for successful display installation.
Formally, the 2SLS model is specified as follows:
Iit = ρTit + θi + ψt + ηXit + τirt, (4.2)
yirt = βLATE Îirt + αi + γrt + δXirt + εirt. (4.3)
All the variables are defined as before. The new variable, Iit, is an
indicator that equals one if the display was accepted and installed in the
home of household i at some time before time t. We first estimate the
probability of the installation, using equation (4.2) and then include this
variable (Îirt) as a covariate in the second stage, shown in equation (4.3).
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Treatment effects on Energy Consumption: ITT esti-
mates
We start with the analysis of the Intention-To-Treat effect as defined in
equation (4.1). As a first step, we estimate the equation on the full data-set.
Table 4.5 shows the estimation results. We find treatment households to con-
sume 134.7 Wh less electricity (p=0.030) and -0.150 m3 less gas (p=0.015)
per day. These results translate into a 1.8 percent and 5.6 percent reduction
in the consumption of, respectively, electricity and gas.
11Note that, strictly speaking, also the intention-to-treat effect is a local treatment
effect, given that it is estimated on the subsample of households who selected into the
experiment.
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Control group mean 7660.794 2.665
R2 0.652 0.755
Number of hh (N) 802 802
Observations (N × T) 346321 343375
Day × location effects Y Y
Weather controls Y Y
Household Effects Y Y
Dependent variables are electricity consumption in Wh
and gas consumption in m3. Observations by household
and day. Standard errors between parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered by region if meter type assignment
was used at the location the household belongs to, and
clustered on the household level otherwise. ***, **, and




As a second step, we analyze heterogeneity of the treatment effect as
a function of outdoor temperatures, as energy consumption fluctuates by
season (see the Figure 4.5). We split the observations of a household’s
gas and electricity consumption into four quartiles based on the average
outdoor temperature for each day. We then re-estimate equation (4.1) on
each of these four subsamples. The estimated treatment effects are plotted
in Figure 4.8. For gas, we find treatment effects to be significant in three of
the four quartiles. The sample splits depict a clear pattern: the treatment
effect is observed to be larger on colder days, and smaller, and measured
with increased precision, on warmer days. For electricity, we only find the
treatment effects to be significant (p=0.039) in the second quartile consisting
of the moderately cold days. We do not find evidence that the electricity
treatment effect varies by outdoor temperature.
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(a) Gas consumption
(b) Total Electricity Consumption
Figure 4.5: Treatment and Control Energy Consumption by Calendar day
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Figure 4.6: The Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the Number of
days after randomisation until display installation.
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Figure 4.8: Intention-To-Treat Estimates by Heating Quartile
The depicted coefficient is βITT , obtained by estimating equation (4.1) on heating
quartile sample splits. The vertical line above and below the estimate depicts the
95 percent confidence interval. Q1 denotes the first quartile (the 25 percent of
observations with the lowest ambient temperature) while Q4 denotes the fourth
quartile (the 25 percent of observations with highest ambient temperature). The
regressions that are shown in Panel (a) have gas consumption in m3 as dependent
variable, while those in Panel (b) instead use electricity consumption in Wh. All
regressions include household and location × day fixed effects, and control for
weather controls. Standard errors are clustered by region if meter type assignment
was used at the location the household belongs to, and clustered on the household
level otherwise.
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4.4.2 Treatment effects on Energy Consumption: IV esti-
mates
We now determine the effects of display installation on energy consumption
for the compliers, those households that accepted the display (and for who
we were able to install the device) when assigned to treatment. Table 4.6
depicts the LATE estimates obtained using equation (4.3).
Before moving to the outcome of the equation, we analyze the relevance
of our instrument by analyzing the correlation between the instrument (Tit)
and the instrumented regressor (Iit). We rely on Kleibergen-Paap tests to
this end, as these tests are valid when regression errors are not independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) (Kleibergen & Paap, 2006). Both the
rk LM-test and the rk Wald F-test reject the null of insufficient relevance,
and thus indicate that our model does not suffer from under- nor weak-
identification.
Regarding the outcome of the regressions, we find electricity consump-
tion of those who accepted and received the display to go down by 2.2 per-
cent (p=0.035), while their gas consumption is estimated to go down by 6.9
percent (p=0.014) compared to the control group mean. The IV estimates
by outdoor temperature quartile are shown in Figure 4.10. The results are
qualitatively similar to what we reported previously. As before, the energy
savings tend to be higher when the temperature is lower, and this pattern
is most prevalent for natural gas savings.
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Table 4.6: IV Estimates of Treatment Effect on Compliers
Electricity Gas
(1) (2)
Instrumented Installation -166.5∗∗ -0.185∗∗
(78.23) (0.0744)
Control group mean 7660.794 2.665
R2 0.002 0.001
Number of hh (N) 802 802
Observations (N × T) 346321 343375
Day × location effects Y Y
Weather controls Y Y
Household Effects Y Y
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic (1 df) 8.793 8.821
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic 834.979 833.869
Dependent variables are electricity consumption in Wh and gas consumption
in m3. Observations by household and day. Standard errors between paren-
theses. Standard errors are clustered by region if meter type assignment was
used at the location the household belongs to, and clustered on the household
level otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per-
cent critical level. The Kleibergen-Paap statistics are significantly different
from zero, indicating that our specification does not suffer from under- nor
weak-identification.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.10: Treatment effect On Complier (ToC) Estimates by Heating
Quartile
The depicted coefficient is βLATE , obtained by estimating equation (4.3) on heating
quartile sample splits. Q1 denotes the first quartile (the 25 percent of observations
with the lowest ambient temperature) while Q4 denotes the fourth quartile (the
25 percent of observations with highest ambient temperature). The regressions
that are shown in Panel (a) have gas consumption in m3 as dependent variable,
while those in Panel (b) instead use electricity consumption in Wh. All regressions
include household and location × day fixed effects, and control for weather controls.
Standard errors are clustered by region if meter type assignment was used at the
location the household belongs to, and clustered on the household level otherwise.
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4.5 How households interact with the in-home dis-
play
We find that the display leads to significant energy consumption savings.
The percentage energy savings are larger for gas than for electricity con-
sumption, and the variation in treatment effect suggests that the gas savings
materialized by a lower level of space-heating consumption. We now turn
to exploring the mechanism behind these responses. Did the display help
households to make better decisions by informing households of the (rela-
tive) energy intensity of different energy uses? Or did the display change
behavior by educating households regarding the size of their gas and elec-
tricity bills? We conducted a survey to get a better understanding of these
motivations.
We sent out the survey in four different rounds. Given the staggered
treatment roll-out, this design enabled us to survey households when ex-
posed to the feedback information for an (approximately) similar period of
time. Households received the survey invitation at least ten months after
they had received notification of their treatment status. At the time of
filling in the survey, the vast majority (90%) of households who accepted
and received a display had been exposed the the display feedback for more
than half a year. Two of the four rounds took place in the non-heating
season (one in September 2019, and the other in May 2020); the other two
rounds took place within the heating season (in January 2020 and March
2020). Households were invited to participate by means of an e-mail, and
survey participation was incentivized with a lottery: twenty gift cards of
each 50 euros were raffled off. Our recruitment strategy led to a 55 percent
response rate (505 respondents), with the response rate being slightly higher
among treated households (61 percent) than among control households (48
percent).12
As we do not observe survey answers for all households, we face two
challenges when analyzing the survey data. First, the household types that
respond to the survey may differ across treatment arms when the decision
12We include the full experimental population in the survey analysis, which consists of
926 households. This sample includes the sample analyzed in the data analysis section
(N=802) plus a group of households that participated in the experiment but for who we
were unable to collect energy data (N=124). A balance test on this full set of households
(available on request) shows that all treatment-control differences are below a normalized
value of 0.25, and only 1 out of the 27 tested characteristics is significant. We therefore
do not find evidence for imbalance on this broader experimental population either. We
have coded incomplete survey attempts as nonresponses.
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to answer the survey is related to treatment group assignment. Treatment-
induced differences in response rates therefore affect the internal validity of
our estimates, as it hinders causal interpretation of our estimated treatment
effect. Second, when the decision to participate in the survey is non-random,
the survey respondents may be unrepresentative of our experimental popu-
lation. We therefore first address selection into the survey, and then discuss
our empirical approach and estimation results.
4.5.1 Selection into the survey
To analyze the decision to participate in the survey, we estimate the following
Linear Probability Model:
pi = µTi + νXi + γi + ϕi, (4.4)
where pi is an indicator variable that equals one if household i filled out
the survey, and zero otherwise. Ti denotes the treatment indicator, and Xi
denotes a vector of household characteristics collected at baseline. We ac-
count for variation in survey response due to variation in timing of survey
recruitment (and hence also in the time since display installation) by includ-
ing three sets of fixed effects in vector γi. We include indicators for every
location, randomisation date, and month at which the survey invitation was
sent. As E[pi|Ti, Xi, γi] = P [pi = 1|Ti, Xi, γi] the regression coefficients in-
dicate the change in survey response probability associated with a certain
level of a covariate. The error term is denoted by ϕi. Estimation of equation
(4.4) is by using OLS.13
Table 4.7 presents the coefficient estimates obtained using equation (4.4).
We restrict the sample to those households for which we have energy data
at baseline, and include an indicator for solar capacity at baseline. Col-
umn (1) shows that households in the treatment group have a 14 percent
higher probability to participate in the survey than households in the control
group (p=0.000). Moreover, we find that having solar panels at baseline and
two household characteristics – coming from a household where one mem-
ber has completed bachelor-level education or higher, and age (having at
least one elderly household member)– to be significant predictors of survey
participation. In column (2), we omit the predictors that were not statisti-
cally significant to see whether these three variables are collinear with the
13Note that the findings are virtually unchanged when using a probit model instead.
The added benefit of the Linear Probability Model is that we can interpret the interaction
coefficients, for which we are unable to calculate the marginal effects in the probit model.
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other characteristics. We do not find evidence for substantial collinearity,
as the coefficients are virtually unchanged. Finally, we analyze whether
these three main predictors reflect asymmetric non-response among treat-
ment households. To that end, we interact the three predictors with the
treatment indicator and add these terms to our estimation equation. We
report the estimated coefficients in column (3). We find that the elderly
household coefficient substantially loses predictive power when we allow for
different selection effects by treatment arm, as the coefficient is no longer
significant (p=0.552). The significant elderly in treatment interaction coeffi-
cient (p=0.080) suggests that the before-found higher response rates among
elderly is primarily driven by the households with elderly members in the
treatment group. For the other two characteristics we do not find evidence
for a different selection process among treatment households as compared
to control.14
We thus find evidence for non-random selection into the survey (survey
respondents tend to more often have solar panels at baseline, and come from
older households, where at least one member enjoyed bachelor education).
As age has been found to correlate with outcomes similar to our survey
questions (such as conservation practices, knowledge and attitudes (Mills &
Schleich, 2012)), and households with elderly members in treatment seem to
respond more frequently than their control group counterparts, we control
for this variable in our survey analysis to obtain causal treatment effects on
the survey respondent population. We explain our identification strategy in
more detail in the next section.
4.5.2 Survey evidence
To analyze the effect of the display on survey outcomes, we proceed as
follows. We assume that the higher response rate in the treatment arm
is not correlated with the potential outcomes of the survey questions once
we control for the household having at least one elderly member.15 Under
this assumption, we can estimate the average treatment effect on the survey
14We corroborate these results when we analyze selection on the broader population of
925 households for which we have baseline characteristics, irrespective of whether baseline
energy data was available. For this sample we do not have information on baseline own-
ership of PV, and hence we drop this variable (and its treatment interaction) from the
analysis. Only the elderly-in-treatment interaction coefficient turns insignificant in this
specification ( p = 0.220).
15In the terminology of Gerber and Green (2012), we assume that missingness (not
filling in the survey) is independent of the potential survey outcomes.
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Table 4.7: Analysis of the decision to respond to the survey invite.
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment group 0.142∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗
(0.0345) (0.0343) (0.0599)
Has solar panels before randomisation 0.0884∗∗ 0.0896∗∗ 0.127∗∗
(0.0382) (0.0371) (0.0535)
Elderly hh 0.110∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.0359
(0.0427) (0.0384) (0.0604)
1 person hh 0.0216
(0.0420)
>2 hh members -0.0172
(0.0537)
Household with children below 18 0.00540
(0.0422)
Bachelor level education or higher 0.132∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗
(0.0390) (0.0378) (0.0531)
Larger residence type 0.0468
(0.0410)
Residence own property -0.0380
(0.0625)
Residence built after 1984 -0.0101
(0.0429)
Treatment group × Elderly hh 0.136∗
(0.0776)
Treatment group × Has solar panels before randomisation -0.0707
(0.0684)
Treatment group × Bachelor level education or higher 0.00142
(0.0686)
Constant 0.419∗∗ 0.405∗∗ 0.388∗∗
(0.195) (0.188) (0.187)
N 827 827 827
R2 0.0896 0.0873 0.0918
Observations by household. Robust standard errors between parentheses. All regressions include indicators for
every location, randomisation date, and month at which the survey invitation was sent. The larger residence type
refers to corner houses, semi-detached houses, and a small share of unclassified houses (farmhouses,houseboats).
This specification includes both households included in the main analysis, and those who were not included due
to energy data constraints (leading to N=926). We exclude 99 households for which we do not know whether
solar panels were available before randomisation.
+ p < 0.125, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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respondents as follows:
yi = α+ βTi + γElderlyi + γi + εi. (4.5)
where yi denotes our outcome measure, and Elderlyi is a covariate which
equals one if household i includes an elderly member and is zero otherwise.
Ti denotes the treatment group, while εi denotes the error term. In this
case, β is the Intention-To-Treat effect on the survey respondent population,
with 92% of treatment respondents actually having a display installed. We
estimate robust standard errors in all specifications.
How energy was saved
We start with analyzing what behaviors and investments have contributed
to the realized energy savings. To this end, we asked household to self-report
whether they have undertaken nine types of daily energy saving behaviors
and 13 types of energy investments. The survey questions can be found in
Appendix 4.A.2, and draw on questions used in Starke (2014); Starke et al.
(2020). We count number of behaviors for which a household indicates that
they undertake them frequently, and the number of energy efficiency invest-
ments households report to have undertaken. We refer to these two sums as
the ‘habit score’ and ‘investment score’, respectively. Table 4.8 shows the
results. Based on the control group answers, we find that households take
quite some energy saving measures; they report to engage in, on average,
six out of the nine energy conservation behaviors, and to have made eight
out of the 13 energy saving investments. We do not find either of the two
scores to be statistically significantly higher for the treatment group- not
for the overall scores (see Table 4.8), but also not for the underlying items,
nor when using an alternative scale that involves more lenient coding of the
items (available on request).16 The positive coefficients on the habit-score
suggests, if anything, an intensification of energy habits (such as lowering
thermostat settings, taking shorter showers, and removing icing from freezer
compartments). Moreover, the coefficient on the investments scale suggests,
if anything, a decrease in the number of isolation measures taken.
16In the latter scale we broaden our definition of energy conservation behavior to also
encompass irregular habits and intentions to undertake a certain behavior and/or invest-
ment. The intentions could have explanatory power of the investment behavior in the
period after the survey was administered.
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Table 4.8: Treatment estimates on reported energy saving behavior
(1) (2)
Habit Score Investment Score




Control group mean 6.038 7.598
Observations by household. Robust standard errors between paren-
theses. The habit score and investment score are calculated as the
sum of respectively 9 or 13 items. Household receive 1 point per
item if they report to always or frequently do the behavior (habit)
or have undertaken the investment (investment). The items are
listed in Appendix 4.A.2. All specifications control for being an
elderly household, and include display roll-out and survey recruit-
ment fixed effects, by including a set of indicators for the locations,
the randomisation dates, and the month for which the survey was
sent.
+ p < 0.125, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Information effects on expected energy savings
Next, we turn to the behavioral determinants of the estimated treatment
effect. In this section we start by discussing the influence of the display on
household judgement of the energy costs. The display may have improved
the salience of the households’ energy cost and so function like a reminder.
But the device may also facilitate learning about the energy intensity of
energy uses, or the size of the energy bill. Before we analyze these factors
and turn to our results, we first describe the household interaction with the
device among those that had an display installed.17
Did households regularly interact with the display? And did they mon-
itor their real-time energy usage or did they mostly make use of the daily
budget interface (see Figure 4.3)? The survey answers suggest that the dis-
play was successful in increasing the salience of energy consumption. Most
of the respondents reported that they kept the display in a central place of
their home (such as the living room (69%), or the kitchen (16%)), and a
large majority of respondents state to have regularly looked at the display
information (more than 85%). Yet, the interaction frequency did go down
over time. In the first weeks after installation more than 80% of households
looked more than five times a week; in the week preceding the survey this
had gone down to 52%. Only 15% of households reported to have ceased
looking at the display altogether. We therefore find little evidence for dis-
use, but also found little evidence that households disliked the display or
questioned its use.18 Households mostly use the direct feedback function-
ality regularly (as reported by three out of five households), while only a
minority reports to monitor their daily budget on a regular basis (24 per-
cent). This results suggest that households mostly use the device to make
real-time energy consumption salient and are less interested in the function-
ality framing the cost feedback with regard to a daily budget – at least at
the time the survey was administered, at which most had the display for
17For this descriptive analysis we ignore 5 households that claimed to not have received
an display. We have verified these installations with project partners and have found no
evidence that our installation data were inaccurate. We therefore label these responses
as respondent mistakes. Also among households that were noted to not have received a
display we found conflicting survey answers; overall, however the amount of mistakes is
minor (3.6 percent of answers).
18Only a minority of 12 percent of households declares to not find the feedback useful,
while only 5 percent reported to not find it pleasurable. Therefore, we do not find evidence
that the display was an experience good in the terminology of Nelson (1970); a good whose
attributes are difficult to assess ex-ante. The households in our experiment were interested
in receiving the device, and the vast majority is still actively engaging with the display
over half a year post installation.
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Table 4.9: Treatment estimates on household estimated energy charges.
Electricity Gas








Treatment group -2.262 0.149+ 9.486∗∗ 0.103
(3.969) (0.094) (4.530) (0.094)
Observations 505 505 505 505
R2 0.064 0.049 0.100 0.030
Control group mean (Non standardized) 46.331 2.108 58.447 2.090
Observations by household. Robust standard errors between parentheses. All specifications control for being an elderly household, and include
display roll-out and survey recruitment fixed effects, by including a set of indicators for the locations, the randomisation dates, and the month
for which the survey was sent. The confidence question asked households how certain their were of their bill estimate on a five-point scale; with
0 indicating very uncertain, and 4 indicating very certain.
+ p < 0.125, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
over 10 months.
To investigate whether the display made households better informed en-
ergy consumers, we analyze two aspects. First, we analyze whether the dis-
play led households to be better informed of their monthly energy charges.
We ask households to estimate their (average) monthly gas and electricity
payment, and consecutively ask them to indicate how confident they are in
their estimates on a scale from 0 (not very certain) to 4 (very certain).19 Ta-
ble 4.9 shows the results. For electricity, we do not find convincing evidence
that households became more knowledgeable on their monthly charge. We
do not find evidence that the estimated amount changed (p=0.569), and only
find borderline significant (p=0.112) evidence that households became more
confident in their bill estimate. For gas, we do find evidence that house-
holds became better informed of their bill. We find significantly higher bill
estimates in the treatment group (difference of about 10 Euros, p=0.037),
closer to the bill estimate expected by their yearly gas usage.20 However,
we find no evidence for households to be more confident in their gas bill
estimate (p=0.273).
Second, we analyze whether the display enabled households to better
judge the energy intensity of various technologies and behaviors. Following
Attari et al. (2010), we ask households to evaluate the intensity of energy use
of a measures with respect to the energy use of other measures.21 Specifi-
19These questions build on the cost awareness measure by Brounen et al. (2013).
20The yearly usage among survey respondents is about 987 m3, this should correspond
to a monthly charge of about 86.55 Euros (NIBUD, 2021)
21Attari et al. (2010) elicit energy beliefs by asking households to report the (electrical)
usage of different measures in terms of light bulbs.
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Table 4.10: Treatment estimates on Use by Category Score.
(1)







Control group mean (non-standardized) 21.509
The items are listed in Appendix 4.A.2. Observations by household. Robust
standard errors between parentheses. All specifications control for being an el-
derly household, and include display roll-out and survey recruitment fixed effects,
by including a set of indicators for the locations, the randomisation dates, and
the month for which the survey was sent.
+ p < 0.125, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
cally, we asked households to rank a number of fairly broad energy consump-
tion categories (heating, lightening, cooking etc.) by their energy intensity.
We used this ranking to calculate a Energy Category Score, where every
category placed in the correct position provides households with 5 points.
For every position the answer deviated from the correct one, a point is sub-
tracted. We sum the scores over the six items, which creates an overall
score ranging from 0 to 30. The average score is about 22 points, and we
standardize the scores (by substracting the group mean, and dividing by
the standard deviation) to facilitate interpretation. The results are shown
in Table 4.10. We do not find evidence that households in the treatment
group are more knowledgeable on the energy intensity of these categories.
In fact, we find evidence of the opposite, as households in the treatment
group have a score that is 0.192 standard deviation lower than that of the
control group (p=0.035).
To better understand the cause of the lower Use by Category Score, we
re-estimate the treatment effect using the ranked position of the items as
dependent variable. Table 4.11 demonstrates that treated households on av-
erage rank heating 0.321 positions lower than control households (p=0.010),
while ranking cooking 0.358 (p=0.006) positions higher in the energy inten-
sity ranking. In other words, treatment households perceive heating to be
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Table 4.11: Treatment estimates on rank of items of the Use by Category
Score.
Use by Category Ranking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bathing and Showering Heating Cooking Lightening White goods Brown goods
Treatment group -0.020 0.321∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗ 0.110 -0.039 -0.014
(0.134) (0.125) (0.129) (0.108) (0.113) (0.133)
Observations 505 505 505 505 505 505
R2 0.089 0.114 0.065 0.064 0.044 0.057
Control group mean 3.726 1.929 3.571 5.108 2.462 4.203
Observations by household. Robust standard errors between parentheses. A value of 1 means that the household ranked the item as
most energy intensive, while a ranking of 6 means the opposite. The questions are listed in Appendix 4.A.2. All specifications control
for being an elderly household, and include display roll-out and survey recruitment fixed effects, by including a set of indicators for the
locations, the randomisation dates, and the month for which the survey was sent.
+ p < 0.125, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
less energy intensive compared to control households, and perceive cooking
to be relatively more energy intensive. If these beliefs drive energy conser-
vation, we would expect households to mainly conserve on cooking-related
energy consumption and not on heating. Yet, as we mostly find gas savings
to materialize on cold days, these learning effects do not seem to be driving
our natural gas savings results.
So far we find evidence that the experimental households enjoyed the
display device. We find disuse to be of minor concern, and document pos-
itive evaluations of the device. Moreover, we find that the display made
households better informed of the importance of the gas bill in total energy
costs. However, we do not find the device to highlight the importance of
space heating in particular. In contrast, we found evidence for households
to update energy intensity beliefs of heating and cooking in the wrong di-
rection.22 For electricity, the results are inconclusive. We did not find clear
evidence for households to become better informed of the size of the energy
bill, nor for learning about the electricity use of appliances. However, due
to the broad range of appliances driving electricity usage, we cannot exclude
the electricity energy savings to be caused by reductions on finer margins
than we studied, such as learning of the energy intensity of specific electronic
devices.
22This may relate to the location of the display within the household home, as 16 percent
of treated households reported to have positioned the device in the kitchen.
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Motivational behavioral determinants
So far, we have analyzed whether the display made households better in-
formed, and concluded that the device informed households of the impor-
tance of gas costs in total energy costs. Given that households underestimate
the gas bill, this better knowledge on gas costs helps households make the
trade-off between the benefits and costs associated with energy conserva-
tion. We therefore expect welfare to increase, as households make energy
decisions, such as investments or the changing of energy use behaviors, of
which they expect the financial benefits to cover the (financial) costs. How-
ever, an important assumption of this positive welfare effect is that other
non-monetary costs are absent. In this subsection we explore whether the
display impacted household utility through other channels. Recent behav-
ioral economic research highlights that behavioral interventions may directly
impact utility by introducing annoyance costs (Allcott & Kessler, 2019), or
a moral cost by appealing to prosocial preferences (Brandon et al., 2017).
As we found disuse to be minor and evaluations of the display to be pos-
itive, see section 4.5.2, we do not have reason to believe the annoyance costs
to be of importance. The device is easy to unplug, and thus households do
not need to be exposed to the feedback if they do not want to. However, the
influence on the pro-social motive may be of concern. To analyze the influ-
ence of the display on the motive to conserve, we analyze the effects of the
display on two types of attitudes. First, we analyze whether the interaction
with the display has affected attitudes towards energy conservation. If the
households enjoy energy conservation more because of the device, perceive
energy conservation as more profitable, or find it easier to conserve energy,
they may evaluate energy conservation more positively. Second, we analyze
whether the device affects household attitudes towards the Dutch ’energy
transition’, by asking households about the desirability of greener energy
sources and the need for governmental policy in the energy domain. Table
4.12 shows that we fail to find evidence for households attitudes towards en-
ergy conservation, or the energy transition to have changed. Digging deeper
into the survey responses, we find that households tend to favorably evaluate
the energy transition as evidenced by the high control group mean (score
4 out of 5), which reduces the scope of improvement for this variable. The
lower control group mean indicates that ceiling effects are less likely to play
a role with respect to the household attitude towards energy conservation
(control group mean 1.5 out of 5). Yet, we do not find evidence for this
attitude to have been moved by the display either.
We therefore conclude that an ‘annoyance cost’ is absent, and that the
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Control group mean (Non standardized items) 1.458 4.181
Observations by household. Robust standard errors between parentheses. Dependent variables are the mean
of the standardized survey items. The items are listed in Appendix 4.A.2. All specifications control for being
an elderly household, and include display roll-out and survey recruitment fixed effects, by including a set of
indicators for the locations, the randomisation dates, and the month for which the survey was sent.
+ p < 0.125, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
display did not change the (prosocial) motive to conserve energy. As a re-
sult, households need to become better off after receiving the display. Either
the purchasing of new energy-saving technologies, or the lowering of energy
consumption, are choices made because the household is better informed
of the energy costs or energy intensity of uses. We therefore expect con-
sumer welfare to increase. As the reduction in energy consumption decreases
carbon-dioxide externalities, we also expect public welfare to increase.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we implemented an RCT to analyze the impact of real-time
disaggregated feedback on energy consumption. The feedback was provided
by means of an energy in-home display. We recruited households interested
in receiving a display that provides insight into metered natural gas (reflect-
ing predominantly heating usage) and electricity consumption (reflecting
appliances usage) in seven locations in the Netherlands. We randomly of-
fered such a display to half of the applications; the other half did not receive
such offer. We monitored all households’ energy consumption for a minimum
of 7 months after the display (would have been) installed. After treatment
households had been exposed to the device for about half a year, we collected
survey evidence on the treatment household interaction with the device and
the degree to which treated and control households made mistakes in their
judgement of energy costs. Our results show that the energy display leads
to gas savings of 6.9 percent, and electricity savings of about 2.2 percent.
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We find evidence that households reduced gas consumption due to being
better informed of the relatively high gas expenditure. The survey answers
indicate that households frequently consulted the device for information on
their energy usage, which suggests that sustained cost salience may have
played an important role in reducing energy consumption.
Our results demonstrate that this type of feedback mitigates consumer
mistakes, which suggests that the display helps households align actual en-
ergy consumption with their privately optimal consumption. These findings
contribute to the recent literature that stresses the importance of concrete
and relevant information to optimize the effect of energy consumption feed-
back. This may involve providing feedback in a real-time manner (Darby,
2006) but also including concrete energy saving information advice (see e.g.
Abrahamse et al., 2005; Gerster & Andor, 2020; Schleich et al., 2017). Our
findings suggest that having energy monitors providing more detailed feed-
back can be effective application of these insights. As a result, these monitors
may be an effective complementary measure to policies that stimulate the
take-up of smart energy meters.
Though we find evidence that households became better informed (re-
garding gas costs), we are unable to provide causal evidence regarding the
degree to which households depend on continued interaction with the de-
vice to remain informed (salience effects), or whether they internalized the
information (learning effects). Further research designed to decouple the
impact of these channels could provide further insight in these mechanisms
that drive the changes in energy decision making. By blocking either one of
these two channels, this research can provide further insight into the need
for continued feedback exposure. See Jessoe and Rapson (2014); Lynham
et al. (2016) for two studies that apply these insights in their experimental
design.
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4.A.1 Electricity Consumption Data
Importantly, our smart meter data does not register (total) energy produc-
tion, but only energy purchased and sold to the grid. And hence we do
not know actual electricity consumption – the sum of electricity purchased
and the amount of own solar production that the household consumed. As
households do not produce gas, the amount of gas purchased coincides with
the amount of energy consumed. However, to analyze effects on electricity
consumption, we need to rely on an estimated measure of the own produc-
tion consumed to infer total electricity consumption.
We estimate the amount of electricity production consumed by analyzing
the hourly amount of electricity sold for households with solar capacity. We
assume that for every household with solar panels in our data set, there
is an hour for which the solar panels produced at maximum capacity and
consumption on top of the base load was negligible. This hour may for
instance be lunchtime during a particularly sunny day in the summer when
none of the household members were at home. We can identify this hour in
our data as the time slot at which the amount of production sold was at its
maximum level. As we assume there to be no electricity consumption on top
of the base load during this hour, we can calculate the underlying amount of
electricity production by calculating the base load and adding this amount
to the observed amount of electricity sold. We calculate the base load as
the average electricity consumption between 3:00 and 5:00 a.m. at night.
Next, we use the maximum solar capacity estimates to uncover the rate
at which a household’s solar panels transform solar radiation into electricity,
and use this so-called ’system production factor’ to infer solar production
during other time slots. Specifically, we calculate the system production
factor by dividing the maximum solar capacity estimates by the solar radi-
ation levels measured during these time slots by the weather station closest
to each household home (based on data of the Dutch Meteorological Insti-
tute’s website). We use this factor to estimate solar production during the
other hours in our data by multiplying the term with the corresponding
hourly solar radiation levels. Based on these estimates of hourly electricity
production, we infer the amount of production consumed by subtracting
the amounts of hourly electricity production sold from our production es-
timates. We find that households on average consume 31 percent of their
total electricity production, which is line with the estimates by Luthander
et al. (2015) who find the share of solar production consumed to lie between
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17 and 38 percent among German residents. More information on the cal-
culation of solar production consumed and the distribution of the base load
estimates can be found in Warrink and Vringer (2021).
4.A.2 Survey
Reported Behavior
We asked the respondents whether they engage in the following nine energy
saving habits on a 5-point scale (always, often, sometimes, never but having
the intention to do so, never and no intention). Together these items were
were aggregated into a habit score. The items of the habit score are:
1. Air-drying the laundry outside or on a line
2. Turning lighting off when nobody is in the room
3. Lowering the indoor temperature when nobody is at home
4. Cooking with a lid on the pans
5. Lowering the indoor temperature with one degree
6. Having short showers
7. Letting clothes air instead of washing them
8. Defrosting the fridge regularly
9. Disconnecting appliances instead of putting them on standby
Next, we asked the respondents whether they have invested in the fol-
lowing thirteen energy saving measures in the last 6 months on a 5-point
scale (yes, no- measure was already taken, no- but I intend to undertake
the investment, no- and have no intention to undertake the investment, I
have no idea). As some investments may not be possible for households liv-
ing in rental residences, the option ’Not applicable’ was also included. The
measures questioned for the investment score were:





4. Weather strips on doors
5. LED lightning
6. Floor isolation
7. Water saving shower
8. Weather strips on windows




13. Replacing energy inefficient appliances
Learning
For the Use by Category Score, we asked the respondents to order six ap-
plications in intensity of energy use. The six applications were, in order of
importance:23
1. Heating the dwelling (4780 kWh)
2. Showering and bathing (1230 kWh)
3. Kitchen en washing appliances - ”White goods” (1002 kWh)
4. Household electronics - ”Brown goods” (742 kWh),
5. Lightning (704 kWh) and
6. Cooking (400 kWh).
23We calculated the order of importance of the six kinds of household energy use as fol-
lows: An average household in the Netherlands used in 2015 about 1600 m2 natural gas,
used for heating the dwelling (78%), heating water (18%) and cooking (4%) (Milieucen-
traal, 2015). The average use for household appliances comes from Mileucentraal (2010).
To add up natural gas and electricity we based our calculation of the primary energy
requirement; One m3 natural gas is equivalent to about 3.6 kWh electricity because one
m3 natural gas requires 31 MJ primary energy and 1 kWh electricity requires about 8.5
MJ primary energy.
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To calculate how correct the respondents did answer this question, we gave
them 5 points for every application in the right position, 4 if they did place
the application a position too high or too low, 3 for a deviation of 2 positions,
etc.
Attitudes
To compute an index for the household attitude towards energy conserva-
tion, we asked the respondents on a 7-point Likert scale (I totally not agree
- I totally agree) about their opinion about six statements: Saving energy...
1. ... saves me money
2. ... contributes to a cleaner environment
3. ... is normal
4. ... is a hassle
5. ... is fun
6. ... costs more (money, trouble) than its yield
To determine the household attitude towards the energy transition, we
asked the respondents on a 7-point Likert scale (I totally not agree - I totally
agree) about their opinion on the energy transition. The index involves six
statements:
1. To keep the earth habitable, we can no longer use gas, coal and oil
2. Windmills are needed to combat climate change
3. Climate protection may cost money
4. It is necessary that windmills and solar panels are installed in our
landscape
5. It is a good idea that the government plans to decouple the Netherlands
from the natural gas network





In this thesis, I analyzed the impact of behavioral interventions on house-
hold behaviors aimed at improving environmental outcomes. I found that
persuasive appeal and social feedback treatments were effective in improving
organic waste sorting in both the short and longer run. A flyer including
a social model was also effective during the 9 months after the treatment
ended, but its effect seemed less persistent. In addition, real-time disaggre-
gated energy feedback was found to reduce household consumption of both
electricity and gas. Evidence for the causal impact of these interventions
was provided by means of field experiments.
In this final chapter, I take a step back and evaluate the contributions
made by this thesis. First, I discuss how the findings contribute to the
literature on the effectiveness of behavioral interventions, and especially on
their impact on habitual behaviors. Second, I analyze the relevance of the
interventions studied for environmental policy. I examine whether the results
are expected to generalize to other settings and whether the treatments are
‘scalable’ (that is, remain equally efficient from a cost-benefit perspective).
I conclude with a brief discussion of how field experiments can be used
to resolve uncertainty regarding the net benefits of policies, and how field
experiments can support evidence-based policy making.
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5.1 Contribution to literature on behavioral inter-
ventions
The findings of this thesis highlight the potential of behavioral interventions
in fostering improved resource conservation, also in the longer term. Chap-
ter 2 until 4 find persistent effects of behavioral interventions, in domains
where households are able to use technology fixes to conserve resources (en-
ergy consumption), but also in domains where long-lasting effects necessarily
imply sustained behavioral change (residential waste sorting). These results
also highlight the potential of behavioral interventions both when markets
are present, and when they are absent. There is a direct private financial
benefit to conservation in the energy domain but not in the waste sorting
domain studied. These insights therefore contribute directly to questions
raised in the recent literature about the the longer-term effects of behav-
ioral interventions, especially their ability to change habits (see Brandon et
al., 2017; Czibor et al., 2019), and their use in and outside of market settings
(Shogren & Taylor, 2008; Kesternich et al., 2017). However, I do acknowl-
edge that the interventions studied are package interventions (DellaVigna &
Linos, 2021), involving multiple behavioral instruments, and that more work
is necessary to identify which part of the interventions studied was critical
for the observed treatment effects.
Although the findings of the three field experiments indicate persistent
behavioral change, which suggests the formation of new habits, I am unable
to attribute the persistent behavioral change to a reduction in marginal costs
of engaging in the behavior due to a change in the habit stock (Becker &
Murphy, 1988). In the waste sorting experiments, there is also evidence for
other mechanisms that may explain the persistence in the treatment effect.
For instance, the persuasive appeal examined in Chapter 2 affected the mo-
tivation of households, and so increased the taste for waste sorting. And the
social learning interventions of Chapter 3 induced learning that affected be-
liefs about the benefits of waste sorting and self-efficacy. These effects may
reflect a direct influence of the information embedded in the intervention
letters. But they may also reflect indirect effects, when behavioral change
in response to the information facilitates learning-by-doing or experience
good processes (Nelson, 1970; Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995). Future work is
needed to pull apart these direct and indirect mechanisms, using clever iden-
tification strategies building on a theoretical framework (Card et al., 2011).
An interesting paper in this domain, suggesting a theoretical framework for
so-called ‘experience enhanced goods’ is Alṕızar et al. (2020).
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5.2 Implications for Dutch environmental policy
From a policy perspective, influencing habitual behaviors is attractive as
even temporary interventions may have persistent effects. In addition, be-
cause the behavior is repeated frequently, even small changes can accumulate
into sizeable effects. The findings of this thesis suggest that indeed long-term
change can be obtained using simple and cheap interventions. However, to
apply the results to other contexts, we need to assess the external validity of
the findings. Can we expect the observed changes in environmental behav-
ior to also materialize in other localities, with similar or possibly different
populations? What benefits do we expect from a larger-scale policy? And
are the average implementation costs subject to, for example, decreasing or
rather increasing returns to scale? These questions all relate to the costs and
benefits of the interventions, and highlight that there may be uncertainties
regarding how these components vary with the size of the intervention.
To analyze the policy implications of this thesis, I guide policy makers
through key considerations that may impact the net benefits of a larger scale
policy based on the checklist listed in Al-Ubaydli et al. (2021). These rec-
ommendations build on insights of the economic model by Al-Ubaydli et al.
(2019) and the conceptual framework introduced in Al-Ubaydli, List, LoRe,
and Suskind (2017); Al-Ubaydli, List, and Suskind (2017). This framework
consists of three categories. The first two categories are the representa-
tiveness of the population and situation with respect to the relevant policy
environment, the policy target population and situation. The target pop-
ulation refers to the types of individuals whose behaviors a policy aims to
change, while the target situation refers to policy features relating to the
context (such as the home of the individuals, or the market price of energy)
and implemented program (such as a letter containing certain information
sent by postal mail). For each chapter, I analyze key aspects that may im-
pact the representativeness of the studied populations and situations with
regards to the policy environment. In the discussion, I pay special atten-
tion to the possibility that market prices may be influenced when the policy
program is of a much larger scale.
The more similar the study environment is to the policy environment,
the more likely it is that the results of the policy resemble those estimated
in the study. If the policy environment differs, the policy maker needs to
be aware of the risk that results may differ. She may decide to lower un-
certainty regarding program impact by collecting additional evidence in a
setting closer resembling the policy environment. But also when the popu-
lation and situation are similar, there is a risk that the policy will not have
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any impact. This risk is especially relevant for surprising results that have
not been replicated. To help policy makers decide whether evidence is suf-
ficient to warrant policy implementation, I discuss the final category of the
Al-Ubaydli et al. (2021) framework, correct statistical inference. I analyze
how practitioners should evaluate statistical evidence to curb the risk that
public funds are spent on ineffective policies. In addition, I highlight how
experimentation could reduce the risk that a program does not induce the
same results in the policy environment. I conclude with a few final remarks
regarding the use of behavioral interventions and field experimentation for
Dutch environmental policy.
5.2.1 Key factors influencing representativeness of the pop-
ulation and situation for the residential organic waste
sorting interventions
The first domain of environmental behavior studied in this thesis is house-
hold organic waste sorting. Organic waste sorting is a behavior that could
create a substantial reduction in environmental damages. It reduces CO2
emissions involved in waste incineration, allows for green energy production
(in the form of green gas, green electricity and heat reuse), and enables the
production of compost. The latter provides valuable nutrients to be used as
natural fertilizer, and is often re-used as production input by the farming
industry (Bijleveld et al., 2021). As a result, the findings of Chapter 2 and
3 are of direct relevance for Dutch policy relating to the national ambition
to transition to a circular economy (Rijksoverheid, 2016). The policy target
is to make sure that by 2050, all primary resources consumed are used effi-
ciently and that all “waste materials” are re-used, without generating any
pollution (Rijksoverheid, 2016).1
With such high ambitions, the consumption and production patterns
of virtually all Dutch households and sectors need to change. Urban resi-
dents, and then especially those living in multi-family buildings, are of key
interest, as sorting rates are generally found to be low among this popu-
lation segment. Compared to households in single-family dwellings, these
households have a higher cost to sorting: they need to walk to drop-off fa-
cilities instead of having access to curbside collection programs, and tend to
be more space-constrained (indoors as well as outdoors) which hinders the
1In addition, there are some carbon dioxide savings associated with the processing of
sorted organic waste, which makes this topic also relevant (albeit to a smaller degree) for
climate policy, that aims for the Netherlands to be climate neutral by 2050 (Klimaatwet,
2019).
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temporary storage of sorted waste streams before they are deposited in the
collective waste sorting facilities. The experimental sites of Chapter 2 and
3 were chosen with this policy environment in mind, as they are both urban
neighbourhoods where households have access to organic waste by means of
drop-off waste facilities.
In these chapters, the persuasive appeal and social learning interventions
had the greatest impact. These treatments can yield substantial environ-
mental benefits when provided to a large group of Dutch households. When
we assume that the effects generalize to the broad population of all Dutch
residents of multi-family dwellings (that likely would make use of drop-off
waste facilities), and that the post treatment effect materializes for one year,
we expect the social feedback and persuasive appeal treatments to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by about 2300 tons of CO2 equivalents, and to
generate over 5102 ton of compost.23 The social modeling treatment is ex-
pected to reduce emissions by about 680 ton CO2 equivalents per year, and
to generate about 1513 ton compost. The CO2 reductions emerge because
of the production of green gas, electricity and heating, which can substitute
for fossil-based sources.
There is one important situational feature, however, that must be sat-
isfied. At the studied sites, all the multi-family dwelling households have
access to an organic waste sorting program (organic drop-off facilities), and
thus are able to sort organic waste, which may not be the case at other
multi-family dwelling neighborhoods. If absent, the costs of establishing
these facilities need to be incurred before the behavioral interventions are
implemented, otherwise households are not able to sort organic waste, even
if they wanted to. This investment may be worthwhile, especially when cou-
2To calculate the CO2 reductions, I multiplied the treatment effects in disposal days
with the average weight in kilogram/disposal day as estimated in Chapter 3 (1.164) and
the CO2 reduction per kilogram of organic waste (0.15) as estimated by Bijleveld et al.
(2021). To calculate the amount of compost produced, I assumed that about a third of the
waste weight is processed to compost based on the 2018 waste processing data analyzed
in RWS (2020).
3In Chapter 2, the post-treatment period was shorter than in Chapter 3. In the former
this period was five months (persuasive appeal); versus nine months in the social learning
treatments of the latter chapter. If we assume that the persuasive appeal treatment
remains at the level measured in the final two months of the monitoring period, the average
treatment effect during the 9 months post treatment is (0.0678*3+0.0998*6)/9=0.0891
disposal days. This effect is very close to the average treatment effect in the 9-month
post-intervention period of the social feedback treatment (0.0893). I therefore calculate the
environmental impact for the social feedback treatment, assuming the one year treatment
effect is 0.0893 disposal days, and conclude that the impact for the persuasive appeal is
comparable.
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pled with one of the behavioral interventions to boost waste sorting rates.
The mere introduction of the drop-off facilities led to about 370 gram of
sorted organic waste per household per week at the site of Chapter 2, while
this amount was less than half this amount (140 gram per household per
week) in Chapter 3.4 The persuasive appeal and social feedback treatments
analyzed in these two chapters increased the organic waste weight collected
by at least 28 and 74 percent respectively.5
The studied interventions in the waste sorting domain could therefore
substantially lower environmental and thus public cost. In the next section,
I discuss key factors of that may influence the degree to which the results
replicate in other settings, and the costs of the program when provided on
this larger scale.
Persuasive appeal, reciprocity and the reward
Because the experimental designs allowed for some time between the intro-
duction of organic waste facilities and the start of the interventions, Chap-
ters 2 and 3 were able to analyze treatment heterogeneity across sorting and
non-sorting households. Chapter 2 indeed finds treatment impact to differ
among those who sorted waste at the time of the intervention, and those
who did not sort. This heterogeneity in effect is mainly visible for the re-
ward and reciprocity treatments, where the treatment impact estimates for
non-sorter households were four times (or more) smaller than the estimates
on the sorter subsample. I therefore expect the average treatment effect
to decrease when these treatments are provided to a population of which
a smaller fraction of households sorts waste at baseline. The analysis of
Section 2.3.2 finds three population characteristics to correlate with base-
line organic waste sorting: being a single person household, having young
children, and age (being an elderly household). Elderly age was found to
positively correlate with organic waste sorting, while the other two charac-
teristics negatively impacted the decision to sort. Only the distance to the
waste containers had explanatory power of the situational characteristics.
Closer by organic waste facilities and further away residual waste containers
are found to increase waste sorting. Therefore in neighborhoods where fewer
4I calculated these amounts by assuming that a household disposes 1.164 kilogram
organic waste per disposal day, (based on the estimate obtained in Chapter 3), and mul-
tiplying this amount by the control group mean number of weekly disposal days in the
post-treatment period (0.320 and 0.120 days per week respectively).
5Based on the estimation results presented in Section 3.4.5 of Chapter 3, the treatment
impact in terms of disposal days presents a lower bound of the treatment impact on the
waste weight collected.
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elderly households live but single-person households and young children are
more prevalent, and where organic waste facilities are further away (while
residual containers are closer by), I expect waste sorting rates to be lower,
and thus the reward and reciprocity treatments to induce a smaller increase
in waste sorting. For the persuasive appeal, I expect the longer run impact
to be similar across populations where more or less households are sorting
their organic waste. The treatment impact became virtually identical for
sorters and non-sorters in the longer run. Another noticeable population
characteristic is that average income in the area of Chapter 2 is relatively
high at a level of about 1.5 times mean income in the Netherlands (CBS,
2015). Whether and to what extent this affects the treatments’ effectiveness
(and hence the scalability of the results) is an open question.
An other important feature of the study was that all three interventions
involved about the same budget. If there are (dis-) economies of scale, the
relative attractiveness of the three interventions may vary with scale. To
analyze how the average cost per intervention changes, I analyze the ratio
of fixed to variable cost among the treatments. The reciprocity treatment is
the one with the highest variable cost (because of the cost of the high-end
cutting board that is offered to all households), and the persuasive appeal
treatment is the one with the lowest variable cost (as the cost of design-
ing the information materials is quite high, whereas the cost of sending out
the information leaflets is relatively low). The persuasive appeal treatment
is the winner of the horse race on the basis of its (longer-run) impact in
the RCT; taking into account the fact that treating additional households
would be both more effective and less costly for the persuasive appeal treat-
ment than for the other two interventions, just reinforces the claim that this
treatment is indeed the most (cost-) effective one. I therefore conclude that
the persuasive appeal remains the most promising treatment and that its
average implementation costs are likely characterized by economies of scale.
Two situational features that receive special attention in the framework
by Al-Ubaydli et al. (2021) are spillover and general equilibrium effects.
Spillover effects are also referred to as peer effects, or network effects, and
refer to the interactions between households that may influence behavior.
I do not expect such spillovers to be there. Chapter 3 specifically studied
spillovers from households that received a behavioral intervention (social
modeling flyer) to their non-treated neighbors, and did not find evidence for
these effects to materialize. General equilibrium effects refer to the effects
of the interventions on the overall market, or market system, that may be
present in a large scale application. For instance, improved waste sorting
behavior could lower residential waste collection fees when the policy target
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population is a high enough share of municipality residents. These fees are
levied as yearly lump-sum taxes in the studied area. But general equilibrium
effects may also impact costs attributes. For instance, the larger national
production of sorted organic waste may decrease the price recycling facili-
ties, including compost producers, are willing to pay for the materials. As
this price decrease lowers the financial returns to running the organic waste
recycling schemes, this may put upward pressure on the municipality waste
collection fees and so may undo (part of) the fee decrease.
Based on these considerations, I conclude that the persuasive appeal
treatment remains the most promising one, also for policymakers. Better
waste sorting leads to environmental benefits, and may also downward push
lump-sum waste collection fees and so create financial benefits. Based on
the treatment heterogeneity analysis, I expect the treatment impact of the
persuasive appeal to be similar across settings with higher or lower baseline
organic sorting rates. In addition, the average cost may decrease with scale
when there are economies of scale in the production of the letters. However,
there are also some open questions. The downward push on waste collection
fees may be undone when the organic waste price changes. An examination
of the (national) organic waste market and the plausibility of this scenario
may provide further insight in this matter.
Social feedback and social modeling
The same population and situational features discussed for Chapter 2 may
influence the impact of the social learning interventions studied in Chap-
ter 3. Social feedback is significantly more effective among households who
had already been sorting, while the chapter is unable to formally conclude
heterogenous treatment impact to be present for social modeling. The co-
efficients signs suggest, if anything, the social modeling impact to also be
larger among households with sorting experience. This implies that espe-
cially for the social feedback treatment, the average treatment effect may
be larger in settings where sorting rates are higher at baseline. How these
sorter households are distributed across the neighborhood, does not seem
to matter much. We did not find evidence that a higher star score (that a
household obtains when it has more sorter neighbors) influenced behavior,
but only evidence that those who sorted ex-ante responded more strongly.
Policy environments where organic sorting facilities are further away, with
less elderly but more small children and more single-member households,
are expected to have a lower baseline sorting rate (see Section 2.3.2). I thus
expect the impact of social feedback to be lower in those environments. On
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the other hand, when the organic waste containers are closer by, less house-
holds have small children, while elderly and multi-member households are
more prevalent, the treatment effect may be larger than the effect observed
in Chapter 3. Another feature that may influence the representativeness of
the experimental population is average income. The average income in the
area of Chapter 3 is below the Dutch average (CBS, 2015), but it is unclear
whether this impacts treatment effectiveness.
Also the costs of the letter interventions may change in the relevant
policy environment. Especially in a larger scale setting, the program costs
involve economies of scale. When the social modeling intervention can be
sent to larger-sized neighborhoods, the fixed costs of designing and making
the flyer can be shared over a larger group of households which decreases
the average fixed cost. Also the average variable cost may decrease when
municipalities are able to print the flyers more cheaply in bulk. However,
the degree to which larger scale applications can exploit economies of scale is
likely constrained by the local nature of the treatments’ design. For instance,
it may be a key program feature that the social models studied were local
neighborhood residents. Larger-scale applications that print the same model
in flyers provided to different neighborhoods may be able to economize on
costs relating to social model recruitment, but may not reach similar results.
For the social feedback treatment, economies of scale considerations
may play a larger role. Especially when it is possible to buy the required
container-level weighing equipment in a joint purchase order, it may be pos-
sible to reduce average program cost by economizing on the fixed cost of the
equipment purchase. But the weighing infrastructure is not the only fixed
cost. To implement the treatment, it is necessary to know for each household
what the nearest organic container is (to create ‘container-clusters’), and a
data-pipeline needs to be established, where the weight data is processed
into container-cluster specific feedback. I therefore expect the fixed costs to
be substantially higher for the social feedback treatment compared to the
social modeling treatment, especially when the weighing-data infrastructure
is not already present. The variable cost is comparable to the social model-
ing treatment, as it involves the printing and distributing of the letters. For
municipalities that do not have container weighing data available, it may
be useful to explore whether existing sources of data can provide input for
alternative social learning applications. Social feedback could also be given
using the number of households disposing organic waste in given month.
However, it may be that the impact of the intervention changes when the
letters are adapted. Field experiments could be used as a tool to evaluate
the impact of these alternative sources of feedback.
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Regarding market equilibrium effects, the expected mechanisms are sim-
ilar as discussed in Section 5.2.1. There may be downward pressure on the
residential lump-sum waste collection fees when residential waste sorting
sufficiently improves, but the fees may also again increase when the (equi-
librium) price of organic waste decreases in response to a larger supply of
organic waste. Moreover, also for these treatments I do not expect spillover
effects that change the behavior of households that did not receive the letter
treatments. There may, however, be peer effects among households that
receive social feedback letters. For these households, changes in the sorting
behavior of their neighbors changes the content of the letters they receive.
We studied behavior in a setting where relatively few households sorted
waste at baseline. In policy environments where more households sort their
waste, the treatment response is expected to be higher, and this then may
feed into a more positive feedback trajectory and further encourage sorting.
Specifically, though we did not find evidence that the star content of the
first letter mattered for treatment impact, it may be that the content of
one of the three subsequent letters actually did matter. These letters pro-
vide insight in whether neighbors changed their behavior in response to the
group-level feedback, and the size of the change. The letters may (further)
encourage waste sorting when the feedback trajectory suggests a stronger
group effort in response to feedback. However, in this case the letters may
need to contain a different set of star-score rules, when the 5-star goal stud-
ied is too easily reachable in this setting and thus does not motivate better
group performance.
Based on these features, I conclude that the social feedback treatment
is expected to induce a larger increase in organic waste sorting in policy
environments with less small children, more elderly and multi-family mem-
ber households, and closer by organic waste facilities. In those areas, more
households are expected to be sorting their organic waste before treatment
and thus the treatment effect is expected to be larger. For social model-
ing, there is more uncertainty about how the results extrapolate, but the
coefficient signs suggest also here for treatment impact to be larger among
households with sorting experience. The expected benefits of the treatments
involve a reduction in environmental costs, but there may also be financial
benefits when the waste collection fees decrease in response to better resi-
dential sorting. The costs of the interventions may change at scale. I expect
the average cost of the social feedback letters to decrease when weighing
equipment can be bought in bulk. For social modeling, I expect average
cost to decrease when the letters are sent to larger sized neighborhoods.
Similar to the interventions of Chapter 2, there may be a general equilib-
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rium effect in the organic waste market. This may influence the price of
organic waste and the reduction in the municipality waste collection fee.
5.2.2 Key factors influencing representativeness of the popu-
lation and situation for the intervention targeting res-
idential energy conservation
The second type of environment-related behavior studied in this thesis is
household energy consumption. Also reductions in energy consumption
could induce substantial public benefits, as both the production of elec-
tricity and natural gas are associated with CO2 emissions. Given that the
residential sector accounts for about a fifth of national emissions (PBL,
2020), interventions that stimulate energy conservation among households
may be effective tools for Dutch climate policy (Klimaatwet, 2019; SER,
2013). Especially energy consumption feedback is seen as promising in this
regard.
To stimulate the development and uptake of energy consumption feed-
back, the Dutch government started in 2015 with the replacement of ana-
logue by smart energy meters. This smart meter roll-out was expected
to induce about 3.5 percent residential energy savings (van Gerwen et al.,
2010). However, Vringer and Dassen (2016) found the energy savings to fall
short of this objective, mostly because the uptake of consumption feedback
after meter replacement was lower than expected. To improve the savings
percentage, a covenant was made between public and private organizations
in the Dutch energy market (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2017). In
this agreement, the involved parties committed to further develop the mar-
ket for energy feedback devices and to provide improved energy consumption
feedback rapports to all Dutch households. However, a recent evaluation by
Paradies et al. (2020) found that also these rapports did not induce the
savings needed to reach the savings objective. It therefore remains a policy-
relevant question how to capitalize on the Dutch smart meter infrastructure
and increase residential energy conservation.
Chapter 4 analyzed the effect of a specific type of consumption feed-
back, namely disaggregated real-time feedback, that is provided by in-home
energy displays. The chapter finds the display to induce 2.2 percent elec-
tricity and 6.9 percent gas conservation. To provide an indication of the
environmental benefits of a larger scale policy, I calculate the amount of
CO2 emissions avoided for the 400,000 households that owned a feedback
device making use of real-time energy data in 2019 (RVO, 2020). Assuming
that these feedback devices reduced the annual consumption of electricity
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and gas with respectively 2.2 and 6.9 percent (from a baseline of 2810 KwH
electricity and 42 GJ gas (Menkveld et al., 2017)) and using CO2 intensities
of 0.49 kg/KwH and 56.4 kg/GJ respectively (CBS, 2019; Zijlema, 2019)),
these households together reduce yearly Dutch CO2 emissions by about 77
kilotonnes. Assuming a social cost of carbon of 100 Euros per ton, these
households reduce social costs by 7.7 million Euros (or about 20 Euros per
household).
Real-time disaggregated energy feedback could therefore substantially
lower social costs when provided on a larger scale. In the next section, I
discuss key factors of that may influence the degree to which the results
replicate or differ in the relevant policy environment, and the costs of the
program when provided on a larger scale.
Real-time energy consumption feedback
Chapter 4 differs from the first two chapters, in that households self-selected
into this experiment. The decision to select into the program depends on
household interest in receiving the display, and may be a function of factors
as the expected benefits of the display treatment (Roy, 1951) or participation
costs (see Al-Ubaydli et al., 2021). As a result, the expected impact of the
display treatment may be different for those who decide to sign up for the
experiment and received and installed the device, compared to those who did
not sign up. The experiment therefore identifies a local average treatment
effect (LATE, Imbens & Angrist, 1994) as opposed to the average treatment
effect (ATE) that expresses the expected savings on the general population
(e.g. the average Dutch household).
When comparing the household and home characteristics of the experi-
mental households to the Dutch average, a few differences stand out. The
experimental households live more often in apartments (and hence in smaller
homes), and are relatively more likely to be tenants.6 But the residences
are relatively similar to a representative sample in terms of year built. The
largest differences are for homes built between 1975-1984 and between 1945-
1974. These home types account for 15 and 31 percent of residences (CBS,
2020), and are over- and undersampled by about 8 and 6 percentage points
respectively, a pattern suggesting that the participants tend to live in slightly
newer homes. This suggests that the scope for energy savings may be larger
655 percent rent their residence compared to the Dutch average of 43 percent (Stuart-
Fox et al., 2019) About 29% of the households in the experiment live in semi- or fully-
detached homes, which is 15% below the national average in the Netherlands) (CBS,
2016).
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among the general population, since home owners can take more energy-
saving measures and the energy (and especially gas) bill tends to be larger
among larger and older home types. This interpretation is reinforced by
the relatively high (self-reported) frequency of energy conservation behavior
and measures taken among the experimental households, a rate that may
be lower among the general population.
The most noticeable feature, however, is that households in the exper-
iment are more likely to have solar panels (40 percent) than the average
household in the Netherlands (15 percent). Most important for the inter-
vention, this may indicate that households have higher than average energy
knowledge, because they are already engaged with their energy consumption
(and/or production). The high energy knowledge score measured in the sur-
vey may therefore be lower for the average Dutch household. But there may
also be differences in other factors that influence the ability of households
to become informed by the display (‘treatment moderators’). For instance,
solar panels may lead to higher household interest in the energy feedback,
when households enjoy being notified that their solar panels are produc-
ing electricity. The experimental households may also have more positive
attitudes towards energy conservation and energy policy than a representa-
tive sample. This may lead to both higher household interest in receiving
feedback, and an extra motive to conserve energy due to its impact on the
environment. On the other hand, the price incentive to conserve energy may
be lower among the experimental households than for the average household.
Households with solar panels earn income from their solar panels, which re-
duces their energy bill and when production is large enough, can even result
in them not needing to pay anything for their electricity consumption.
If a larger scale policy embeds a similar opt-in subscription feature, I
expect the experimental households to be representative of the target pop-
ulation in terms of participation costs. I expect the larger scale program to
also only select households with sufficient interest in the display to actively
sign-up. The study locations where we recruited households are more or
less representative of the Netherlands, and therefore I expect this program
to recruit households that are similar in terms of pre-existing energy knowl-
edge, pro-environmental attitudes and prevalence of solar panels (and thus
price incentive to conserve energy). If in addition, the displays are installed
by a trained volunteer similar to the experiment, I would expect a similar
fraction of about one fifth to drop out, and average energy savings to be
similar to the savings measured in the experiment. However, the recruited
sample may have a larger scope for energy savings when the policy program
is able to recruit more home owners, and more residents of larger and older
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home types. These households are expected to have a larger gas bill and
may more severely underestimate their gas bill. When a larger scale policy
successfully recruits households that were less prevalent in the experiment,
and indeed the display corrects larger mistakes, average energy savings may
increase. I expect the program to foster positive net public benefits, given
that the yearly energy savings detected in Chapter 4 translate to financial
savings of about 85 Euros, while the device costed about 100 Euros per
piece. This calculation ignores the extra public benefits that arise from the
reduction in carbondioxide emissions. In addition, the average display costs
can likely be lowered in a larger bulk order.
When a larger scale policy changes the recruitment feature of the pro-
gram, the target population may deviate from the experimental population
studied in Chapter 4. This creates uncertainty regarding the expected ben-
efits of the program, as the experimental results may not be generalizable.
For instance, consumer mistakes may be more prevalent in a representative
sample of households, compared to the households that participated in the
study who may already have been engaged with their energy consumption
before the program started. The size of the mistake, as measured by the
gap between the actual and the estimated gas bill, may also be larger. This
could foster a stronger energy conservation response when households be-
come better informed of the actual size of their energy bill. The households
may also have taken less energy saving measures before participating in the
program, and so have more options to conserve energy available.
Although the scope for energy savings may be larger among this popu-
lation, this does not mean that this potential is realized. To become better
informed in response to consumption feedback, households do need to in-
stall and use the display. The interest to do so may be lower among the
general population. For instance, in the United Kingdom, displays were
offered to households at smart meter installation, a method that substan-
tially lowers participation cost. In a rapport evaluating the progress of this
roll-out, DECC (2013, 2014) found that 15 percent of households had a dis-
play device. A substantial share (about 40 percent) of households who did
not receive a device yet indicated to also not be interested in receiving one.
Among the households that did already receive a display, one out of five
displays was never installed, and another one was installed, but never used.
New experiments can provide insight in how program attributes relating
to display distribution impact the expected energy savings of the program.
By testing the impact of the way by which households are recruited, or the
way by which the displays are distributed, policy makers obtain valuable
information about the expected benefits (energy savings) and costs that may
222
5.2. IMPLICATIONS FOR DUTCH ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
guide policy design. For example, it may be optimal to distribute the device
to the general population, when the economies of scale in the purchasing
of displays are substantial and average energy savings on the representative
population are sufficiently large. An alternative strategy could be to only
provide the displays to households who actively declare to be interested, or
who value the display enough to exert the effort to sign up for the program.
The latter strategy may prevent public funds being wasted on devices that
may never be used and may be desirable when the average energy savings
decrease too much in the first program. But also variations in recruitment
methods may merit further study. Different recruitment methods may target
a different populations, and some methods may convince more households
to participate than others. There may also be practical reasons to study
changes in some of the program attributes. For instance, the policy program
may want to send the displays to households by mail as opposed to installing
them. The supply of trained volunteer labor may be insufficient to cover a
large-scale implementation, and educated labor may be too costly.
The type of display used in the program is another important program
feature. Chapter 4 analyzed one type of energy display, a simple monitor
that made the current consumption of gas and electricity salient. When
the policy program distributes a different type of display, results may differ.
Unfortunately, there is little randomized evidence on the impact of other
energy displays in the Dutch context.7 I therefore recommend to evaluate
whether alternative displays also make the importance of heating salient,
to analyze whether these alternative devices can also be expected to induce
savings on space heating. If the functionality of other devices differs too
much from the display studied, it may be decided to conduct a separate
experimental evaluation of their impact.
Finally, a policy maker may want to consider general equilibrium effects
to evaluate the impact of the program at scale. For instance, the scaled-up
program may influence energy prices if the program is sufficiently large. It
is difficult to predict whether this would be the case as many determinants
influence these prices. If the reduction in energy usage does influence energy
prices, however, we would expect the prices to decrease, which may increase
demand for energy in either the short or longer run. These effects would
therefore dampen the positive environmental impact calculated before. But
there may also be positive general equilibrium effects. Chapter 4 found that
7As energy taxes are relatively high in the Netherlands, the price motive to conserve
is higher in the Dutch context than, for instance, the U.S. context. But there may also
be cultural differences across countries.
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the display especially induced energy savings during the coldest days. Since
those days are the days of peak energy demand in the Netherlands (Ministry
of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands, 2016), these results demonstrate
that consumption feedback could be an effective tool to reduce strain on
the energy grid during periods of high demand. Moreover, when households
become better informed of the size of their gas bill, this may impact the
housing market (Brounen et al., 2013). Consumer demand may reduce for
homes that carry a larger gas bill, such as poorly insulated homes. When
better insulated homes are more in demand, this may provide an extra
financial incentive for households to insulate their homes and reduce their
energy bill. The better insulated homes reduce carbon dioxide emissions and
so further increase the public benefits of the display intervention. However,
further research is necessary to analyze whether indeed this spillover on
housing demand occurs.
In conclusion, a large scale policy that stimulates the take-up of displays
can induce substantial benefits at scale. These benefits involve both pri-
vate financial benefits from a lower energy bill and public benefits due to
the accompanying reduction in carbondioxide emissions. When the displays
are provided using an opt-in program such as the one studied, I expect the
energy savings to be similar to those estimated in the experiment. As there
likely are economies of scale in the purchasing of displays, I expect the pri-
vate financial benefits to cover the financial cost and thus positive public
net benefits. Yet, if the method of recruitment of the program is changed to
recruit other types of households, the energy saving results may not be gen-
eralizable. Specifically, I expect average energy savings to increase when a
larger-scale program is better able to recruit interested households that have
more opportunities to conserve energy (e.g. owner occupants, residents of
larger and older homes). However, average savings may also decrease when
the display is provided to less interested households. Further experimen-
tal research may provide insight into the program attributes that maximize
the average net public benefit of the display intervention. Moreover, this
research may provide insight into whether the average energy savings cover
the (likely lower) average costs of these programs. Finally, a larger scale
roll-out of energy displays may lead to both positive and negative general
equilibrium effects. It may reduce peak-demand of energy during winter
time which reduces strain on the energy grid, but may also decrease energy
prices which may undo part of the energy consumption decrease. In addi-
tion, there may be spillovers on the housing market. Better informed energy
consumers may also be better informed consumers in the housing market,
increasing housing demand for well-insulated homes.
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5.2.3 Properly acknowledging and resolving uncertainty in
evidence-based policy making
Correct statistical inference is the final aspect relevant for evaluating the
expected impact of the programs studied at scale (Al-Ubaydli et al., 2021).
Even if the experimental population and situation are representative of the
policy environment, results may not replicate in other settings. Correct
inference starts with the awareness that a single study is not conclusive
evidence of program impact. Even the positive result of a well-powered
study may be a false-positive; and thus may mask a true zero effect. But
there are also factors that increase the probability that study findings do
not replicate. This probability increases when the p-value in the study was
incorrectly reported, for instance when the authors do not correct for mul-
tiple hypotheses testing (List et al., 2019). The study findings may also not
be representative of true program impact when the study is underpowered,
or the literature suffers from publication bias. Studies that are underpow-
ered may not be able to detect program impact, but may also find extreme
(too large) effects (Gelman & Carlin, 2014). Publication bias can lead the
findings of a literature to not be representative of the true (distribution of)
treatment effects as non-significant results do not get published (Young et
al., 2008). Al-Ubaydli et al. (2021) advises policy makers to ignore evidence
from low-powered studies, to not take p-values at face value and to not rely
on a single piece of evidence.
Instead, they recommend policy makers to adopt a critical reading of
available statistical evidence, and evaluate a metric such as the post-study
probability (PSP) that a result is true (Maniadis et al., 2014). This metric
takes the prior, the expected probability that a study result is true given the
pre-study evidence, and updates this prior consistent with the strength of
the provided result. The evaluation of whether evidence is actionable should
thus be taken based on this updated value (the PSP), and not the p-value
mentioned in the particular study. Based on this evidence, the policy maker
can decide whether the evidence is convincing enough to warrant program
implementation in the targeted policy environment, or whether additional
statistical evidence should be collected.
The treatment effects estimated in Chapter 2 until 4 are in line with
the pre-existing literature in both the waste sorting and energy domain.
Behavioral interventions in the domain of residential waste sorting tend to
increase sorting by a few percentage points (Nomura et al., 2011; Milford et
al., 2015; Linder et al., 2018), while display interventions tend to generate
savings in the order of 6-10 percent (e.g. Schultz et al., 2015; Faruqui et al.,
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2010; Ehrhardt-martinez et al., 2010). I therefore argue that the prior, the
pre-study probability that the result of one of these chapters is true, should
be in favor of the result being true. However, the exact choice of prior
should be decided upon by the policy maker as it relates to the relevant
policy environment at stake. If the policy maker is not too concerned that
publication bias may be present in the pre-existing literature, she may set
the prior equal to the fraction of pre-existing work that finds the same result.
Based on the studies listed, this leads to a value close to one. Alternatively,
she may set the prior more conservatively at a value closer to 0.5 when
she deems the literature to not be well-developed enough. A lower prior
may also reflect uncertainty because of differences between the populations
and situations studied in the literature and the relevant policy environment.
At a prior of 0.5, and probability of type I and II error of 0.05 and 0.2
respectively (given that the evidence of Chapter 2 until 4 had 80% power and
the effect was significant at 5 percent significance), the PSP is 0.94, which
means that the probability that the found evidence is true is 94 percent.8
If the policy maker deems this level of confidence in the result sufficient,
she may implement the larger scale policy. If she requires a higher level
of confidence, she may decide to collect additional evidence. Al-Ubaydli et
al. (2021) recommend policy action to be taken when the PSP is at least
0.95 and argue for at least 3 or 4 independent replications of a result before
scaling up an intervention.
Being mindful that representativeness of the population, situation and
statistical inference, influence program impact allows the policy maker to
make an informed evaluation of available evidence. When there is too little
proof, she may decide to collect additional statistical evidence by means of
additional field experiments before a national roll-out. These replications
may also be fitted to uncover specific features of the cost-benefit trade-
off. For instance, a new experiment may specifically compare the impact of
two programs that vary in the manner by which they distribute displays to
Dutch households. In addition, larger-scale experimentation could specifi-
cally analyze whether interventions are equally effective, and cost-effective,
at scale (Muralidharan & Niehaus, 2017). Larger scale experimentation can
also allow for a formal analysis of market equilibrium effects. For instance,
by randomly assigning municipalities to treatment (e.g. the social feedback
letters) or control (no intervention) it is possible to analyze the impact of
the intervention on the municipal waste collection fees.
8PSP = (1−β)π
(1−β)π+α(1−π) , where π denotes the prior, (1−β) the power of the study, and
α the significance level of the result.
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5.2.4 Concluding remarks regarding policy lessons
In this thesis, I have analyzed several behavioral interventions that may be
attractive for policy to improve environmental outcomes. The interventions
had lasting impact in different domains (energy use and waste sorting) and
on different types of Dutch households (with incomes below and above the
Dutch average).9 Because of their relatively low costs and relatively easy
political implementability, these interventions may be low-hanging fruit and
attractive policy tools to complement existing environmental policy.
The evidence is promising, but it is clear that the interventions studied
are by no means sufficient to reach the circular economy and green house gas
emissions targets for the year 2050 in the Netherlands (Rijksoverheid, 2016;
Klimaatwet, 2019). Therefore, questions on how to further improve the en-
vironmental impact of these interventions remain relevant. More households
need to receive and use the displays in order to facilitate larger national en-
ergy savings, but it is uncertain how to optimally distribute the display de-
vices to maximize program impact. Also in the waste sorting experiments,
substantial scope for improvement was left untapped. A large number of
households never sorted organic waste, also not after the interventions were
provided. More research is needed to understand whether a lack of interest
in either waste sorting or consumption feedback is rational, or whether there
are mistakes in judgement that prevent households to participate. Research
into these hidden barriers, and how to overcome them, can provide valuable
insights that may feed into more effective versions of the interventions stud-
ied and the programs by which they are implemented. The research avenue
discussed in Section 5.1 may be promising in this respect, as these barri-
ers may relate to the exposure-enhanced mechanism at play. For instance,
households may underestimate the influence of habit formation, or neglect to
incorporate learning-by-doing or experience good processes in their decision
making.
Field experiments can be used to analyze these questions. Coupled with
insights from the literature on scaling, these experiments can be designed to
uncover relevant information for the particular policy question at stake. The
evidence they provide lowers uncertainty regarding the expected net bene-
fits of policies, which reduces the risk that ineffective policies are adopted.
Field experiments can therefore play an important role in the movement
9Average income in the area of Chapter 2 is about 1.5 times mean income in the
Netherlands, while the average income of the area of Chapter 3 is below the Dutch average
(CBS, 2015). In both areas we found behavioral treatments to induce persistent behavioral
change.
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to evidence-based policy making (Al-Ubaydli et al., 2021).10 In addition,
field experimental evidence can speed up political processes by being more
convincing compared to other (especially non-causal) empirical methods.
But there are also costs involved. Generating field experimental evidence
takes time, as data needs to be collected, and project partners may need to
be found to implement a desired experiment. The question of whether to
implement a field experiment therefore ultimately revolves around the pub-
lic benefits of the stronger empirical evidence, and whether these benefits
exceed the public costs of collecting this evidence.
10In this paradigm, policies are based on evidence (Davies, 2012), and scarce public
funds are only spent on what actually works, in a way that ideally maximizes the public
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Kesternich, M., Reif, C., & Rübbelke, D. (2017, July). Recent trends
in behavioral environmental economics. Environmental and Resource
Economics, 67 (3), 403–411.
Klimaatwet. (2019). Klimaatwet. Retrieved 2021-03-23, from https://
wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0042394/2020-01-01
Linder, N., Lindahl, T., & Borgström, S. (2018). Using behavioural insights
to promote food waste recycling in urban households - Evidence from
230
5.3. REFERENCES
a longitudinal field experiment. Frontiers in Psychology , 9 (352), 1–
13.
List, J. A., Shaikh, A. M., & Xu, Y. (2019). Multiple hypothesis testing in
experimental economics. Experimental Economics, 22 (4), 773–793.
Maniadis, Z., Tufano, F., & List, J. A. (2014). One swallow doesn’t make
a summer: New evidence on anchoring effects. American Economic
Review , 104 (1), 277–290.
Menkveld, M., Rietkerk, M., Mastop, J., Tigchelaar, C., & Straver, K.
(2017). Besparingseffecten van slimme meters met feedbacksystemen
en slimme thermostaten (ECN Notitie No. 17-017).
Milford, A. B., Øvrum, A., & Helgesen, H. (2015). Nudges to increase
recycling and reduce waste (Discussion Paper No. 2015–01). NILF
Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute.
Ministerie van Economische Zaken. (2017). Convenant 10 PJ energiebespar-
ing gebouwde omgeving (Tech. Rep.).
Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands. (2016). Energy report:
Transition to sustainable energy (Tech. Rep.). Ministry of Economic
Affairs.
Muralidharan, K., & Niehaus, P. (2017). Experimentation at scale. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 31 (4), 103–124.
Nelson, P. (1970). Information and consumer behavior. Journal of Political
Economy , 78 (2), 311–329.
Nomura, H., John, P. C., & Cotterill, S. (2011). The use of feedback to
enhance environmental outcomes: a randomised controlled trial of a
food waste scheme. Local Environment , 16 (7), 637–653.
Paradies, G., Dreijerink, L., & Menkveld, M. (2020). Effectmeting verbeterd
verbruiks- en kosten overzicht (TNO-rapport No. 2020 P10380). TNO.
PBL. (2020). Klimaat- en energieverkenning 2020 (Tech. Rep.). Den Haag:
Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving.
Rijksoverheid. (2016). Nederland circulair in 2050 (Tech. Rep.).
Roy, A. (1951). Some thoughts on the distribution of earnings. Oxford
Economic Papers, 3 (2), 135–146.
RVO. (2020). Monitoringrapportage 2019 convenant Gebouwde Omgeving
(Tech. Rep.). Rijksdienst voor ondernemend Nederland.
RWS. (2020). Afvalverwerking in Nederland: gegevens 2018 (Tech. Rep.).
Utrecht: Rijkswaterstaat (RWS).
Schultz, P. W., Estrada, M., Schmitt, J., Sokoloski, R., & Silva-Send, N.
(2015). Using in-home displays to provide smart meter feedback about
household electricity consumption: A randomized control trial com-
paring kilowatts, cost, and social norms. Energy , 90 , 351–358.
231
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
SER. (2013). Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei (Tech. Rep.).
Shogren, J. F., & Taylor, L. O. (2008). On behavioral-environmental eco-
nomics. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy , 2 (1), 26–
44.
Stuart-Fox, M., Blijie, B., Ligthart, D., Faessen, W., & Kleinepier, T. (2019).
De woningmarkt en leefbaarheid in krimpgebieden. Uitkomsten van het
WoonOnderzoek Nederland (WoON) 2018 en CBS data (Tech. Rep.).
Delft: ABF Research.
van Gerwen, R., Koenis, F., Schrijner, M., & Widdershoven, G. (2010).
Intelligente meters in Nederland: Herziene financiële analyse en ad-
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This dissertation studies the impact of behavioral interventions on waste sorting and 
energy conservation, two domains where sustained environmental conservation 
has the potential to substantially reduce social costs. The interventions are 
evaluated by means of field experiments. The first essay investigates the relative 
impact of behavioral interventions versus neoclassical interventions. It finds that 
interventions that draw on extrinsic motivations have an immediate and sizable 
effect on waste sorting behavior, but also that the average treatment effects 
attenuate steeply over time. In contrast, the essay finds equally sizeable yet long-
lasting effects of a treatment designed to increase households’ intrinsic motivation 
to sort waste. The second essay analyzes the effect of social learning interventions. 
It considers two interventions, one aimed at leveraging social learning via role 
models and a second one via feedback on the prevalence of organic waste sorting 
in the household’s direct vicinity. The essay finds that both interventions increase 
waste sorting in the short run, but only the social feedback’s impact is long-lasting. 
The third essay analyzes residential energy consumption, and how real-time 
disaggregated consumption feedback corrects consumer mistakes in this domain. 
The essay finds this feedback, provided by way of in-home displays, to reduce 
household energy consumption. The savings are largest on gas consumption, and 
the evidence suggests the effect to reflect reductions in space heating. The three 
essays are preceded by an introductory chapter that introduces the topic of study 
and the field experimental methodology. The dissertation closes with a concluding 
chapter that reviews its contribution to the literature on behavioral interventions 
and its implications for Dutch environmental policy.
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